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Abstract 
 
Experience with a stimulus changes a person forever... if not forever, at least for 17 
years (Mitchell, 2006). Any process engaged by the brain leaves a trace behind that affects 
similar future processing. This form of plasticity aims to optimize the brain toward more 
efficient interaction with stimuli that have been encountered before, adapting the 
individual to the environment. Similar adaptation manifests itself as faster and more 
accurate performance to repeated stimuli.  
Repetition priming is the term used in the literature to describe this kind of 
facilitation. A crucial open question on repetition priming is whether experience makes 
stimulus processing more efficient or facilitates the selection of an appropriate response to 
a stimulus. In the literature these two alternatives are theorised respectively by facilitation 
in perceptual and conceptual networks and by rapid response learning (Chapter 1). In the 
work presented here, processing/response accounts are tested in person recognition.  
This thesis presents evidence that repetition priming in person recognition is mostly 
produced by facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, but, when stimuli are 
repeated three or more times, additional facilitation due to rapid response learning occurs 
as well (Chapters 2 - 3 - 4). Orthogonal tasks were used to distinguish the contribution of 
perceptual/conceptual facilitation and rapid response learning in behavioural facilitation 
(Chapter 5). Furthermore, LRPs/ERPs shed light on the neural processes that generate 
rapid response learning in person recognition: the response accessed from rapid response 
learning interacts with the response obtained from stimulus re-processing and determines 
benefits when congruent and costs when incongruent (Chapter 6). 
These results show that rapid response learning and facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks refer to two complementary types of memory that can lead to 
vii 
 
repetition priming. This thesis proposes a framework in which facilitation in perceptual 
and conceptual networks is supplemented, under specific circumstances, by rapid response 
learning (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
 
In the model of Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) human memory is divided into three 
separate systems according to capacity and storage duration: sensory registry, short-term 
memory and long-term memory. Sensory registry stores a large amount of perceptual 
information for less than a second (Sperling, 1960). Short-term memory, nowadays called 
working memory (Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), stores around 5-10 bits of 
information (Miller, 1956) for as long as rehearsal processes are consciously employed 
(Craik & Watkins, 1973), otherwise its duration is on the order of few seconds. Long-term 
memory is thought to have unlimited capacity and information seems to be stored 
permanently.  
Human long-term memory is not a unitary cognitive system but the sum of different 
memory systems (Squire & Zola, 1996; Tulving, 1972). The clearest evidence in support 
of multiple memory systems comes from the study of amnesia - a deficit that affects some 
types of memory but not others. The most notable example of the componential nature of 
memory comes from patient HM, who, despite suffering from profound amnesia, showed 
spared capacity to learn some memory tasks (Corkin, 2002). Patients with amnesia present 
deficits in the creation of new memories about facts or events, but they are able to learn, 
for instance, new motor skills (Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968) or artificial grammars 
(Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992); moreover, their performance can be influenced by 
past events (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1974), regardless of the fact that the event is not 
remembered (Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984). According to similar neuropsychological 
dissociations and functional imaging studies, Squire & Zola (1996) proposed a taxonomy 
of long-term memory in which different memory systems are divided into two classes: 
declarative and non-declarative memories. Declarative memories are memories associated 
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with feelings of awareness and depend on medial temporal lobe/diencephalon structures 
that are generally affected in amnesia. Declarative memories are memories for events 
(episodic memory) and facts (semantic memory). On the other hand, non-declarative 
memories are spared in amnesia, because they do not involve medial temporal 
lobe/diencephalon structures, and they do not require awareness. Memories numbered 
among the non-declarative class are procedural memory, priming, conditioning and non-
associative learning.  
 
1.1 Repetition priming 
 
Repetition priming is the most prominent example of nondeclarative memory; it is 
mainly demonstrated by faster and more accurate responses when information is processed 
repeatedly (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). 
Repetition priming, like all forms of nondeclarative memory, is not thought to rely on 
medial temporal lobe (Squire & Zola, 1996), since patients suffering from amnesia caused 
by medial temporal lobe damages usually demonstrate normal priming. For example, 
amnesic patients present a normal propensity in completing a three-letter word stem (like 
PER _ _ _) with a previously read word (PERIOD) than a different word (PERSON) when 
asked to use the first word that comes into their mind, but showed a deficit when asked to 
use the word that was previously read. This result indicates that repetition priming, unlike 
episodic memory, does not rely on the functioning of the medial temporal lobe (Graf et al., 
1984). 
Repetition priming is considered facilitation in performance as a consequence of a 
previous processing and so can be observed in a range of tasks and for different types of 
stimuli. For instance, having read a name before increases the possibility of perceiving the 
name in difficult threshold conditions (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Salasoo, Shiffrin, & 
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Feustel, 1985), of using that name again to complete a three-letter word stem (Graf et al., 
1984) or fragmented words (Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992). Importantly, 
repetition priming is not restricted to names. Having seen a picture of an object (or a face), 
for instance, facilitates processing the same object, or similar information, when it is 
presented again (Warren & Morton, 1982), even for extremely short presentation times or 
as a fragmented picture (for a review see Schacter, Delaney, & Merikle, 1990). In addition, 
repetition priming is not restricted to specific stimuli or stimulus domains but generalizes 
across different pictures of the same stimulus (Warren & Morton, 1982) and transfers from 
one domain to another: for example the written name of a celebrity primes the facial 
picture of the celebrity if the task requires semantic level decision, e.g. nationality (Burton, 
Kelly, & Bruce, 1998). Moreover, repetition priming has been shown in different sensory 
modalities: visual, acoustic (Schacter & Church, 1992), and olfactory (Olsson, 1999); and 
it generalizes between modalities: for instance an auditory stimulus primes a visual 
stimulus, and vice versa (Bassili, Smith, & MacLeod, 1989).  
The main signatures of repetition priming are faster response times and greater 
accuracy in responding to stimuli that were presented before (primed) compared with 
stimuli presented for the first time (unprimed). Commonly used designs to investigate 
repetition priming generally consist of at least two phases: a study phase* and a test phase. 
In study phases stimuli are primed by presenting them to the participant; at test, stimuli are 
contrasted according to their priming history: stimuli that are presented for the first time at 
test are considered to be in the baseline condition, against which stimuli presented before 
at study are contrasted to determine facilitation that can be attributed to the different 
priming history. 
* the use of the term study phase could be misleading because the term study implies 
actively encoding the materials in memory, however in priming experiments participants are not 
made aware that the studied materials will be presented again to prevent that the participants do not 
employ declarative forms of memory 
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In some cases repetition of a stimulus can result in impaired performance where 
response times are longer and accuracy lower for primed than unprimed stimuli (for a 
review see Mayr & Buchner, 2007). Costs are generally obtained for stimuli that are 
unattended at study in negative priming paradigms (Tipper, 1985) or when a task is 
repeatedly changed in task-switching paradigms (Allport & Wylie, 1999).   
Repetition priming is a one-shot long-lived phenomenon. Facilitation is reliable after 
a single presentation and benefits marginally by successive presentations (Rugg et al., 
1998); and it has been shown to last for months or even years (Cave, 1997; Mitchell, 
2006). The longevity of repetition priming distinguishes this type of learning from other 
forms of priming that are short-lived: semantic priming (Bruce & Valentine, 1986) and self 
priming (Calder, 1996), for instance, do not survive delays longer than a few seconds.  
As introduced earlier in the present chapter, repetition priming is not affected by 
amnesia. Other forms of priming, like priming for new associations, are abolished in 
amnesia (Shimamura & Squire, 1987). On the other hand, deficits in repetition priming are 
generally associated to damage to or neurodegeneration of the neocortex: deficits in 
perceptual repetition priming have been associated with occipital lobe damage (Gabrieli, 
Fleischman, Keane, Reminger, & Morrell, 1995; Keane, Gabrieli, Mapstone, Johnson, & 
Corkin, 1995), whereas temporal or frontal lobe damage often produces a deficit in 
conceptual repetition priming, for example in Alzheimer patients (Fleischman, Gabrieli, 
Reminger, Vaidya, & Bennett, 1998; Keane, Gabrieli, Fennema, Growdon, & Corkin, 
1991). 
Although separation between declarative and non-declarative memories is quite clear 
in amnesia, it is hard to draw a demarcation line between memory effects in normal 
subjects, because all the memory systems are constantly active and contribute to general 
performance. This problem is know in the literature as “memory contamination” and it is 
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particularly pervasive in priming experiments (for a review see Butler & Berry, 2001). 
Memory contamination may occur if participants incidentally encode the stimuli presented 
in the study phase in such a way that priming observed in the test phase may be biased by 
engagement of episodic memory (Jacoby, 1991). Many experimental approaches have 
been suggested to control for episodic memory contamination in priming studies: Among 
these approaches analysis of facilitation for stimuli in the absence of awareness has given 
the most convincing results (Rugg et al., 1998). In fact, awareness of previous encounter 
with a stimulus differentiates declarative from non-declarative memories. Interestingly, 
awareness does not interact with behavioural priming (Bowers & Schacter, 1990) and so 
awareness is rarely assessed in studies examining repetition priming. 
 
Theories of repetition priming can be divided into two main categories: structural 
and episodic. Structural models assume that repetition priming results from structural 
modification within the representation system of a stimulus caused by previous encounter 
with the stimulus. Episodic models interpret repetition priming as the effect of retrieval 
and utilization of a memory trace created for each encounter with the stimulus. Facilitation 
in perceptual and conceptual networks (Burton, 1998) is the dominant structural model, 
while rapid response learning (Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2004), and its 
theoretical precursor instance theory (Logan, 1990), is an episodic model that has recently 
attracted a lot of attention. The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework (Horner & 
Henson, 2009) is a recent hybrid structural/episodic model. These three models are briefly 
described below; strengths and limits are highlighted according to empirical evidence.  
  
1.1.1 Structural model: Facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks  
 
Currently dominating theoretical views on memory posit that repetition priming 
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reflects facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks (Bruce & Young, 1986, 2012; 
Burton, 1998; Humphreys, Lamote, & Lloyd-Jones, 1995; Moscovitch, 1992; Richardson-
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Squire, 2004; Tulving & Schacter, 
1990). Facilitation results from the strengthening of links between hierarchical processing 
stages for stimulus perception, recognition, identification and categorization (Burton, 
1998; Burton, Bruce, & Johnston, 1990). These stages are summarized, for example, in the 
influential models for recognition and naming of objects, faces and words (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Warren & Morton, 1982). Three main stores of knowledge about familiar 
stimuli can be sequentially accessed, according to task requirements, after a stimulus has 
been encoded and perceived. The first stores of the three models are pools of recognition 
units containing representations of known objects, familiar faces and possible words. The 
second stores are pools of identity-specific semantic representations containing semantic 
knowledge about objects, people (like nationality or occupation) or names. The last stores 
are pools of name codes, permitting naming the stimulus. Importantly, although the 
differences in how stimuli in the three domains are represented in the recognition units 
(pictogens for objects or logogen for words (Morton, 1979)), the functional organization of 
the recognition units is similar in the three domains (Bruce & Humphreys, 1994). A 
prediction that follows the hierarchical organization (Young, Hellawell, & De Haan, 1988) 
of the stores is that accessing semantic information occurs only after perceptual processing 
of the stimulus, and, similarly, naming occurs only after perceptual and semantic 
processing of the stimulus (except for words).  
Bruce and Young’s (1986) model for person recognition was later revised by Burton 
et al. (1990). After a stimulus has been structurally encoded and perceived as a face 
(Structural Encoding level), the associated FRU (Face Recognition Unit) is accessed. This 
unit communicates with the SIUs (Semantic Information Units) though PIN (Person 
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Identity Node). PINs can be activated not only by the face of familiar people but by the 
voice or the name (NRU) too (see Figure 1). An additional stage, often neglected, is lexical 
output, a pool of units essential for verbal responses, but no mention of a motor output 
stage is given in the model. 
 
 
Figure 1 Illustration of Burton’s (1998) model of person recognition. Solid arrows 
represent links that can be strengthened by repetition; dotted line represents the output of a 
speeded classification task that cannot be strengthened by repetition. 
 
This person recognition model thus describes the perceptual and conceptual 
networks responsible for person perception and identification and explains repetition 
priming in person recognition by assuming that processing in perceptual and conceptual 
networks benefits from prior processing. Two main forms of facilitation can be 
distinguished, data-driven and conceptually driven priming (Jacoby, 1983; Richardson-
8 
 
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988).  
Data-driven priming for faces occurs when a face is repeatedly identified, for 
example, when it is recognized repeatedly as familiar in a familiarity task (Bruce & 
Valentine, 1985), and it is sensitive to (Boehm, Klostermann, Sommer, & Paller, 2006; 
Schweinberger, Pickering, Jentzsch, Burton, & Kaufmann, 2002) or abolished by (Ellis, 
Flude, Young, & Burton, 1996; Johnston & Barry, 2006) perceptual manipulations of the 
stimuli between encounters (Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Ellis, Young, Flude, & Hay, 1987). 
Data-driven priming (see Figure 1) results from both improved structural encoding and 
strengthening of the link between a FRU and a PIN (Boehm et al., 2006; Burton, 1998). 
Thus, data-driven priming in person recognition, in fact, comprises two components, a 
stimulus-specific contribution from improved structural encoding, and an abstract 
contribution from strengthening the link between face and person representations (Boehm 
et al., 2006). Importantly, Ellis, Young and Flude (1990) showed that data-driven priming 
is absent in expression or sex decision tasks, but performing these tasks at study produces 
facilitation in familiarity judgement tasks (Bruce, Ellis, Gibling, & Young, 1987; Young, 
McWeeny, Hay, & Ellis, 1986), indicating, firstly, that identity of familiar faces is accessed 
automatically, even in tasks that are based on pure perceptual discrimination, secondly, sex 
and expression judgement are made by cognitive systems that are not affected by priming 
(but see McNeill, Burton, & Ellis, 2003) and, thirdly, data-driven priming takes place only 
in tasks that require identification of a face, like familiarity judgement, occupation or 
nationality judgements or naming. 
Conceptually driven priming for faces, in contrast, occurs in conceptual tasks when a 
face is categorized based on semantic memory information, as in occupation or nationality 
judgment tasks, and is not disrupted by perceptual manipulations (Burton et al., 1998; 
Johnston & Barry, 2006). Conceptually driven priming (see Figure 1) results from a 
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strengthening of the links between PIN and SIUs (Burton, 1998). Activation of a PIN 
passes to all the associated SIUs determining equal strengthening of the links for all the 
semantic units associated to a person. However, Johnston & Barry (2006) reported 
reduction of priming after change of task, suggesting possible modulation of conceptually 
driven priming in relation to performing same or different tasks.  
An additional form of facilitation was reported in studies that required naming faces 
(Burton & Bruce, 1992): priming can depend on accessing the same lexical entry at the 
level of lexical output. Producing the name of a celebrity from description, or reading the 
name, facilitates performance in a naming task but does not facilitate a familiarity 
judgement (Ellis et al., 1996). 
On the other hand, giving the same motor response to a stimulus in two separate 
occasions did not produce any priming in expression or sex judgment (Ellis et al., 1990), 
and does not contribute significantly to overall priming in semantic classification judgment 
(Johnston & Barry, 2006). These results justify the absence of a motor output level in this 
model. 
According to facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, the magnitude of 
priming is determined by the overlap of processes engaged at study and test. Priming is 
maximal when in study and test phases the same semantic judgement is performed on 
identical stimuli because of the combined effects of data-driven and conceptually driven 
priming (FRU-PIN and PIN-SIU links are strengthened). Performing familiarity judgement 
on identical stimuli in study and test phases expresses only data-driven priming because 
stimulus processing stops at PIN level and only FRU-PIN link is strengthened. On the 
other hand, performing the same semantic judgement on the name of the stimulus at study 
and on the picture of the stimulus at test leads to conceptually driven priming but not data-
driven priming; PIN is accessed from two different recognition units (name at study and 
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face at test), therefore processing overlap occurs only at stages following PIN level and 
facilitation is produced only by strengthening of PIN-SIU links. Interestingly, the sum of 
data-driven and conceptually driven priming when invoked individually is identical to the 
amount of priming when data-driven and conceptually driven priming are invoked 
conjointly (Boehm & Sommer, 2012).  
Although the networks facilitation offers many explanations for priming results in 
person recognition, the picture that emerges from similar attempts to account for priming 
in object and word recognition according to structural models is less clear. Data-driven 
priming for objects (similarly to data-driven priming for faces) is maximal for the identical 
pictures of a stimulus and reduced, but still significant, for different pictures of a stimulus, 
and abolished by the presentation of the name at study (Warren & Morton, 1982). 
However, the most conflicting result between facilitation in person recognition and 
facilitation in object or name recognition is the disappearance of data-driven and 
conceptually driven priming after a change of task, despite the fact that the same stimulus 
was presented at study and test (Bruce, Carson, Burton, & Ellis, 2000; Horner & Henson, 
2009; Race, Badre, & Wagner, 2010; Vriezen, Moscovitch, & Bellos, 1995).  
The existence of conceptually driven priming in object recognition is supported by 
the evidence that facilitation in performing two different semantic tasks is not affected by 
the format of the stimulus (name or picture) when natural/manmade judgement is required 
(Bruce et al., 2000; Vriezen et al., 1995); however, in one instance complete disruption of 
conceptually driven priming after change of stimuli format was shown in size judgement 
(Horner & Henson, 2011b).  
Bruce et al. (2000) suggested that the requirement of computations associated with 
some tasks may be a crucial factor behind the expression of either data-driven or 
conceptually driven priming. That is, a crucial factor behind the expression of data-driven 
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and conceptually driven priming in object recognition is whether a semantic task is based 
on a pre-existent semantic entry or on semantic information that must be further computed 
to express an answer (see also Barsalou, 1983).  
Facilitation in naming objects was reported by Wheeldon & Monsell (1992): naming 
the picture of an object was facilitated by having given the same name in response to a 
definition or having read the name before. 
Regarding facilitation in giving the same motor response, Vriezen et al. (1995) did 
not find any significant effect of giving the same response as opposed to giving two 
different responses, but congruency of the responses has been widely reported as 
impacting significantly upon priming for objects and names (Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner 
& Henson, 2009). 
 
In conclusion, facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks accounts well for 
repetition priming in person recognition. However priming results in object, and name, 
recognition are difficult to fully reconcile with the structural networks view. In Bruce et al. 
(2000) a multiple memory systems approach, like the ones of Schacter (1994) and 
Moscovitch (1994), was suggested for object recognition, instead. In these models 
perceptual and conceptual systems are not accessed sequentially and tasks can affect 
facilitations in these networks independently. Recently, rapid response learning and 
multiple-routes multiple-stages framework have been proposed to account for results in 
object and word recognition, but not for priming in person recognition.  
 
1.1.2 Episodic model: Rapid response learning 
 
 Instance theory (Logan, 1990) is an example of an episodic model of priming. When 
a stimulus is repeated instances of previous exposures with the stimulus are retrieved from 
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memory leading to faster and more accurate responding to repeated than not-repeated 
stimuli. Hommel (1998) supported a similar position with the concept of event-files: a 
binding between stimulus and response (stimulus-response binding). Retrieval of an 
instance or an event-file (memory-based processing) can be used to by-pass stimulus 
processing (algorithmic-based processing) and, consequently, be faster and more accurate 
in responding to repeated stimuli. The main prediction of instance theory is significant 
facilitation when study and test contexts are identical, but it is unclear how instance 
retrieval is managed after changes in perceptual (different stimulus) or conceptual 
(different task) aspects of the stimulus and the task at test. Logan & Etherton (1994) 
showed that an instance is retrieved even for stimuli partially similar to the encoded ones. 
However, it is not clear whether an instance is retrieved regardless of the task. After a 
change of task, retrieval of an instance can produce priming in response times but retrieved 
content could be inappropriate for the new task and so negative effects may be observed in 
accuracy performance. Otherwise, retrieval could be blocked when task instructions are 
changed; in this condition no priming is expected because algorithmic-based processing 
does not allow any facilitation.  
Dobbins et al. (2004) presented the first clear evidences in favour of a blocking 
account of instance theory (see also Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004). In the Dobbins 
et al. (2004) paradigm, the same pictures of repeated stimuli were presented throughout the 
different phases of the experiment and tasks required always accessing and using the same 
semantic information; what differed from regular priming paradigms was the categorical 
cue that could determine a change of the output: categorical cues could be identical (i.e. 
“bigger than?” – Yes, “bigger than?” - Yes) or reversed (i.e. “smaller than?” – No, “bigger 
than?” - Yes). Importantly, the used design, in which perceptual and conceptual properties 
of the stimulus and task were unaltered, ruled out any possible modulation of facilitation in 
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perceptual and conceptual aspects on priming. On the other hand, retrieval of a prior 
episode for studied items was blocked by changing the direction of the categorical cue in a 
size judgement task (from “bigger than” to “smaller than” a shoebox). Behavioural and 
neuronal priming was observed when categorical cues at study and test were identical (i.e., 
when responses at study and test were identical) whereas both behavioural and neural 
priming effects were eliminated when categorical cues were reversed (i.e., when the 
previously given response was inverted).  
Evidence that response reversal can lead to elimination of priming effects has been 
interpreted as rapid response learning (Dobbins et al., 2004). According to rapid response 
learning, stimuli at study are bound to a response; the obtained stimulus-response binding 
is then reactivated at test only when task instructions are identical. The main difference 
between instance theory and rapid response learning is that in the former instances are 
automatically activated every time a primed stimulus is presented, while in the latter 
stimulus-response binding is retrieved only for the identical but not the reversed task 
instruction. In this way, rapid response learning accounts for the absence of any facilitation 
in response times and no negative priming in accuracy for reversed task instruction 
condition. Importantly, inversion of categorical cue abolished priming, or generated 
negative priming, as predicted by pure episodic models (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 
2003). 
Schnyer, Dobbins, Nicholls, Schacter and Verfaellie (2006) replicated most of 
Dobbins’ et al. (2004) results and showed that retrieval of stimulus-response binding is 
blocked not only when a stimulus is presented in a phase with different task instruction but 
also when task instructions have been changed before, for example when a test phase with 
reversed categorical cue is performed between study and test phases with identical task 
instruction. This finding further supports rapid response learning and advances the 
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understanding about how the cognitive system utilizes stimulus-response binding to 
produce repetition priming. 
Having demonstrated that rapid response learning is a good model for repetition 
priming in object recognition, recent studies on the topic have focused on understanding 
the nature of the association between stimulus and response and the level of generalization 
of these two constituent elements.  
Rapid response learning is considered a form of incidental associative learning 
dependent on medial temporal lobe structures. Amnesic patients do not show any benefit in 
giving the same response at study and test (Schnyer et al., 2006), which suggests that rapid 
response learning – and consequently priming – depends on cerebral structures assigned to 
episodic memory encoding and retrieval. Importantly, facilitation was not completely 
abolished in amnesic participants, particularly for stimuli primed at study by a single 
presentation, indicating the existence of alternative sources of facilitation not affected by 
amnesia. Contrary to other forms of associative learning, the creation of stimulus-response 
binding is incidental (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2009) and therefore not affected by aging 
(Dew & Giovanello, 2010; Schnyer et al., 2006): inversion of categorical cue equally 
affects facilitation in both young and old age groups. 
Schnyer et al. (2007) showed that stimulus-response effect does not generalize to 
different pictures of a stimulus, even for stimuli judged to be highly visually similar. This 
result was taken as an indication of high specificity to the primed stimulus of stimulus-
response binding (for opposite results see: Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009; Horner & 
Henson, 2011b; Wig, Buckner, & Schacter, 2009). Regarding the response constituent 
element of the binding, Schnyer et al. (2007) did not replicate the results of Dobbins et al. 
(2004) of specificity of the stimulus-response binding to motor mapping but instead found 
that changing the finger mapping did not affect the stimulus-response effect (but see 
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Dennis & Perfect, 2013) suggesting a more general response representation of the output. 
In agreement with Logan (1990), Schnyer et al. (2007) suggested that the association 
behind rapid response learning is a binding between a stimulus and an interpretation 
(“classification decision”). Although studies carried out by Schnyer et al. give strong 
support to rapid response learning, significant priming for reversed categorical cue, 
condition in which algorithmic-based processing is not by-passed, suggests the existence 
of secondary sources of facilitation, probably tuning of both perceptual and conceptual 
processing. 
Rapid response learning can provide an account of priming when same task is used, 
as in most investigations on repetition priming (see previous section) but modulation of 
facilitation according to the specific exemplar or format of a stimulus is incompatible with 
high specificity of the input of stimulus-response binding (Horner & Henson, 2011b). 
However, the hardest challenge for rapid response learning is facilitation even when 
different tasks are used (Horner & Henson, 2009; Race et al., 2010) or the reference size is 
changed (Horner & Henson, 2011b), because retrieval of a memory trace created in a 
different task does not allow any facilitation in the new context. A similar facilitation is 
particularly evident in person recognition (Burton et al., 1998; Johnston & Barry, 2006), 
but not so much in object recognition as some studies have found that priming across tasks 
is weak and unreliable (Bruce et al., 2000; Vriezen et al., 1995). 
  
In summary, rapid response learning accommodates for facilitation when categorical 
cues at study and test are identical (identical-question condition), but not significant 
facilitation when categorical cue at study and test are reversed (reversed-question 
condition). This last finding provides evidence against a pure memory-based model of 
priming, and demonstrates the need for a secondary form of facilitation not based on 
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retrieval of instances. A hybrid framework of structural and episodic models could provide 
a more reasonable account of significant priming for the reversed-question condition and 
significantly smaller priming in this condition compared to priming for the identical-
question condition. The simultaneous occurrence of these effects indicates that structural 
and episodic models are not mutually exclusive but complementary.   
 
1.1.3 Hybrid model 
 
The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework (Horner & Henson, 2009) is a hybrid 
model of repetition priming (see Figure 2 for an example of the framework adapted to 
person recognition). It combines structural and episodic models to account for most 
priming results. According to this framework priming arises principally from memory-
based processing - rapid response learning - however facilitation can be produced by 
algorithmic-based processing - facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks - as well. 
On the first presentation, stimulus processing is tuned by strengthening of links between 
units/nodes of perceptual and conceptual networks and simultaneously a memory trace is 
created. For successive repetition of a stimulus, priming is determined by the interaction 
between response features retrieved from memory and response features obtained from 
stimulus reprocessing.  
Larger facilitation for the identical-question than the reversed-question condition is 
cause by positive interaction between responses (for example yes-yes) when categorical 
cues are identical but similar interaction between responses (for example yes-no) is 
negative when categorical cue are reversed. According to an interaction account, the fastest 
route (the memory-based processing) is activated but the retrieved response is not 
expressed immediately because it must be first compared with the output of algorithmic-
based processing, and so the generation of responses no more correct in new task contexts 
17 
 
is blocked. Interaction between responses can also explain larger priming for congruent 
than incongruent responses when a different task is used at test. Similar to the processes 
when categorical cues are reversed, interaction between responses allows facilitation when 
responses are congruent but not when responses are incongruent, even when categorical 
cue is changed.  
However, response interaction is not the only source of priming because otherwise 
priming within tasks and across tasks in the two congruency conditions should be equal, 
whilst it is larger within tasks than across tasks (Horner & Henson, 2009). One explanation 
for the dissimilar pattern of priming effects across these conditions has been the 
incorporation of an additional stage in stimulus processing, a classification code. When a 
categorical judgement is performed, the stimulus is associated not only with a response but 
with a task-specific classification (stimulus-classification binding) that can be retrieved 
when the stimulus is presented again, and this represents an additional stage where priming 
can occur. In other words, having classified a stimulus as “bigger than” in a size judgement 
task allows one to be faster in the size judgement task independent of the direction of the 
question, but not in other tasks, like natural/manmade. 
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Figure 2 Illustration of the most relevant parts of multiple-routes multiple-stages framework 
(Horner & Henson, 2009) adapted for person recognition in a speeded classification of occupation. 
Solid arrows represent pre-existent links that can be strengthened by repetition; dotted lines 
represent the output that cannot be strengthened by repetition. Circles represent stages of 
interaction between the two routes from where most of repetition priming is generated. 
 
It is important to underline that the interaction between responses can cause both 
facilitation and interference, as shown by negative priming in response time for 
incongruent responses across tasks (Race et al., 2010). A similar negative effect could be 
masked, but still exist, within tasks by larger facilitation due to classification. 
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Moutsopoulou & Waszak (2012) provided compelling evidence for how different response 
codes can operate independently in producing facilitation or interference. A match between 
outputs of the two routes in a stage determines facilitation, while a mismatch can 
determine interference. Dennis & Perfect (2013) showed that facilitation of a match for 
one stage can be cancelled by inhibition caused by a mismatch at another stage. 
This framework explains repetition priming mainly as an effect of rapid response 
learning, whereby priming due to facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks is 
considered possible but secondary to overall priming. In effect it seems that algorithmic-
based processing is required only as a control to memory-based processing, but most of 
facilitation occurs beyond the semantic system, when classification and response codes 
interact. The clearest evidence in support of a similar interpretation is that repetition 
priming across tasks, if averaged between congruency condition to eliminate any 
facilitation or cost due to response codes, is not significant, ruling out potential 
contribution of facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks. Moreover, significant 
within-task repetition priming is interpreted not as facilitated stimulus reprocessing (as 
predicted by facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks) but positive retrieval of a 
stimulus-classification binding. Consequently, even if the multiple-routes multiple-stages 
framework is a hybrid model, it seems that facilitation associated with prior exposure is 
mainly the product of episodic memory compared to structural changes in long term 
perceptual and semantic stores. 
The properties of stimulus-response binding have been further detailed to account for 
the modulation of repetition priming due to modification of the stimulus and task. 
Stimulus-response binding is not stimulus-specific but identity-specific. Retrieval of a 
memory trace affects performance when different pictures of objects are used in study and 
test phases (Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009; Wig et al., 2009; but, see also Schnyer et al., 
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2006), and even when names of objects are used at study and pictures of objects are used 
at test (Horner & Henson, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). However, priming is larger when the same 
stimulus is presented at study and test compared to a change of exemplar or a change of 
format: similar attenuation could be an effect of data-driven and conceptually driven 
priming occurring before the retrieval of the instance. An alternative explanation could be 
that the binding codes both stimulus-specific and identity-specific representations and both 
can contribute to repetition priming (Horner & Henson, 2011b). 
Likewise, a reinterpretation of the response component of the binding has been 
necessary to accommodate some new results. Three different bindings are suggested 
(Horner & Henson, 2009): Classification (for example, „bigger‟ or „smaller‟), decision 
(„yes‟ or „no‟), and action („left finger press‟ for a positive manual response or „Yes‟ for 
positive verbal response). Decision and action generally go together; therefore the 
umbrella term “response” is used to describe their combined contribution. Dennis & 
Perfect (2013) isolated the independent contribution of decision to repetition priming by 
changing task and response modality (verbal to manual); while the independent 
contribution of action was isolated by changing task and labelling buttons with a 
categorical name (bigger or smaller) instead of decision (yes or no). The findings showed 
that decision and action can contribute to priming independently. Classification has never 
been isolated from decision or action codes but, nevertheless, its influence on priming was 
analysed. Horner & Henson (2009) changed the size of the reference (from shoebox to 
wheelie-bin – to modulate the impact of classification) and the categorical cue (from 
smaller to bigger – to modulate the impact of response). Classification was assessed as the 
difference between amounts of priming for congruent classifications (an elephant is bigger 
than a shoebox and a wheelie-bin) and for incongruent classifications (a chair is bigger 
than a shoebox but smaller than a wheelie-bin); similarly response was assessed as 
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difference between amounts of priming for congruent decisions (yes-yes, no-no) and for 
incongruent decisions (yes-no, no-yes). Results showed larger priming for congruent than 
incongruent classification and larger priming for congruent than incongruent decisions: 
supporting the existence of both a stimulus-classification binding and stimulus-response 
binding.  
According to the multiple-stages part of this framework, priming is greatest when 
questions at study and test are identical because of the contribution of stimulus-response 
and stimuli-classification binding, and reduced, but still significant, when the questions are 
reversed because of the absence or inhibition of stimulus-response binding. For different 
questions, only stimulus-response binding is involved in the interaction and positive or 
negative effects are obtained according to the congruency of responses given at study and 
test. Priming can be further modulated by the format of input but whether this effect is 
caused by different stimulus-specificity of memory-based binding or facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual level is unclear. 
The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework accounts quite well for most priming 
results in object recognition, particularly the absence of priming across tasks (Bruce et al., 
2000; Vriezen et al., 1995). However, the predictive power of this framework is low in 
person recognition: firstly because no facilitation beyond the semantic system has ever 
been reported before in person recognition; secondly because of significant facilitation 
across tasks regardless of response congruency, thirdly because of the high sensitivity of 
priming to modification of the stimuli, for which the suggested explanation sounds 
unsatisfactory. Most of these difficulties could be solved by considering a higher impact of 
facilitation in algorithmic-based processing in repetition priming. 
The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework presents a theoretical limitation. If 
the outputs of memory-based processing and algorithmic-based processing must be 
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compared before a response can be expressed, response times should be determined 
principally by the slowest, not the fastest, processing, therefore by algorithmic-based 
processing. Consequently, priming should mainly be determined by facilitation occurring 
in the algorithmic-based processing, and enhanced or inhibited by the successive 
interaction with rapid response learning. A similar interpretation if correct would 
completely reverse the weights of memory-based and algorithmic-based processing to 
priming, underlining the major contribution of the latter. However, no significant priming 
across tasks is incompatible with the expectation of significant data-driven and 
conceptually driven priming, unless retrieval of a stimulus-classification binding generates 
strong interference in new tasks. Alternatively, considering no facilitation in algorithmic-
based processing, larger facilitation within tasks than across tasks could be determined by 
the utilization of a stimulus-classification binding to compute a response within tasks, but 
not across tasks. However, a similar interpretation presents the limit of how the cognitive 
system utilizes stimulus-classification binding when the size of the reference is changed, as 
in Horner & Henson (2009), determining the need of re-computing the size according to 
the new reference.  
 
In conclusion, the multiple-routes multiple-stages framework seems to be the best 
model for repetition priming in object recognition, but the secondary role of facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks makes it less powerful in accounting for repetition 
priming in person recognition. In addition, the dynamic interaction between the two routes 
at the different response stages is unclear. 
 
1.1.4 Event-related potentials 
 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) correlates of repetition priming have been 
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extensively investigated in the domain of person recognition. Most of the studies have 
used immediate repetition but the obtained effects did not survive longer lags between 
repetitions (Schweinberger, Pickering, Burton, & Kaufmann, 2002). The fast decay rate of 
these short-lag ERP correlates of stimulus repetition could index processes other than 
priming (Bentin & Peled, 1990). ERP components of short-lived priming were observed in 
the time-window 200-300 ms (Hertz, Porjesz, Begleiter, & Chorlian, 1994), particularly 
the so called N250r (Schweinberger, Pickering, Jentzsch, et al., 2002). On the other hand, 
long-lived repetition priming has often been obtained as centro-parietal positivity in a later 
time-window, starting at around 400 ms (Henson, Rylands, Ross, Vuilleumeir, & Rugg, 
2004; Schweinberger, Pickering, Burton, et al., 2002). Whether this effect indexes 
repetition priming or other types of memory is a matter of debate. 
Episodic memory contamination represents a strong challenge for the interpretation 
of electrophysiological data (Rugg et al., 1998): electrophysiological correlates of stimulus 
repetition could be, in fact, an expression either of repetition priming or episodic memory. 
Many approaches, which do not rely directly on awareness, have been used to distinguish 
repetition priming from episodic memory. Most of these approaches employed analyses of 
how experimental manipulations that affects repetition priming but not episodic memory 
influence ERPs, and, vice versa, how ERPs are influenced by experimental manipulations 
that boost episodic memory but not repetition priming. Repetition priming, but not 
episodic memory, is modulated by perceptual changes in the stimulus material, such as 
presentation of words backward (Paller & Gross, 1998) or presentation of faces upside-
down (Boehm, Klostermann, & Paller, 2006). Episodic memory, but not priming, is 
influenced, instead, by level of processing manipulation (Rugg et al., 1998), combination 
of brief presentation time and attentional engagement (Paller, Hutson, Miller, & Boehm, 
2003) or by engaging subjects in a working memory task (Boehm & Sommer, 2005). 
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Neural correlates of long-lasting repetition priming have been identified as small brain 
potentials (1µV) whose time course and topography vary in relation to task and material, 
implying the existence of one or more specialized mechanisms in stimulus processing. For 
example, in the absence of awareness, the repetition of a picture of a face produces a 
negative potential over frontal electrodes between 200 and 300 ms (Paller et al., 2003), 
while repetition of a word produces a positive potential over parietal electrodes between 
300 and 500 ms (Rugg et al., 1998). Whether the cognitive function indexed by these 
ERPs is perceptual or conceptual, is not clear yet. 
The neural correlates of episodic memory are instead large potentials (around 2µV) 
whose time course and topography are consistent across a large number of experiments 
and stimulus materials. ERP correlates of episodic memory have a frontal to central 
positivity around 300-500 ms, and a left parietal positivity around 500-800 ms (Rugg et 
al., 1998). These ERP correlates are generally called Old/New effects because they result 
from the contrast of correctly recognised studied stimuli as old and correctly recognised 
unstudied stimuli as new. Successive investigations have associated these two Old/New 
effects with qualitatively different memory processes: respectively, familiarity (mid-frontal 
Old/New effect) and recollection (parietal Old/New effect) in a dual-process model 
(Yonelinas, 2002). The mid-frontal Old/New effect is not affected by level-of-processing 
manipulations and occurs for all the correct recognitions, no matter the quality of the 
judgement, high-low certainty or with/without context. The parietal Old/New effect, 
instead, is present after deep encoding (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003) and is associated with 
judgements in which the participants report a high confidence rate or are able to describe 
the study context.  
In the time-window succeeding the parietal Old/New effect, there is often an 
inversion of polarity at parietal electrodes. This ERP correlates is an effect often evident in 
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episodic memory source judgement tasks, and it is called late posterior negativity 
(Hayama, Johnson, & Rugg, 2008; for a review see Johansson & Mecklinger, 2003). This 
effect has been decomposed into an early component of action monitoring in high-
response conflict designs and a late component of post-retrieval processes (Herron, 2007). 
 
ERPs can be used to distinguish facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks 
from rapid response learning. A significant contrast between novel and repeated stimuli 
regardless of the question at study (identical, reversed or orthogonal) is a clear indication 
of data-driven and conceptually driven priming; further modulation of similar ERP 
components in relation to exemplar or format of the stimulus would give strong support to 
a similar interpretation. On the other hand, a significant difference between ERPs for 
repeated stimuli due to congruency or incongruency of responses at study and test is 
evidence of retrieval of a stimulus-response binding.  
The first study carried out to distinguish ERP correlates of facilitation in perceptual 
and conceptual networks from ERP correlates of rapid response learning was conducted by 
Race et al. (2010) in object recognition. An ERP correlate of facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks was found as a negativity around 400 ms (according to its timing this 
effect was interpreted as facilitation in conceptual networks). Stimulus-response binding 
was indexed by an ERP modulation caused by response congruency of response 
congruency around 450 ms after stimulus onset (two response-locked ERPs, one before 
and one after response time, were also reported); an ERP correlate of stimulus-
classification binding was reported around 600 ms after stimulus onset. A second study 
was carried out by Horner & Henson (2012). They found an ERP correlate of networks 
facilitation in stimulus-locked analysis and an ERP correlate of rapid response learning in 
response-locked analysis. These data were supported by effects of networks facilitation 
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and rapid response learning in brain activity, measured with fMRI. In a recent study Hsu 
and Waszak (2012) found an ERP correlate of stimulus-classification binding but did not 
find any ERP correlates of facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks or stimulus-
response binding. However, ERP correlates of stimulus-classification binding might be 
correlates of facilitation in conceptual networks instead. 
 
In summary, ERP studies have shown that electrophysiological correlates of rapid 
response learning have been regularly obtained when tested directly but they vary across 
experiments. ERP correlates of networks facilitation were also found in Race et al. (2010) 
and Horner & Henson (2012), but not in Hsu and Waszak (2012). Due to the high 
variability of the results, electrophysiological data do not support any specific 
interpretation of repetition priming. 
 
1.1.5 Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
 
Repetition of a stimulus results in a decrease of BOLD (blood-oxygenation level 
dependent) signal in specific areas of the brain: this phenomenon is called neural priming 
(Schacter & Buckner, 1998). When a picture of an object is repeated in, for example, a 
yes/no judgement task repetition related suppression effects are found throughout the brain 
typically including the occipital, infero-temporal and prefrontal regions of the cortex 
(Buckner et al., 1998).  
Studies that have explored the relationship between repetition suppression and 
behavioural priming effects have found a correlation between neuronal priming and 
behavioural priming in frontal lobe, particularly in the left inferior frontal cortex for scenes 
and the left middle frontal gyrus for faces, but not in visual regions associated with 
stimulus processing (parahippocampal cortex and fusiform cortex) (Bunzeck & Düzel, 
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2006). Further support for a crucial role of the prefrontal cortex in repetition priming 
comes from transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies (Thiel et al., 2005; Wig, 
Grafton, Demos, & Kelley, 2005). TMS administered over left inferior frontal gyrus, but 
not over a control location, disrupts both neuronal priming in this region and behavioural 
repetition priming (Wig et al., 2005). Together, these results provide evidence for the 
involvement of a network of occipital, temporal and frontal areas in processing repeated 
stimuli, but only changes in frontal areas seems to be causally linked to repetition priming. 
 The relationship between episodic memory and repetition priming has attracted less 
attention in fMRI studies compared to ERP studies. The approach that has generally been 
used is the distinction of these two memory processes according to subsequent memory: at 
the end of a priming experiment, participants had to perform old/new judgement on 
repeated (primed) and novel stimuli: Hits represent primed stimuli with episodic memory 
while misses represent primed stimuli without episodic memory. Turk-Browne, Yi & Chun 
(2006) showed that neuronal priming and behavioural priming were significant for 
remembered stimuli, but not for forgotten stimuli; moreover, the correlation between 
neural and behavioural priming was significant in the fusiform gyrus, and nearly 
significant in the right inferior prefrontal cortex.    
 
According to facilitation in conceptual and perceptual networks, activity reductions 
seen with fMRI associated with priming are thought to reflect facilitation in processing 
perceptual and conceptual information (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; Henson, 
2003; Schacter & Buckner, 1998). This interpretation is supported by three properties of 
neural priming: it takes place in brain regions involved in processing the stimulus material, 
it is not restricted to a single region but includes multiple brain regions, and it is task-
dependent. Neural priming is considered to be result of a reduction in the number of 
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neurons engaged by processing repeated stimuli (sharpening model) or shorter processing 
time (facilitation model) in comparison to processing a stimulus for the first time (Grill-
Spector et al., 2006).  
Neural priming in the ventral temporal region is considered the manifestation of 
facilitation in perceptual networks: for example, repeated famous faces produce a decrease 
of the signal in the right lateral fusiform region (Henson, Shallice, Gorno-Tempini, & 
Dolan, 2002). Wig et al. (2009) further advance this point by showing that repetition of an 
object is accompanied by repetition suppression in the inferior temporal gyrus and the 
fusiform gyrus regardless of task instruction, and similar reduction of activity is modulated 
by the visual similarity of the stimuli: higher for the identical compared to a different 
picture of a stimulus. In addition, Vuilleumier et al. (2002) showed a different sensitivity to 
change of visual characteristics of objects (shape and viewpoint) in the left and the right 
fusiform region: neural priming was perceptual-specific in the right but not in the left 
fusiform region (Eger, Schweinberger, Dolan, & Henson, 2005; Koutstaal et al., 2001). 
Simons, Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner & Schacter (2003) replicated this laterality effect and 
found that only the left fusiform region benefits from lexical/semantic processing 
Repetition suppression in left inferior prefrontal regions is thought to reflect 
facilitation in conceptual networks: neural priming for repeated words is significant for 
stimuli primed by both identical and different tasks, but larger for identical task (Wagner, 
Koutstaal, Maril, Schacter, & Buckner, 2000). Horner & Henson (2011a), found that 
occipito-temporal and prefrontal cortex undergo repetition suppression even for pictures of 
objects primed by names of objects regardless of task instruction: the absence of any 
possible contribution from data-driven priming in the present cross-domain design 
provides strong evidence of facilitation in conceptual networks in these two cortical areas.  
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On the other hand, rapid response learning offers a new interpretation of neural 
priming. Reduction in neural activity for repeated stimuli is not the effect of more efficient 
neuronal processing but from truncated processing as a consequence of by-passing these 
networks. A by-pass of stimulus processing stages for primed but not unprimed stimuli 
would results in signal decrease when activity for unprimed stimuli is subtracted from no 
activity, because processing stages are by-passed for primed stimuli.  
Although Dobbins et al. (2004) found that reversing the task had an effect on 
repetition suppression even in temporal regions, including the fusiform area, most of the 
successive fMRI studies showed that rapid response learning could account only for 
modulations of activity in the prefrontal cortex (Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 
2008, 2011a, 2012; Race, Shanker, & Wagner, 2009; Wig et al., 2009). Moreover, Race et 
al. (2008) found two distinct patterns of repetition suppression in lateral frontal cortex due 
to rapid response learning at the classification and decision/action levels: the first was 
more frontal than the second. It is important to underline that neural priming in the 
prefrontal cortex, generally interpreted as rapid response learning, co-occurred with neural 
priming in occipital and temporal regions, and these effect were interpreted as networks 
facilitation (Horner & Henson, 2008, 2011a, 2012; Race et al. 2009; Wig et al., 2009; but 
see Dobbins et al., 2004). 
 
To conclude, most neuroimaging studies have provided evidence in support of a 
hybrid model of repetition priming. Changing stimulus-response binding has typically 
been associated with an elimination of repetition suppression in the frontal lobes, 
suggesting that this region is involved in producing instanced based priming effects. In 
contrast, altering the perceptual properties of a stimulus has been shown to modulate 
repetition priming in visual regions of the occipital and temporal lobes, indicating that 
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repetition can induce changes in perceptual and conceptual brain networks. 
  
1.2 Overview of the thesis 
 
The general picture that emerges from the wide literature on repetition priming is 
that an episodic model can account quite well for repetition priming in object recognition, 
even better if retrieval of a memory trace interacts with some structural processing in 
consideration of new task requirements. The main behavioural evidences in support of a 
strong influence of memory-based processing in object recognition are: 1) larger priming 
for stimuli primed by an identical question compared to stimuli primed by a reversed 
question, 2) larger priming for congruent than incongruent response conditions across 
tasks, 3) negative priming for incongruent response conditions across tasks, 4) absence of 
any net priming across tasks when data are collapsed across congruency conditions. 
On the other hand, facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks provides a 
useful account of repetition priming in person recognition. It sounds unreasonable to 
consider any rapid response learning or multiple-routes multiple-stages framework in the 
domain of person recognition because priming across tasks is significant (against point 4), 
and congruency of responses across tasks does not have any significant impact on priming 
(against point 2), in fact priming across-task is positive even for incongruent responses 
(against point 3). Inversion of categorical cue has never been employed in person 
recognition, leaving open the possibility that repetition priming plays an important role 
within tasks (point 1). 
 
In the present thesis the influence of a memory-based processing in repetition 
priming in person recognition is investigated.  
Chapter 2 addresses the question: Does rapid response learning significantly 
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influence priming in person recognition? Experiment 1 employed a design as similar as 
possible to designs used in object recognition, adapted for person recognition. Participants 
had to make height judgement to repeated faces of celebrities presented three times at 
study and again at test among faces of celebrities never presented before. Categorical cues 
at study and test were identical in some study-test cycles (shorter-shorter or taller-taller) 
and reversed in others (shorter-taller or taller-shorter). Memory-based processing was 
assessed as a stimulus-response effect: a significant difference between the amount of 
priming for identical task instructions and the amount of priming for reversed task 
instructions. Significant stimulus-response effects would be unquestionable evidence of 
facilitation beyond perceptual and conceptual networks, a plausible consequence of 
retrieval of a memory trace. Absence of significant stimulus-response effects would be 
evidence, instead, for independence of repetition priming from memory-based processing. 
A significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 1 moved the investigation 
toward understanding the experimental conditions that favour rapid response learning in 
person recognition. Chapter 3 addresses the question: Which experimental factor gives rise 
to rapid response learning in person recognition? Three experimental factors were 
identified, according to the literature, as potential sources of the formation and use of a 
memory trace in the design. Task, arrangement of study and test phases, and number of 
stimulus repetitions were cumulatively subtracted from the design used in Experiment 1. In 
this way, step-by-step, the experimental design became similar to designs in which no 
evidence of rapid response learning in person recognition has yet been shown. Experiment 
2 employed a regular categorical task for investigating person recognition, occupation 
judgement, instead of height judgement task, differently to Experiment 1; Experiment 3 
employed a design made up of a single test phase preceded by two study phases, instead of 
study-test cycles, differently to Experiment 2; Experiment 4 employed single repetition of 
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stimuli at study, instead of triple presentations of stimuli at study, differently to Experiment 
3. Subtraction of the crucial experimental factor would determine disappearance of the 
stimulus-response effect, indicating that rapid response learning is no longer effective in 
the specific experimental design. Disappearance of the stimulus-response effect is 
expected in the present series of experiments because Experiment 4 employed a design that 
has been widely used in person recognition and no evidence of facilitation due to retrieval 
of a stimulus-response binding has ever been reported previously. If the stimulus-response 
effect resists all this subtractions, this would indicate that rapid response learning in person 
recognition has never been isolated before because it has never been tested directly as in 
Experiment 1.    
 Chapter 4 further investigates which experimental factor is necessary for the 
creation and retrieval of a memory trace. Experiment 5 addressed the question: Are 
multiple stimulus repetitions at study required for rapid response learning in person 
recognition? Stimuli were repeated only once at study in a design made up of study-test 
cycles to investigate whether multiple presentations of stimuli at study are necessary for 
rapid response learning. If stimulus-response binding requires multiple stimulus repetitions 
at study, the stimulus-response effect should be not significant in this design, replicating 
results of Experiment 4. Experiment 6 addressed the question: Is stimulus-response 
binding short-lived? Or does it require contiguity of phases with identical task instructions 
to be expressed? The influence of the design used in Experiment 3 (study-study-test) is 
investigated with a focus on the effect of lag on rapid response learning. The separation 
between study phases is temporally expanded in such a way that lag-effect would abolish 
rapid response learning in this experiment. Alternatively, rapid response learning should be 
significant only when contiguity of phases with an identical categorical cue is not 
interrupted by an intervening phase with a reversed categorical cue. 
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In Chapter 5 the focus switches from rapid response learning to facilitation in the 
perceptual and conceptual networks. Two experiments address the question: Is facilitation 
in the perceptual and conceptual networks obliterated by rapid response learning? An 
orthogonal task was performed in a study-test cycle: response at test was congruent to 
responses given at study for half of the stimuli but incongruent for the other half. 
Significant across-task priming for incongruent response should be unquestionable 
evidence of facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, given that no facilitation 
can be generated by rapid response learning. None significant priming in this condition 
would argue otherwise: rapid response learning makes other forms of facilitation, 
generally present in other priming conditions, no longer behaviourally relevant to 
repetition priming in person recognition.  
Chapter 6 aims to explore the processes behind rapid response learning. EEG signal 
was recorded to extract ERPs and lateralized readiness potentials (LRP) to address the 
question: Is rapid response learning a benefit of giving the same response again or an 
effect of interaction between responses? Electrophysiological activity associated with 
repetition priming was analysed to detect evidence of activation of the wrong response 
after inversion of a categorical cue. Such activation, evident in LRPs, would be clear 
evidence that stimulus-response binding is activated independent of the correctness of the 
associated response, because the retrieved output interacts with the output of stimulus re-
processing determining facilitation or interference. The absence of a similar activation 
would give support to an interpretation of rapid response learning as retrieval of a 
stimulus-response binding exclusively when output is correct.  
The results are discussed in Chapter 7 according to structural model – facilitation in 
conceptual and perceptual networks -, episodic model – rapid response learning – and 
hybrid model – multiple-routes multiple-stages framework.   
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Chapter 2  
 
Rapid response learning has been extensively reported in speeded semantic 
classification tasks in the domain of objects but never in other domains. Consequently, at 
present, rapid response learning cannot be considered a general theory of priming because 
of the lack of evidence of its influence in domains other than objects. For instance, priming 
in the domain of person recognition is generally explained as facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks, and no facilitation beyond these networks has ever been reported. 
Experiment 1 aimed to directly investigate rapid response learning in person recognition. A 
design as similar as possible to that used to study rapid response learning in object 
recognition was employed with faces as stimuli. Stimuli were presented three times at 
study, and once at test among new stimuli. A height judgement was required; categorical 
cue at test was identical to the categorical cue at study in two study-test cycles and 
reversed in two study-test cycles. Results showed that facilitation for repeated stimuli in 
response times was significantly smaller in cycles with reversed categorical cues compared 
to cycles with identical categorical instructions. This finding is the first direct 
demonstration of stimulus-response binding outside the domain of objects, showing that 
rapid response learning is not specific to object recognition.  
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Does rapid response learning influence significantly priming in 
person recognition?  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the publication of the groundbreaking paper by Dobbins et al. (2004), rapid 
response learning has been exclusively investigated in speeded semantic classification 
tasks of objects, using either pictures of objects (Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009; Dew & 
Giovanello, 2010b; Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 
2012; Hsu & Waszak, 2012; Moutsopoulou & Waszak, 2012; Schnyer et al., 2007; Schnyer 
et al., 2006; Wig et al., 2009) or names of objects (Dennis, Carder, & Perfect, 2010; 
Dennis & Perfect, 2013; Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Hsu & Waszak, 2012; Race et al., 2010; 
Race et al., 2009) as test stimuli; even novel objects have been used to test rapid response 
learning in speeded perceptual classification tasks (Saggar, Miikkulainen, & Schnyer, 
2010; Soldan, Clarke, Colleran, & Kuras, 2012). Although the extensive corpus of data in 
speeded semantic and perceptual classification of objects suggests that rapid response 
learning is able to account for most, or even all, repetition priming effects in object 
recognition (Horner & Henson, 2009), the status of universal interpretation of repetition 
priming cannot be granted yet.  
Repetition priming is a form of memory present in recognition tasks of stimuli other 
than objects, such as, for example, person recognition (Bruce & Young, 1986). In fact, in 
person recognition many elegant theoretical achievements have been obtained in the 
interpretation of repetition priming (Boehm & Sommer, 2012), and the predictive power of 
Burton’s (1998) model of person recognition is the clearest example. High homogeneity of 
the stimuli, human expertise and strong reliability of priming effects make person 
recognition the perfect proving ground for rapid response learning in a speeded 
classification task for stimuli other than objects. However, such an investigation has not 
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been conducted yet.  
In speeded semantic classification tasks of objects, facilitation for repeated stimuli 
can be entirely explained by rapid response learning (Horner & Henson, 2009). According 
to rapid response learning, repetition priming is not the effect of facilitation across stages 
of stimulus processing (algorithmic-based processing) but the effect of by-passing these 
stages (memory-based processing; Logan, 1990; Schacter et al., 2004). Repeated stimuli 
are bound to a classification (stimulus-classification binding) and a response (stimulus-
response binding) that can be retrieved to carry out the task without the need of any 
stimulus re-processing. From a similar perspective the amount of priming is determined by 
the equivalence of classification and response (decision and action) at study and test 
(Horner & Henson, 2009). Rapid response learning predicts that priming is significantly 
modulated by the correctness of the classification and the response retrieved from memory 
in the test context; a similar prediction is supported by the fact that after a change of task, 
priming is significant only when the response given at study is also correct at test, but not 
when a different response must be expressed (Race et al., 2010). Horner & Henson (2009) 
showed that priming was greatest when categorical cues at study and test were identical 
(for example: “bigger than...” at study to “bigger than...” at test) due to retrieval of 
stimulus-classification and stimulus-response bindings (within-task condition, identical-
question); and reduced by inversion of the categorical cue (for example: “bigger than...” at 
study to “smaller than...” at test) because retrieval of stimulus-response binding does not 
produce any facilitation but facilitation arises by retrieval of stimulus-classification 
binding (within-task condition, reversed-question); and abolished by change in task when 
responses were incongruent (size judgement at study and natural/manmade judgement at 
test) because no facilitation can arise from retrieval of stimulus-classification binding or 
stimulus-response binding (across-task condition). In summary, rapid response learning at 
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multiple codes is able to account for most priming effects in speeded classification of 
objects. 
On the other hand, over the years cumulative results in studies of person recognition 
have supported an interpretation of repetition priming as facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks. Facilitation for repeated stimuli is thought to result from 
modifications in perceptual and conceptual networks assigned to stimulus processing 
(Bruce & Young, 1986, 2012; Burton, 1998; Burton et al., 1990; Humphreys et al., 1995). 
In relation to perceptual and/or conceptual overlap of processes engaged in successive 
encounters with a stimulus, repetition priming can be data-driven and/or conceptually 
driven (Jacoby, 1983; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Data-driven priming is 
modulated by changes in stimulus material (different pictures of a stimulus at study and 
test) and abolished by changes in stimulus format (name at study and picture at test); 
conceptually driven priming is modulated by conceptual requirements of two different 
tasks (occupation at study and nationality at test) and blocked in perceptual or familiarity 
judgement tasks. The independence of these two types of facilitation for person 
recognition has been recently highlighted by Boehm & Sommer (2012). In two 
experiments they showed that priming for person recognition from faces or names was the 
combination of data-driven and conceptually driven priming. The amount of priming for a 
stimulus presented in study and test phases under the same perceptual (identical facial 
pictures of celebrities – data-driven priming) and conceptual conditions (occupation 
judgement both at study and test – conceptually driven priming) was identical to the sum 
of the amounts of priming for stimuli repeated respectively in designs in which perceptual 
properties (name at study, picture at test – no data-driven priming) and conceptual contexts 
(familiarity judgement at study, occupation judgement at test – no conceptually driven 
priming) were modified. The likeness was so perfect that no room for alternative 
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explanation was left.  
These studies present a quite intriguing picture: rapid response learning produces 
repetition priming in object recognition while facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks causes repetition priming in person recognition. Whether rapid response learning 
occurs in person recognition is a question that has never been addressed directly. However, 
some clues can be found in those experiments that have tested priming in person 
recognition within tasks and across tasks. As introduced earlier, a change of task 
obliterates facilitation from retrieval of stimulus-classification binding and blocks 
facilitation from retrieval of stimulus-response binding for some stimuli and not others. 
Therefore, studies that used across-task conditions represent a way to find preliminary 
indications of rapid response learning in person recognition. For instance, greater 
facilitation within tasks than across tasks in Johnston & Barry’s (2006) Experiment 1 may 
indicate retrieval of stimulus-classification binding; however, this explanation is 
questionable because similar results would also be expected as modulation of facilitation 
in conceptual networks. On the other hand, evidence against any involvement of rapid 
response learning in person recognition is less controversial: across-task facilitation was as 
large as within-task facilitation when tested from faces to names or vice versa (Burton et 
al., 1998; Johnston & Barry, 2006), giving no indication of retrieval of stimulus-
classification binding; moreover, effect of response congruency across tasks was not 
significant (Johnston & Barry, 2006), giving no indication of stimulus-classification 
binding.  
Although rapid response learning for person recognition seems to be ruled out, 
design issues leave open the possibility that effects of binding retrieval have never been 
obtained before because processes occurring beyond perceptual and conceptual networks 
have never been properly tested. The use of tasks that do not differ in semantic 
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requirement but in the utilization of this semantic information allows a similar isolation 
(Dobbins et al., 2004). In a similar condition, the semantic information accessed to express 
a size judgement in comparison to a reference size (shoebox) is identical regardless of the 
categorical cue of the question, “bigger?” or “smaller?”, excluding any modulation of 
conceptually driven priming; at the same time, presenting the same stimulus at study and 
test excludes any modulation of data-driven priming. In similar designs any modulation of 
priming can be attributed exclusively to rapid response learning. 
The aim of Experiment 1 was the direct investigation of rapid response learning for 
person recognition. A design as similar as possible to that employed to study rapid 
response learning for object recognition was adapted to be suitable in speeded 
classification tasks of facial pictures of celebrities. 
 
2.2 Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 employed a design ideal to study the effect of stimulus-response 
binding but with faces of celebrities as stimuli. The shoebox task was changed to a size 
judgement more suitable to be used with people: height judgement. Stimuli were presented 
three times in study phases and each study phase was followed immediately by the 
respective test phase where stimuli presented at study were presented again intermixed 
with new stimuli. The crucial factor, inversion of the direction of task, was implemented 
by using two categorical cues (taller and shorter) for the height judgement task. Thus, 
when the categorical cues at study and test were identical (identical-question condition) 
facilitation can be generated from stimulus-classification and stimulus-response bindings; 
when the categorical cues were different (reversed-question condition) response codes 
retrieved from stimulus-response binding had to be inverted (for example: ‘yes’ became 
‘no’, ‘right button’ became ‘left button’) but facilitation can be generated by stimulus-
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classification binding. 
If repetition priming for person recognition results from rapid response learning, 
there should be a significant difference in the amount of facilitation in relation to task 
instruction performed at study (stimulus-response effect): priming should be larger in 
identical-question condition compared to reversed-question condition. 
 
2.2.1 Materials and Methods 
 
2.2.1.2 Participants 
 
Forty-two healthy adults participated in return for course and print credits. The data 
from two participants were discarded because of technical problems. The mean age of the 
remaining forty participants (20 females) was 21 years (range 18-40). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and four participants were left-handed by self-
report. The study was approved by the ethics committee at the School of Psychology, 
Bangor University, and all participants gave written informed consent. 
 
2.2.1.2 Stimuli 
 
The stimulus set consisted of 272 black and white facial pictures of celebrities 
(among them: singers, actors, politician, athletes and TV stars). The stimulus set was made 
up of four sub-sets of 68 stimuli each: two for male celebrities (taller than the reference 
height vs. shorter than the reference height; for example Arnold Schwarzenegger and 
Danny DeVito) and two for female celebrities (for example Uma Thurman and Mother 
Teresa). The difference in average height between male and female celebrities was 
accounted for by selecting a reference height of 5’10’’ (178 cm) for male and of 5’05’’ 
(165 cm) for female celebrities. The selected celebrities had a height at least 1’’ above or 
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below the corresponding gender-specific reference height. The height of selected 
celebrities was obtained from web pages and internet forums. 
An additional 28 pictures were used for practice runs: 7 stimuli for each 
gender/height sub-set. 
 
2.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
The experiment consisted of four study-test cycles, and initial practice runs. 
Participants were to express yes/no judgments on a categorical question about the height of 
famous people. Possible task instructions were “Is the celebrity taller than x?” or “Is the 
celebrity shorter than x?”, where x referred to the gender-specific reference height. 
Male and female celebrities were presented in different cycles because of differences 
in reference heights, resulting in four cycles. Each cycle consisted of one study and one 
test phase. In two cycles (one for male celebrities, one for female celebrities), categorical 
cues in study and test phases were identical (at study “...taller...?” and at test ”...taller...?” 
or at study “...shorter...?” and at test ”...shorter...?”), and two cycles (one for each gender) 
had different categorical cues in study and test phases (“...shorter...?” “...taller...?” or 
“...taller...?” ”...shorter...?”). Half of the participants performed “...taller...?” judgments in 
test phases, the other half performed “...shorter...?” judgments at test. The order of 
judgements at study was randomized across participants. 
In study phases, 34 celebrities, with an equal proportion of celebrities taller than and 
shorter than the reference height, were presented three times in semi-random order (second 
presentation could start only after all the stimuli had been presented once, similarly for 
third presentation; in addition, immediate stimulus repetition was avoided). In test phases, 
studied celebrities were presented again (primed stimuli), randomly intermixed with 34 
celebrities (17 taller than the reference height) not presented in the experiment before 
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(unprimed stimuli). Four experimental conditions were obtained: according to the 
relationship between categorical cues at study and test within the cycle stimuli could be 
primed at study under same (primed identical-question) or reversed (primed reversed-
question) questions; similarly half of unprimed stimuli were incorporated in cycle with 
identical categorical cues in the two phases (unprimed identical-question) and half of 
primed stimuli were incorporated in cycles with different categorical cues (unprimed 
reversed-question). 
At the beginning of each phase, task instruction was displayed (for cycles with 
female celebrities questions were: ‘Is the celebrity taller than 5’05’’ (165 cm)?‘ or ‘Is the 
celebrity shorter than 5’05’’ (165 cm)?’; while in cycles with male celebrities the questions 
had a reference height of 5’10’’ (178 cm)). Reminders of the categorical cue (‘T’ for taller 
and ‘S’ for shorter) were placed on paper next to the keyboard, and participants were 
instructed to change them according to task instruction displayed at the beginning of each 
phase. 
Throughout, stimuli were presented at a size of 11.3x15 deg for 2000 ms at the 
centre of the screen against a black background, separated for 500 ms by a white fixation 
cross. Participants pressed the F and J keys of a computer keyboard (labelled respectively 
‘yes’ and ‘no’) with their left and right index fingers for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answers. 
Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received written instructions about 
the tasks and had four short practice runs, one for each combination of categorical cue 
(taller; shorter) and gender (male; female), with seven stimuli each. 
 
2.2.1.4 Data Analysis 
 
Only accuracy and response times data from the final test phases are reported and 
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analysed (see Appendix 2 for data analysis of accuracy and response times in the study 
phases). Trials with missing or early responses (response time < 200 ms) in test phases 
were excluded. In response times analysis, but not in the analysis of accuracy, only correct 
trials were analysed, and, furthermore, primed stimuli, even if the correct response was 
given at test, were excluded from the calculation of the averages when at least a wrong 
response had been given at study; this is a standard procedure in investigations of rapid 
response learning in order to avoid analyzing primed trials with wrongly bound responses 
(see Appendix 1 for response times analysis when consistently incorrect trials were 
considered too). 
Priming in the two conditions was assessed as the difference in accuracy and 
response times between primed and unprimed stimuli (priming identical-question = 
unprimed identical-question – primed identical-question; priming reversed-question = 
unprimed reversed-question – primed reversed-question); priming values were contrasted 
to assess rapid response learning (stimulus-response effect = priming identical-question – 
priming reversed-question). 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on response times and accuracy to 
check for any interaction of gender on main effects and stimulus-response effect. 
Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests were applied to mean response times to determine 
effects of stimulus repetition and stimulus-response binding; for accuracy analyses, the 
non-parametric test, Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used, instead, because data did not 
fulfil the assumption of normality. The significance level was set at α = .05 for all 
statistical tests. 
Repeated measures ANOVA with categorical cue at test as between participants 
factors was applied to mean priming levels, to check for any interaction with stimulus-
response effect. 
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2.2.2 Results 
 
Although participants were faster and more accurate in responding to male than 
female celebrities, gender did not interact with priming or stimulus-response effect, both in 
accuracy, Fs(1,39) < 1.66, ps > .205, and response times analysis, Fs(1,39) < 0.94, ps > 
.337. In upcoming analyses, response times and accuracy data were collapsed across 
genders. 
Missing and early responses (response time < 200 ms) accounted for 1.0% of trials. 
Accuracy in all the four conditions was significantly larger than change performance 
(50%), zs > 5.33, ps > .001. Repetition of a stimulus did not significantly improve 
accuracy, both for the identical-question condition, z = 1.76, p = .079, or the reversed-
question condition, z = 1.34, p = .179 (see Table 1). The gain in accuracy for stimuli 
primed with identical categorical cue compared to that of stimuli primed with reversed 
categorical cue was not significantly larger, z = 0.28, p = .778. 
 
Table 1  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 1.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 62.6 (1.2)            61.5 (1.2)            
Primed 65.1 (1.4)  63.3 (1.2)  
     
Priming 2.5 (1.4)  1.8 (1.4)  
 
A further 33.3% of the primed trials were excluded because of wrong responses at 
study. Responses to primed stimuli were significantly faster than those for unprimed 
stimuli regardless of categorical cue at study: for the identical-question condition, t(39) = 
12.53, p < .001; for the reversed-question condition, t(39) = 9.35, p < .001 (See Table 2). 
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Table 2  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 1.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 1053 (25)            1086 (27)            
Primed 827 (22)  906 (20)  
     
Priming 225 (18) *** 180 (19) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
The stimulus-response effect was significant, t(39) = 2.28, p < .028 (see Figure 3): 
facilitation was larger for the identical-question condition compared to the reversed-
question condition. 
 
 
Figure 3 Mean priming (plus standard error) in Experiment 1. 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
The between-subjects factor, categorical cue at test, did not interact with the 
stimulus-response effect, F(1,38) = 1.58, p = .693. 
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2.2.3 Discussion 
 
Participants were significantly faster, but not significantly more accurate, in 
responding at test to stimuli primed in a study phase with identical categorical cue 
compared to stimuli primed in a study phase with reversed categorical cue. This is the first 
direct evidence of significant stimulus-response effect in speeded semantic classification 
task of person recognition and, consequently, indicates that rapid response learning 
generalizes to recognition of stimuli from domains other than objects, specifically the 
domain of faces. 
Regardless of the identity of categorical cue at study, response times to primed 
stimuli were significantly faster, but not significantly more accurate, than response times to 
unprimed stimuli. Similar facilitation, particularly for reversed-question condition, could 
be either evidence of retrieval of stimulus-classification binding or evidence of facilitation 
in perceptual and conceptual networks. In fact, a task that requires a comparison of the 
height of a celebrity to a reference height, like the often used shoebox task, implies that the 
semantic information retrieved from memory (height of the celebrity) should be further 
computed (compared to reference height) so that a response can be generated. According 
to Horner & Henson (2009) a computation output is stored in memory as classification 
code and can be retrieved to generate a stimulus-classification effect. On the other hand, 
the same stimulus and the same semantic information were processed both in study and 
test phases, therefore priming in the reversed-question condition could results from 
facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks. To discriminate between these two 
alternatives, a task that does not need any computation (like occupation judgement) would 
be preferable (see Chapter 3).   
The height judgement task is a task that has never been used before. Low accuracy 
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demonstrates that participants had a feeling of how tall is a celebrity but this piece of 
information is probably secondary in the organization of the semantic system. This 
limitation, evident as low accuracy and high exclusion rate of inconsistent responses across 
phases, would suggest the replication of these results in an experiment with more regular 
categorical judgements, like nationality or occupation (see Chapter 3).  
 
In conclusion, results of Experiment 1 show evidence of facilitation in person 
recognition, in a height judgement task, beyond perceptual and conceptual networks for 
face perception and recognition; this facilitation is the product of retrieval of a stimulus-
response binding, in other words, of rapid response learning. 
 
2.3 General discussion 
 
The present experiment was conducted to directly investigate whether rapid response 
learning plays any role in person recognition. Reversing the categorical cue at test 
significantly increased response times compared to keeping categorical cue at test 
identical: this result is clear evidence of retrieval of a stimulus-response binding in person 
recognition. In a wider perspective, these results indicate that rapid response learning is not 
a form of facilitation restricted to recognition of objects, but it generalizes to recognition of 
people from faces as well. 
An important question that emerges from Experiment 1 is why this stimulus-
response effect has never been reported before, ruling out rapid response learning in 
person recognition, and consequently why facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks has been able to account perfectly for whole priming effects when faces are used 
as stimuli. Possible reasons could be found in the numerous differences between 
experimental designs used to study rapid response learning (like the one used in 
48 
 
Experiment 1) and experimental designs generally used to study data-driven and 
conceptually driven priming. Identification of the experimental “factor x” that involves 
rapid response learning in the generation of facilitation in performance for repeated stimuli 
is a crucial piece of knowledge for advancing our understanding of the memory processes 
supporting priming (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).  
Whether rapid response learning is a global interpretation of priming remains an 
open question. Residual priming for the reversed-question condition could, indeed, 
represent facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks; in this case, rapid response 
learning would not be the exclusive mechanism of priming but a complementary 
explanation. A design that rules out any facilitation from bindings’ retrieval is 
recommended to shed more light on this critical point: complete abolition of priming in the 
absence of rapid response learning would imply abandoning facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks as interpretation of priming in favour of rapid response learning (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The presence of a stimulus-response effect in Experiments 1 is the first 
demonstration of rapid response learning in a speeded semantic classification task with 
stimuli from a domain other than the domain of objects, indicating that rapid response 
learning is not specific to object recognition but generalizes to person recognition too. 
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Chapter 3 
  
Experiment 1 presented the first evidence of rapid response learning in person 
recognition. This finding contrasts with the lack of any evidence of facilitation in 
processes beyond perceptual and conceptual networks for person recognition. A similar 
new outcome could be justified by the presence in Experiment 1 of some experimental 
factors unusual to most designs used to study facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks in person recognition. Three design issues were identified: 1) a task that requires 
computation of a classification, 2) contiguity of study and test phases, 3) multiple 
presentations of stimuli at study. In three experiments the relevance of these experimental 
factors was investigated by cumulatively subtracting them from the design used in 
Experiment 1. Experiment 2 employed a conventional conceptual task in order to evaluate 
the relevance of computational processes involved by the task; Experiment 3 employed a 
conventional study-study-test design to address the relevance of contiguity of study and 
test phases; in Experiment 4 stimuli were presented only once at study to investigate the 
importance of multiple study presentations. Results showed that the stimulus-response 
effect was abolished when stimuli were presented only once at study and when contiguity 
of study and test phases with identical categorical cues was interrupted by the intrusion of 
a study phase with reversed categorical cue. These results indicated that contiguity of 
study and test phases and multiple presentation of stimuli at study are necessary for the 
creation of stimulus-response binding, and consequently, for rapid response learning in 
person recognition.  
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Which experimental factor gives rise to rapid response learning in person 
recognition? 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Inversion of the categorical cue allows modulation of the stimulus-response effect 
without affecting perceptual and conceptual processing. This experimental factor is 
generally embodied in a design made up of multiple study-test cycles, where stimuli at 
study are presented three times in a size judgement task - a similar design is often used in 
the literature of repetition priming in object recognition and was used in Experiment 1. 
Three design factors distinguish this design from repetition priming design in person 
recognition, like the one used by Boehm & Sommer (2012): 1) the task, 2) arrangement of 
study and test phases, and 3) number of stimulus repetitions at study. In regular repetition 
priming designs in person recognition a conventional task (occupation judgement) is used, 
all the study phases precede a single test phase and stimuli at study are presented only 
once.  
 
3.1.1 Task that requires further computation  
 
Rapid response learning in object recognition is generally studied in so-called 
“shoebox tasks” (Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2009; Schnyer et al., 2007; 
Schnyer et al., 2006); Experiment 1 employed a similar size judgement task. Size is not a 
discrete but a continuous variable; consequently any categorical judgement should be 
computed online according to a reference size. Rapid response learning can be, therefore, 
the consequence of active utilization of semantic information in tasks that require further 
computations to be carried out (Bruce et al., 2000). The cognitive system could encode the 
output of ad hoc time-consuming computation (either classification or response) and 
retrieve its content when the stimulus is presented again, involving rapid response 
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learning. On the other hand, similar encoding and retrieval processes could be limited 
when the utilization of pre-existent semantic information is sufficient to carry out a more 
regular categorical task (like occupation judgement), without the need of computations; in 
this case the stimulus-response effect should be absent because stimulus-response binding 
is not encoded as it is not necessary for the task. A significant stimulus-response effect in 
other classification tasks in object recognition, like natural/manmade (Horner & Henson, 
2009, Experiment 2), seems to indicate that stimulus-response binding is created even in 
classical categorical tasks. However, Bruce et al. (2000) showed high dependency of 
repetition priming in object recognition on the semantic task; therefore, it is still possible 
that stimulus-response binding in person recognition might need further computations to 
generate a classification code. 
 
3.1.2 Contiguity of phases with identical question 
 
Rapid response learning was first studied in a design made up of a single study phase 
followed by two test phases (Dobbins et al., 2004; Schnyer et al., 2007; Schnyer et al., 
2006 Experiment 1). Schnyer et al. (2006) showed that breaking contiguity of study and 
test phase with identical categorical cue by intrusion of a test phase with reversed 
categorical cue had a significant impact on stimulus-response effect. The role of contiguity 
in the utilization of a stimulus-response binding has not been investigated further, but it 
has been neglected and circumvented by the use of designs in which test phases 
immediately follow the corresponding study phases (Horner & Henson, 2008, 2009, 
2011a, 2011b, 2012; Schnyer et al., 2007; Wig et al., 2009); similarly, Experiment 1 used a 
design made up of study-test cycles. Contiguity of study and test phases makes evident the 
relationship between task instructions in the two consecutive phases and could promote the 
use of episodic memory strategies. For example, participants could retrieve the previously 
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given response for the identical categorical cues or retrieve and invert the previously given 
response for the reversed categorical cue. Dew and Giovanello (2010a) showed that this is 
not the case. Awareness that some stimuli were repeated at test and use of memory 
strategies did not influence associative priming, ruling out this interpretation. On the other 
hand, contiguity of phases with identical categorical cue could be necessary for utilization 
of a stimulus-response binding, a particular kind of associative priming. In conclusion, 
rapid response learning could be favoured by designs in which the relationship between 
categorical cue at study and test is clear because of contiguity of the two phases but 
blocked when this relationship is less clear.  
 
3.1.3 Number of stimulus repetitions at study 
 
 The need for multiple stimulus presentations to obtain rapid response learning has 
been an extremely controversial topic. Most consistent and reliable stimulus-response 
effects have been obtained after two (Wig et al., 2009) or three presentations of stimuli at 
study (Horner & Henson, 2011b, 2012; Race et al., 2010; Race et al., 2009) but reversing 
the categorical cue can decrease facilitation even after a single study presentation when 
stimuli were primed alone (Experiment 1 in Dew & Giovanello, 2010b; Soldan et al., 
2012) and for pairs of stimuli (Dennis et al., 2010; Dennis & Schmidt, 2003). However, a 
significant stimulus-response effect after a single presentation of individual stimuli at 
study was obtained for long exposure times (Experiment 1 in Dew & Giovanello, 2010b) 
but not after short presentation times (Experiment 1 in Horner & Henson, 2011a). In 
addition, studies that presented stimuli one or three times at study, showed that the general 
trend of rapid response learning was similar in the two repetition conditions but more 
robust after three repetitions (Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2009; Schnyer et al., 
2007; Schnyer et al., 2006). In conclusion, stimulus-response binding might need multiple 
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presentations of stimuli at study to acquire sufficient strength to become behaviourally 
relevant. 
These three experimental factors can offer the solution to the question why rapid 
response learning in person recognition was significant in Experiment 1 but not in other 
studies on priming for person recognition, like Boehm & Sommer (2012). 
 
3.1.2 Present experiments 
 
 The aim of the present series of experiments was to cut as much as possible the 
distance between experimental design used in Experiment 1, in which stimulus-response 
effect was significant, and experimental designs generally used to investigate repetition 
priming in person recognition, in which stimulus-response effect was not significant.  
 
 
Figure 4 Representation of factors subtracted step by step from a design (red) that showed 
significant stimulus-response effect and a design (black) in which stimulus-response effect 
was not significant. In design column: S = study phase, T = test phase.  
 
 
Rapid response learning in person recognition was tested directly in three 
experiments to identify the design factors that give rise to stimulus-response effect. A 
subtractive procedure was conducted (see Figure 4); starting and ending points of this 
process were respectively Experiment 1 and Boehm & Sommer (2012). Experiment 1 was 
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designed to be as similar as possible to experiments carried out to study stimulus-response 
binding in object recognition (Horner & Henson, 2008, 2009), with the main exception 
that faces of famous people were used instead of objects. In Experiments 2-4, design 
factors were cumulatively subtracted. In Experiment 2, instead of size judgement, a 
judgement that does not require computation of a response (Bruce et al., 2000; see also 
Barsalou, 1983), like occupation judgement, was used. In Experiment 3 contiguity of study 
and test phases was interrupted by employing a design in which all the study phases were 
separated from a single test phase by a distractor task. As the last subtraction, in 
Experiment 4 the number of stimulus repetitions was reduced from three to one. In 
conclusion, Experiment 4 was identical to experiments carried out to test repetition 
priming in person recognition (the only difference was the use of identical and reversed 
task instructions), in which no evidence of stimulus-response effects have ever been 
reported (Boehm & Sommer, 2012). 
Experiments 2-4 investigated which experimental factor determines the transition 
from facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks to rapid response learning: such a 
transition would be evident as disappearance of any significant difference in facilitation for 
repeated stimuli due to prime history (identical and reversed categorical cue), the so-called 
stimulus-response effect.   
 
3.2 Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 2, rapid response learning in person recognition was tested in an 
occupation judgement task. Occupation judgement is a canonical task to study repetition 
priming in person recognition and it is based on a piece of semantic information that is 
crucial for famous people: celebrities are familiar to most of the people because of their 
occupation. Moreover, the occupation task relies directly on a semantic entry and, unlike 
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height judgement, no further computations are required to express an answer. 
Different directions of the categorization were accomplished by the use of a negation 
in the question: the two categorical questions were ‘Is the celebrity an actor/actress?’ and 
‘Is the celebrity a non-actor/non-actress?’. 
 
3.2.1 Materials and Methods 
 
The experimental design of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, with 
the following exceptions. 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
 
Forty-three adults took part in the experiment. The data from three participants were 
discarded because overall accuracy was below 60% (chance performance is 50%). The 
mean age of the remaining participants (25 females) was 21 years (range 18-37). By self-
report three participants were left-handed. 
 
3.2.1.2 Stimuli 
 
Stimuli consisted of 208 grey-scale facial images of celebrities. The set was made up 
of 52 actors, 52 actresses, 52 non-actors, 52 non-actresses. Non-actors/non-actresses were 
mostly singers, politicians, television presenters and athletes. The stimulus set was 
identical to that used by Boehm and Sommer (2012), except that four stimuli were added. 
A set of 20 pictures of famous people, resembling the characteristics of the 
experimental stimulus set, was used for practice runs. 
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3.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
The experiment consisted of two cycles of consecutive study-test phases. The 
experimental task was occupation judgement; task instructions were ‘Is the celebrity an 
actor/actress?’ and ‘Is the celebrity a non-actor/non-actress?’. Questions in study and test 
phases were identical in one cycle and reversed in one cycle. The order of cycles was 
counterbalanced across participants. Half of the participants performed ‘actor’ judgments 
in test phases, half performed ‘non-actor’ judgments in test phases. 
In study phases 52 faces (13 faces for each sub-set: actor, non-actor, actress, and 
non-actress) were presented in semi-random order three times. In test phases, 104 faces 
were presented in random order; half of them were repeated from the preceding study 
phase (primed), half were novel stimuli, never presented before in the experiment 
(unprimed). 
Stimuli were presented at a size of 11.1x13.5 deg for 600 ms, separated by a fixation 
cross for 2400 ms in study phases and for 1900 ms in test phases. 
Participants first practiced to categorize stimuli according to the two occupation 
questions in two short runs (10 stimuli each). 
 
3.2.2 Results 
 
Missing and early responses (response times < 200 ms) accounted for 0.4% of trials. 
Repetition of a stimulus determined a significant improvement in accuracy, both when 
questions in the cycle were identical, z = 4.54, p < .001, and when questions in the cycles 
were reversed, z = 3.25, p = .001 (see Table 3). Facilitation in accuracy was significantly 
larger for stimuli primed in the identical-question condition compared to those primed in 
the reversed-question condition, z = 2.12, p = .034.  
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Table 3 
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 2.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 74.0 (1.8)            75.1 (1.4)            
Primed 83.0 (1.3)  79.9 (1.7)  
     
Priming 9.0 (1.5) *** 4.8 (1.4) ** 
Note: **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Further 22.3% of the primed trials were excluded because of wrong responses at 
study. Responses to primed stimuli were significantly faster than responses to unprimed 
stimuli both for the identical-question condition, t(39) = 13.30, p < .001, and the reversed-
question condition, t(39) = 11.44, p < .001 (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 2.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 952 (31)            961 (33)            
Primed 722 (25)  766 (29)  
     
Priming 230 (17) *** 195 (17) *** 
Note: ***p < .001 
 
The stimulus-response effect, assessed as difference between amounts of priming in 
the two cycles, was significant, t(39) = 2.13, p < .039 (see Figure 5). 
The between-subjects factors, order of the cycles and task instruction at test, did not 
interact with stimulus-response effect in response times analysis, Fs(1,36) < 2.33, ps > 
.632. 
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Figure 5 Mean priming in the two question conditions in Experiments 2-3-4 
Note: * p < .05 and ns p > .05. 
 
3.2.4 Discussion 
 
Having answered a reversed question in the study phase significantly affects priming 
both for accuracy and response times compared to having answered the identical question 
at study: accuracy gain and response times benefit due to stimulus repetition were smaller 
in the reversed-question condition compared to the identical-question condition. This 
outcome, a replication of the results of Experiment 1, demonstrates that a stimulus-
response effect for faces can be obtained even in more conventional tasks where accuracy 
is higher and no further computations are required.  
Priming in the reversed-question condition was significant both for response times 
and accuracy; this facilitation could be either the effect of stimulus-classification binding 
or facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks. 
 
The significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 2 rules out task requirements 
from the list of the design factors that determine the involvement of rapid response 
learning in person recognition.  
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3.3 Experiment 3 
 
In Experiment 3 rapid response learning in person recognition was tested with a 
design in which, instead of having study-test cycles, two study phases were performed 
consecutively at the beginning of the experiment, followed by a distractor task, and a 
single test phase. A similar design was used by Dennis et al. (2010) in Experiment 1, with 
the exception that a distractor phase between study phases and test phase was employed in 
the present experiment. In this design it is quite unlikely that participants realize the 
memory nature of the experiment, therefore explicit encoding is reduced. In addition, 
contiguity between phases with identical question is interrupted by distractor task.  
 
3.3.1 Materials and Methods 
 
The experimental design of Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 2, with 
the following exceptions. 
 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
 
From forty-seven adults participating in the experiment, the data of seven 
participants were discarded because the overall accuracy was below 60% (chance 
performance is 50%) or a failure to answer the correct question in one of the study phases. 
Mean age of the remaining 40 participants (27 females) was 21 years (range 18 - 43). 
Three participants were left-handed by self-report. 
 
3.3.1.2 Stimuli 
 
Only 204 stimuli (identical stimulus set used by Boehm and Sommer, 2012) from the 
set of 208 stimuli used in Experiment 2 were used for the experiment proper. An additional 
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150 colour pictures of common objects on a white background were used for the distractor 
phase; half of the objects were presented upright and the other half were presented upside-
down. 10 objects were randomly selected for practice with the distractor task; the 
remaining 140 objects were used for the experimental distractor phase. 
 
3.3.1.3 Procedure 
 
Participants first practiced the two categorizations for celebrities (‘actor/actress’ and 
‘non-actor/non-actress’) and the categorization for objects (‘correctly orientated’ or ‘not 
correctly orientated’) in three short practice runs (10 stimuli each). 
The experiment consisted of two study phases, followed by distractor phase and test 
phase. Different questions were answered in the two study phases. At test a stimulus could 
be presented for the first time (unprimed) or could have been presented before under 
identical (primed identical-question) or reversed (primed reversed-question) question. The 
order of the two study phases was counterbalanced across participants. Task instructions 
for the distractor phase were for half the participants ‘Is the object correctly orientated?’ 
and for the other half ‘Is the object not correctly orientated?’. 
In study phases, 68 faces (17 faces for each category: male actor, male non-actor, 
female actor, and female non-actor) were presented in random order three times, while 
avoiding immediate repetitions. At test, all the 204 stimuli were presented: 1/3 of the 
stimuli were repeated from the study phase with identical question, 1/3 of the stimuli were 
repeated from the study phase with reversed question and 1/3 were stimuli not presented 
before. 
Between the two study phases and the test phase, a distractor phase was conducted, 
presenting pictures of objects in random order with size of 13.1*13.1 deg for 600 ms and 
separated by a black fixation cross on white background for 2400 ms.3.3.1.4 Data Analysis 
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Priming in the two conditions was assessed by contrasting unprimed stimuli against 
stimuli presented before in one of the two study phases separately (priming identical-
question = unprimed – primed identical-question; priming reversed-question = unprimed – 
primed reversed-question). 
Data from the distractor phase was not considered in data analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
Missing and early responses (response times < 200 ms) accounted for 0.8% of trials. 
Accuracy for unprimed stimuli was significantly lower than accuracy for stimuli presented 
in a study phase with identical question to that at test, z = 4.36, p < .001, or with reversed 
question, z = 3.39, p = .001 (see Table 5). The 1.1% (SE = 0.9%) difference in accuracy 
gain between question conditions, signature of stimulus-response effect, was not 
significant, z = 1.13, p = .258. 
 
Table 5  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 3.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 72.9 (1.6) 
Primed 79.0 (1.5)  77.9 (1.3)  
     
Priming 6.1 (1.0) *** 5.0 (1.2) ** 
Note: **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Inconsistent responses accounted for 23.2% of correct primed trials. Priming resulted 
in significant faster responses for both identical-question, t(39) = 10.24, p < .001, and 
reversed-question condition, t(39) = 11.42, p < .001 (see Table 6). 
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Table 6  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 3.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 906 (30) 
Primed 736 (23)  758 (24)  
     
Priming 171 (17) *** 149 (13) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
Facilitation was significantly reduced when the question was reversed, (M = 22, SE = 
9), t(39) = 2.57, p = .014, indicating a stimulus-response effect (see Figure 5). 
Interestingly, the size of the stimulus-response effect was larger when the second 
study phase and the test phase had identical questions (for example: first study phase - 
‘actor/actress?’; second study phase – ‘non-actor/non-actress?’ – test phase ‘non-actor/non-
actress?’) (M = 40 ms, SE = 10) compared to when question in test phase was reversed 
compared to question at second study (for example: first study phase - ‘non-actor/non-
actress?’; second study phase – ‘actor/actress?’ – test phase ‘non-actor/non-actress?’) (M = 
3 ms, SE = 13), F(1,36) = 5.20, p = .029. The significant stimulus-response effect was 
obtained only when the second study and test phases had identical questions (priming 
identical-question: M = 187 ms, SE = 24; priming reversed-question: M = 147 ms, SE = 
20), t(19) = 4.07, p = .001, but not when questions in these two phases were reversed 
(priming identical-question: M = 155 ms, SE = 22; priming reversed-question: M = 151 
ms, SE = 17), t(19) = 0.26, p = .795. 
The second between-subjects factor, question at test, did not interact with stimulus-
response effect, F(1,36) = 1.41, p = .243. 
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3.3.3 Discussion 
 
The results showed that rapid response learning in person recognition was present in 
a design that minimizes, as much as possible, the influence of episodic memory and the 
association between a primed stimulus and a specific priming history condition. 
Facilitation in response times, but not in accuracy, at test was significantly larger for 
stimuli primed in a study phase with the identical question than that for stimuli primed in a 
study phase with the reversed question.  
Again, priming in the reversed-question condition was significant both for response 
times and accuracy.  
Interestingly the stimulus-response effect was not abolished by the intrusion of a 
distractor phase between the two study phases and the single test phase, indicating that the 
contiguity of identical question is not necessary for rapid response learning. On the 
contrary, modulation of stimulus-response effect by the arrangement of study phases seems 
to indicate otherwise: the stimulus-response effect was significant when the second study 
phase had identical question but not when the second study phase had reversed question. 
This effect could be due to the fact that stimulus-response binding does not survive long 
lags or, alternatively, that stimulus-response binding requires contiguity of identical 
questions between the test phase and the preceding study phase, even if separated by a 
classification task for object recognition. 
 
The overall significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 3 seems to rule out 
the necessity of study-test cycles to obtain rapid response learning in person recognition. 
The order effect, on the contrary, suggests that either contiguity of study and test phases 
with identical questions, even if interrupted by a distractor task, is necessary for the 
retrieval of stimulus-response binding, or, alternatively, the binding is short-lived.  
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3.4 Experiment 4 
 
In the study of repetition priming in person recognition stimuli were generally 
primed by a single presentation at study. In Experiment 4 rapid response learning in person 
recognition was investigated when primed stimuli were presented only once at study. The 
design of Experiment 4 resembles designs reported in the literature of priming in person 
recognition with the only difference that in study phases different questions were 
presented. 
 
3.4.1 Materials and Methods 
 
The experimental design of Experiment 4 was identical to that of Experiment 3, with 
the following exceptions. 
 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
 
From forty-five adults participating in the experiment, the data of five participants 
were discarded because the overall accuracy was below 60% (chance performance is 
50%). The mean age of the remaining forty participants (26 female) was 23 years (range 
19-53). All the participants were right-handed by self-report. 
 
3.4.1.2 Procedure 
 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3, with the exception that stimuli 
in the two study phases were presented only once. 
 
3.4.2 Results 
 
Missing and early responses (response times < 200 ms) accounted for 0.4% of trials. 
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When question was identical in study and test phases, the accuracy for primed stimuli was 
significantly larger than accuracy for unprimed stimuli, z = 4.22, p < .001, indicating 
improved accuracy as a result of priming. Repetition of a stimulus improved accuracy even 
when questions were reversed, z = 3.61, p < .001. Accuracy gains for primed stimuli did 
not differ significantly, z = 1.30, p = .19 (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 4.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 80.2 (1.4) 
Primed 85.2 (1.1)  84.4 (1.1)  
     
Priming 5.0 (0.8) *** 4.2 (1.0) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
Inconsistent responses accounted for 10.8% of correct primed trials. Response times 
for primed stimuli were significantly faster than unprimed stimuli regardless of the 
question at study phase, ts(39) > 11.90, ps < .001 (see table 8).  
 
Table 8  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 4.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 1019 (24) 
Primed 891 (24)  900 (26)  
     
Priming 127 (11) *** 118 (10) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
The stimulus-response effect in reaction times was not significant, t(39) > 1.11, p < 
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.276 (see Figure 5). 
None of the between-subjects factors interacted with the stimulus-response effect: 
order of the study phases, F(1,36) = 0.51, p = .480, task instruction at test, F(1,36) = 1.36, 
p = .251. 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
 
Facilitation for stimuli primed by a single presentation at study did not differ 
significantly according to the question at study. This result suggests that a stimulus must 
necessarily be presented more than one time in order to induce the stimulus-response 
binding, fundamental for rapid response learning. The absence of a stimulus-response 
effect when stimuli were presented only once at study is in line with most of the studies of 
repetition priming in person recognition. 
No matter the absence of rapid response leaning, priming for repeated stimuli was 
significant both in accuracy and response times. 
 
A non significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 4 suggests that multiple 
stimulus repetitions at study is the experimental factor x - the experimental factor that 
determines the involvement of rapid response learning in repetition priming in person 
recognition. 
 
3.5 General Discussion 
 
The present series of experiments was conducted in an attempt to identify the 
design factor, or design factors, that gives rise to a stimulus-response effect. Rapid 
response learning in person recognition was extensively studied in three experiments and 
three design factors were cumulatively subtracted to evaluate which one is necessary for 
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the expression of rapid response learning in person recognition. Reversing the direction of 
categorization significantly reduced priming in response times when stimuli were repeated 
three times (Experiments 2-3) but not when stimuli were presented only one time at study 
(Experiment 4). In addition, the order effect in Experiment 3 suggests that retrieval of a 
stimulus-response binding can be modulated by arrangement of the study phases or the 
delay between study and test phases. These results indicate that stimulus-response binding 
requires multiple study presentations to be created, and it can either be short-lived or 
depend on contiguity of phases with identical task instruction. 
Throughout the three experiments, facilitation was significant in response times 
analyses and numerically positive in accuracy analyses not only for primed identical-
question but for primed reversed-question as well. Residual priming after inversion of task 
instruction could result from stimulus-classification binding or from facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks, but the use of a task that does not required additional 
computation theoretically excludes stimulus-classification binding. Classifying a stimulus 
as taller or as shorter than a reference size, as in Experiment 1, could be useful because a 
response cannot be generated immediately from semantic information, height of the 
person, but it requires further computations. On the contrary, an occupation judgement 
task, the classification code coincides with the semantic entry: a celebrity is already 
categorized as an actor, and therefore there is no reason for any task-specific classification. 
Therefore imposing a classification code even for pre-existent categorization is an 
excessive twist; it would be easier to state that, even if perceptual and semantic networks 
are by-passed by stimulus-response association, they are tuned, and some facilitation can 
be generated in these networks, when the retrieval of a stimulus-response binding is no 
more efficient. Chapter 5 presents unquestionable empirical data in favour of tuning of 
perceptual and conceptual networks beside the creation of a stimulus-response binding.  
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 3.4.1 Task that requires further computation 
 
The presence of a significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 2 means that 
rapid response learning is not a consequence of the task (height judgment vs. occupation 
judgement). Rapid response learning was significant both in a task like height judgement 
(Experiment 1) that requires creation of an ad hoc answer to be solved, and in a task like 
occupation judgement (Experiment 2) that can be solved by the usage of pre-existing 
information. Surprisingly, the stimulus-response effect in accuracy analysis was significant 
in the occupation judgement but not in the height judgement: the opposite would be 
expected because if stimulus-response binding is the consequence of encoding the output 
of computational processes to avoid re-engaging in these computations again, then the 
stimulus-response effect should be significant in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of both the stimulus-response effect and priming in response 
times between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was numerically similar, indicating a 
general homogeneity of the involved facilitations in these two different judgements. This 
homogeneity suggests that other secondary experimental differences between Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2 like presentation times (600 ms in Experiment 2 and 2000 ms in 
Experiment 1), and consequently different ISI, and number of stimuli at study (52 in 
Experiment 2 and 34 in Experiment 1), do not have any significant influence on the 
stimulus-response effect. It is important to highlight at this point that such homogeneity of 
results between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggests that task, and item difficulty, 
does not affect significantly priming and rapid response learning results. Even though 
participants are less sure in judging the height than the occupation of a celebrity and might 
be, therefore, more prone in creating an ad hoc classification to give consistent responses 
to difficult items, the stimulus-response effect had a similar magnitude in these two 
experiments. On the other hand, when consistently incorrect responses are considered in 
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average response times in Experiment 1 (see Appendix), the stimulus-response effect 
became stronger, indicating a possible influence of ad hoc classifications on rapid response 
learning.    
The occupation judgement was selected because it is a natural categorization that 
does not required online computation, but it could be argued that the use of a non-actor 
category as task instruction implies computation and perhaps the creation of a 
classification code. The semantic system is probably not organized between actors and 
non-actors, but across actors, singers, politicians, and so on, therefore the need of an ad 
hoc classification for non-actors could be plausible. The use of two close categories (for 
example actors and singers) is recommended (see Chapter 5, Experiment 7). 
 
3.4.2 Contiguity of phases with identical question  
 
 The results of Experiment 3 are less definitive in determining whether rapid 
response learning depends on contiguity of study and test phases. Although an overall 
significant stimulus-response effect indicates that contiguity of study and test phases is not 
a prerequisite for rapid response learning, the significant effect of arrangement of the study 
phases argues the opposite. The stimulus-response effect was significant (and its 
magnitude was surprisingly similar to that in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) only when 
study and test phases with identical question were contiguous, even if separated by a 
distractor phase, but the stimulus-response effect was abolished when the contiguous study 
and test phases had reversed questions. The order effect opens two important possibilities: 
1) contiguity of study and test phases with identical question is a design factor x for rapid 
response learning or 2) stimulus-response binding is short-lived. Before discussing the 
details of these two alternatives, it is worthwhile underlining that a similar effect must be 
considered cautiously and further investigations are preferable, particularly within-
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participant, given the low statistical power of the analysis in Experiment 3 (see Chapter 4, 
Experiment 6; and for within-participant analysis Chapter 6).  
An interaction of the arrangement of questions in the study phases with a stimulus-
response effect is not a new finding in the literature of rapid response learning in object 
recognition. The first design used to test rapid response learning employed a single study 
phase and two test phases: ‘switch’, reversed question condition, and ‘return’, identical 
question condition. Dobbins et al. (2004) reported that after a switch phase, neural and 
behavioural priming did not show any recovery: in other words, performing a test phase in 
which task instruction was reversed abolished neural and behavioural signatures of rapid 
response learning. Schnyer at al. (2006) analysed behaviourally this effect and obtained 
similar results: when the test phase with the identical question was performed after the test 
phase with the reversed question, the stimulus-response effect was significantly smaller 
compared to when the test phase with the identical question followed immediately the 
study phase. Schnyer at al. (2006) interpreted this result as neglect in retrieving stimulus-
response binding when a categorization state is interrupted (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).  
An alternative interpretation is the lag-effect: stimulus-response binding is short-
lived and disappears when a stimulus is not tested immediately after its study phase. 
Contrary to the design with multiple test phases, in Experiment 3 two study phases were 
conducted before a single test phase, and these different phases were separated by a 
distractor task. Consequently, there are different delays between the moment a stimulus is 
studied in the two conditions and the moment it is tested, determining differences in lag. 
Although this experiment was not design to test lag-effect, it can give us some interesting 
insights about the nature of stimulus-response binding. The delay between phases imposed 
by the distractor task would create lags similar, or even longer, to the ones for the second 
test phase in Schnyer et al. (2006), hence, any stimulus-response effect should be 
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abolished no matter the arrangement of questions in the study phases in Experiment 3. On 
the other hand, the stimulus-response effect survived lag when the reversed question was 
answered during the first study phase and the identical question during the second study 
phase and its magnitude resembled that obtained in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, when 
no lag was involved. Although these findings seem to indicate that the stimulus-response 
effect is not short-lived direct investigation is required (see Chapter 4, Experiment 6).  
 
3.7.3 Number of stimulus repetitions at study 
 
 The absence of a significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 4 indicates that 
a single stimulus repetition at study is not sufficient to induce binding between stimulus 
and response - binding that is essential for the expression of rapid response learning. The 
lack of a significant stimulus-response effect in Experiment 4, which employed a setup 
closest to conventional repetition priming studies, is in line with more than twenty years of 
research in priming in person recognition, suggesting that rapid response learning may 
contribute very little to conventional person recognition when stimuli are presented just 
once at study.  
However, Experiment 4 is the end point of a subtractive process, therefore the 
absence of a significant stimulus-response effect could be determined by the combination 
of the three subtracted factors (task, design structure, number of repetitions) and not by the 
number of stimuli presentations at study per se. The numerical decrease of both priming 
and stimulus-response effect (if order effect is not taken into account) in Experiment 3 
suggests that design structure could have had an influence on facilitation. Besides, the 
stimulus-response effect in object recognition was previously shown significant even after 
a single presentation (Dew & Giovanello, 2010b). Therefore the statement that rapid 
response learning in person recognition requires multiple presentations of stimuli at study 
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needs to be corroborated by an experiment with a regular rapid response learning design 
(study-test cycles) and a single stimulus repetition at study (see Chapter 4, Experiment 5). 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Stimulus-response binding requires multiple stimulus presentations at study to be 
behaviourally relevant, and its effect is abolished when the contiguity between study and 
test phases with identical questions is interrupted by another study phase with reversed 
questions. These two potential x factors need, tough, further corroboration. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 3 shows that rapid response learning in person recognition is absent when 
stimuli are presented only one time at study or when the study phase with identical task 
instruction does not immediately precede the test phase. Both these two outcomes need 
further investigation to exclude confounding factors or to obtain a better understanding of 
the reason behind the specific effect. Two experiments were carried out. Experiment 5 
employed a design identical to that of Experiment 2 with the exception that stimuli were 
presented only once at study to address the necessity of multiple presentation of stimuli for 
stimulus-response binding. Experiment 6 employed a design identical to that of 
Experiment 4 with the exception that the duration of the distractor phase was extended to 
investigate any lag effect for stimulus-response effect. The results showed that the 
stimulus-response effect was absent after a single repetition even in a design made up of 
study-test cycles but was significant both for short and long delays. Surprisingly, the order 
effect was not replicated in Experiment 6. These two experiments clearly indicate that 
rapid response learning in person recognition occurs only in designs in which stimuli are 
repeated more than once, and that it survives delays longer than half an hour between 
study and test. In addition, the contiguity of study and test phases does not seem to have a 
reliable/strong impact on rapid response learning. 
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a) Are multiple stimulus repetitions at study necessary for rapid 
response learning in person recognition? 
 
4.a.1 Introduction 
 
Priming in person recognition benefits marginally from multiple presentations at study 
(Lander, Bruce, Smith, & Hancock, 2009; Lewis & Ellis, 1999). Priming is generally 
significant even after a single presentation (e.g. Rugg et al., 1998). Consequently, priming 
has been studied mostly by presenting stimuli only once in study phases.  
On the other hand, rapid response learning for objects has been mainly tested with 
stimuli primed by single (low primed) or triple presentation (high primed) during the same 
study phase (Dennis & Perfect, 2012; Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2009; 
Schnyer et al., 2007; Schnyer at al., 2006). In general, the stimulus-response effect is 
robust and consistently significant across experiments only in the high primed condition; 
low primed condition generally presents smaller and less reliable stimulus-response effect 
(but see Schnyer et al., 2006). In fact, most recent rapid response learning experiments 
have preferred triple or double presentation of stimuli at study (Horner & Henson, 2012; 
Race et al., 2009; Race et al., 2008; Wig et al., 2009); but significant rapid response 
learning has been reported even after a single study presentation (Dew & Giovanello, 
2010b; but see Experiment 1 in Horner & Henson, 2011a). 
Chapter 3 shows that after a single study presentation, like in Experiment 4, the 
stimulus-response effect is not significant. This result is in line with Experiment 1 in 
Horner & Henson (2011a) but contrasts with significant effect of stimulus-response 
binding in Dew & Giovanello (2010b). This last contradiction is difficult to accommodate 
because similarly to Experiment 4, but contrary to Horner & Henson (2011a), Dew & 
Giovanello (2010b) presented the same stimulus at study and test. However, an important 
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difference between Experiment 4 and Experiment 1 in Dew & Giovanello (2010b), which 
could account for this conflict, is the arrangement of study and test phases: respectively 
study-study-test and study-test-study-test. In fact, the cumulative subtraction of 
experimental factors from Experiment 2 to Experiment 4 leaves the possibility that the 
single presentation of stimuli in study phases is not sufficient to abolish any contribution 
from stimulus-response binding, but the absence of a stimulus-response effect in 
Experiment 4 is determined by the combined effect of single stimulus repetition at study 
and arrangement of study and test phases (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6 Schematic representation of design factors. On the left hand side designs used in 
Experiment 2 (study-test cycles) and Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 (study-study-
distracter-test) are represented; on the right hand side the experiments are arranged 
according to the number of stimulus presentations at study (triple or single). A summary of 
the results of Chapter 2 is reported. The missing point to get the complete picture of the 
results is Experiment 5.  
 
Experiment 5 tested whether a single repetition is sufficient to elicit stimulus-
response binding in person recognition when a design that emphasizes contiguity between 
study and test phases is used, as in Dew & Giovanello (2010b). No significant difference 
between amounts of priming would support the claim that stimulus-response binding in 
person recognition depends on multiple stimulus repetitions, regardless of the arrangement 
of study and test phases; on the other hand, significant results would indicate that single 
presentation of stimuli is not sufficient to abolish stimulus-response effect if the contiguity 
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of study and test phases is maintained.  
 
4.a.2 Experiment 5 
 
Experiment 5 investigated whether the stimulus-response effect is not significant 
after a single presentation of stimuli even when study-test cycles are used. Experiment 5 
employed a design identical to that of Experiment 2 with the exception that stimuli were 
presented only once at study. 
  
4.a.2.1 Materials and Methods 
 
The experimental design of Experiment 5 was identical to that of Experiment 2, with 
the following exceptions. 
 
4.a.2.1.1 Participants 
 
From forty-five adults participating in the experiment, the data of five participants 
were discarded because overall accuracy was below 60% (chance performance is 50 %). 
The mean age of the remaining 40 participants (28 females, 5 left-handed) was 21 years 
(range 18-36). 
 
4.a.2.1.2 Procedure 
 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2, with the exception that stimuli 
in study phases were presented only once. 
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4.a.2.2 Results 
 
Missing and early responses accounted for 0.4% of trials. When questions in study 
and test phases were identical, accuracy for primed stimuli was significantly higher than 
accuracy for unprimed stimuli, z = 3.41, p = .001; when questions were reversed, accuracy 
for primed stimuli was not significantly different from accuracy for unprimed stimuli, z = 
1.42, p = .157 (see Table 9). The larger accuracy gain of 3.7% for the identical-question 
condition compared to the reversed-question condition was not significant, z = 1.45, p = 
.146 
 
Table 9  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 5.  
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 81.1 (1.4)            79.2 (1.5)            
Primed 75.4 (1.9)  77.2 (1.4)  
     
Priming 5.7 (1.5) ** 2.0 (1.3)  
Note: **p < .01. 
 
A further 12.8% of correct primed trials were discarded because of incorrect 
responses at study. Priming in response times was assessed by comparing response times 
of correct and consistent primed trials against correct unprimed trials in the two question 
conditions. Repetition of a stimulus resulted in significant faster responses for both the 
identical-question condition, t(39) =10.47, p < .001, and the reversed-question condition, 
t(39) = 9.80, p < .001 (see Table 10).  
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Table 10  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 5.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 961 (33)            967 (31)            
Primed 847 (27)  863 (29)  
     
Priming 114 (11) *** 102 (10) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
The stimulus-response effect was assessed by comparing the two amounts of 
priming; reversing the categorizations did not significantly slow down responses (M = 12 
ms, SE = 13), t(39) = 0.92, p = .365, indicating a lack of significant rapid response 
learning.  
Neither the question in test phases nor the order of the cycles interacted with the 
stimulus-response effect, Fs(1,36) < 0.73, ps > .398.  
 
4.a.2.3 Discussion 
 
Results of Experiment 5 showed that the stimulus-response effect was not significant 
after a single study presentation even when a design that highlights the association 
between a repeated stimulus and its study context was employed. This result contrasted 
with significant priming in both question conditions (identical and reversed).  
The present experiment further supports the conclusion that rapid response learning 
does not play a significant role in person recognition when stimuli are presented only once 
at study.  
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4.a.3 General discussion 
 
The present experiment was conducted to investigate whether single presentation of 
stimuli at study did not involve facilitation produced by retrieval of stimulus-response 
binding even when the arrangement of study and test phases emphasised the association of 
a primed stimulus to a specific priming context. The absence of a significant stimulus-
response effect in Experiment 5 indicates that the number of stimulus repetitions at study 
is a factor x behind the expression of rapid response learning: when stimuli are presented 
only once, facilitation for repeated stimuli does not change according to the question at 
study. 
The results of Experiment 5 replicate the outcomes of Experiment 4: the stimulus-
response effect is not significant after a single presentation. In addition, any concurrent 
influence of arrangement of study and test phases on results of Experiment 4 is ruled out. 
This result, together with the similar result in Experiment 4, is in line with most studies of 
priming in person recognition: response processes (decision and action) occurring beyond 
perceptual and conceptual networks do not play a significant role in regular priming 
experiments when stimuli are presented only once at study. In the domain of objects, 
instead, Dew & Giovanello (2010b) reported the only direct evidence of rapid response 
learning after a single presentation but this could be consequence of long presentation time 
(6 sec) of stimuli at study. Indeed, in Experiment 1, Horner & Henson (2011b), using a 
shorter presentation time (2 sec) did not find a significant stimulus-response effect. The 
effect of trial duration on rapid response learning has never been considered, but it could 
allow more elaborated processing and, consequently, the strengthening of the link between 
a stimulus and a response, even after a single presentation.  
On the other hand, results from experiments that used low and high primed stimuli 
within the same study phase, should be considered cautiously, because such design could 
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favour retrieval of stimulus-response binding even when the binding is weak, as for stimuli 
primed only once at study. In addition, these experiments present a methodological 
limitation. In an ANOVA, a non significant interaction between question conditions 
(identical vs. reversed) and priming conditions (low vs. high) could be driven by a similar 
trend in the stimulus-response effect but, without follow-up test, it is impossible to 
conclude that the stimulus-response effect is significant even for low primed stimuli. As a 
matter of fact, in the present experiment and Experiment 4, a numerical trend was 
observed (priming in the identical-question condition was numerically larger than priming 
in the reversed-question condition) but the difference was not significant. An interesting 
follow-up investigation would be to test rapid response learning in person recognition 
using low primed and high primed stimuli within the same study phase. 
It is important to note that after a single repetition the stimulus-response effect is not 
significant, but that priming is significant for all repeated stimuli. As suggested before, this 
could be evidence for stimulus-classification binding, but it sounds quite overblown that an 
association between a stimulus and a classification code requires only one repetition while 
an association between a stimulus and decision or action codes would need multiple 
repetitions. Therefore, an interpretation of similar priming as facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks seems more plausible (for direct evidence, see Chapter 5). 
 
4.a.4 Conclusion  
 
Multiple presentations of stimuli are an essential requirement for the creation and 
utilization of stimulus-response binding and for the observation of a robust stimulus-
response effect. 
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b) Is stimulus-response binding short-lived? Or does it require 
contiguity of phases with identical task instruction to be 
expressed?  
 
4.b.1 Introduction 
 
Rapid response learning in object recognition has generally been studied with 
designs in which test phases proceed immediately after the respective study phase (Dew & 
Giovanello, 2010b; Horner & Henson, 2009), but the first design used to study rapid 
response learning had a single study phase and two test phases with opposite questions 
(Dobbins et al., 2004). Schnyer et al. (2006) suggested for the first time to abandon 
Dobbins et al. (2004) design in favour of a design made up of study-test cycles, because of 
the potential confounding experimental issues of lag. In fact, the effect of arrangement of 
the test phases, interpreted as blocked reactivation of any stimulus-response binding by 
responding to different questions, could be the result of decay of stimulus-response 
binding if not tested within a short period of time.  
Experiment 3 presented a similar experimental issue. Stimuli were primed at two 
different points in time, creating delays that could have an impact on rapid response 
learning due to lag. In Experiment 3, delays between presentations of a stimulus at study 
and test were defined mostly by the length of the distractor task and by the order of the 
study phases. If we consider d (7 min) the duration of the distractor task and s (10 min) the 
duration of each individual study phase; the minimum lag for stimuli presented in the first 
study phase was equal to d+s (a mean lag* of 25 min) while the lag for stimuli presented in 
the second study phase was equal to d (a mean lag of 15 min).  
 
*Mean lag is calculated by adjusting minimum lag, a situation in which a stimulus is last in the 
study phase and first at test, by adding 50% of the duration of the test phase (5min) and 86% of the 
duration of the study phase (around 8min) 
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These temporal differences (d vs. d+s) could have an effect if stimulus-response 
binding is short-lived and, in this case, the lag could be the cause of the significant order 
effect in Experiment 3 (see also Dobbins et al., 2004; Schnyer et al., 2006). Given that the 
stimulus-response effect in Experiment 3 was significant for identical question in the 
second study phase but not in first study phase, s seems to be a temporal delay sufficient to 
disrupt or block the utilization of stimulus-response binding. 
In Experiment 6, lag effects on rapid response learning were directly investigated. 
The number of stimuli in the distractor phase was increased and, consequently, the 
duration of the distractor phase was longer: d+d’ (where d’ = s; 17min) (see Figure 7). In 
Experiment 6 the delay between study phases and test phase was d+d’ (a mean lag of 
around 25min) for the second study phase and d+d’+s for the first study phase (a mean lag 
of around 35min) (or, if d’ is substituted with s: d+s for the second study phase and d+s+s 
for the first study phase).  
 
 
 
Figure 7 Schematic representation of the designs used in Experiment 3 and Experiment 6. The 
only difference is that the duration of the distractor task in Experiment 5 is expanded in such a way 
that the delay between second study phase and test phase in Experiment 6 match the delay between 
first study phase and test phase in Experiment 3. 
 
 
The aim of Experiment 6 was to test whether stimulus-response binding survives 
long lag between study and test phases. If stimulus-response binding does not survive a 25 
min delay, as in Experiment 3, no stimulus-response effect is expected in the present 
experiment, no matter the arrangement of the questions at study. An overall significant 
83 
 
stimulus-response effect would instead rule out any lag effect, and support an 
interpretation of the order effect as contiguity.    
 
4.b.2 Experiment 6 
 
In Experiment 6 rapid response learning was investigated after a long distractor 
phase. Compared to Experiment 3, the number of stimuli in the distractor phase was 
increased from 140 to 340, increasing the duration of the distractor phase to 17 min.   
 
 
4.b.2.1 Materials and Methods 
 
Experiment 6 was identical to Experiment 3 with the following exceptions. 
 
4.b.2.1.1 Participants 
 
From forty-three adults participating in the experiment, the data of three participants 
were discarded because the overall accuracy was below 60% (chance performance is 50%) 
or the wrong task instruction was answered in one of the study phases. The mean age of 
the remaining 40 participants (28 females, 3 left-handed) was 19 years (range 18-29). 
 
4.b.2.1.2 Stimuli  
 
A further 200 pictures of objects (100 objects represented in their canonical position, 
100 objects represented upside-down) were used in the distractor task.  
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4.b.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
During the distractor task 340 pictures of objects were randomly displayed instead of 
140. 
 
4.b.2.2 Results 
 
Missing and early responses accounted for 1.5% of trials. When the question at test 
was identical to the question at study, accuracy was significantly higher for primed 
compared to unprimed stimuli, z = 4.23, p < .001, but not when the question was reversed, 
z = 0.92, p = .357 (see Table 11). The larger accuracy gain of 5.5 % for the identical-
question condition compared to the reversed-question condition was strongly significant, z 
= 4.39, p < .001.  
 
Table 11  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 6.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 75.8 (1.6) 
Primed 83.0 (1.2)  77.5 (1.2)  
     
Priming 7.2 (1.4) *** 1.7 (1.4)  
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
A further 22.6% of correct primed trials were discarded because of incorrect 
responses at study. Priming in response times was assessed by comparing response times 
of correct and consistent primed trials for the two question conditions against the unprimed 
trials. Priming resulted in significantly faster responses for both the identical-question 
condition, t(39) =14.39, p < .001, and the reversed-question condition, t(39) = 12.07, p < 
.001 (see Table 12). 
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Table 12  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 6.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 928 (26) 
Primed 752 (21)  780 (23)  
     
Priming 176 (12) *** 149 (12) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
 
Rapid response learning was assessed by comparing response times between the two 
question conditions; the reversed-question condition presented significantly slower mean 
response times than mean response times in the identical-question condition (M = 28 ms, 
SE = 8), t(39) = 3.35, p = .002, indicating a stimulus-response effect.  
The size of the stimulus-response effect was numerically larger, but not significantly 
larger, when the second study phase and the test phase had identical questions (M = 34 ms, 
SE = 13) compared to when questions in the second study phase and the test phase were 
reversed (M = 21 ms, SE = 11), F(1,36) = 0.57, p = .454. A significant stimulus-response 
effect was only obtained when the second study and test phases had identical questions 
(priming identical-question: M = 183 ms, SE = 20; priming reversed-question: M = 149 
ms, SE = 17), t(19) = 2.69, p = .014, but not when questions of the second study and the 
test phase were reversed (priming identical-question: M = 169 ms, SE = 14; priming 
reversed-question: M = 148 ms, SE = 18), t(19) = 1.97, p = .063. 
The second between-subjects factor, task at test, did not interact with the stimulus-
response effect, F(1,36) = 0.46, p = .501. 
 
4.b.2.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 6 tested rapid response learning after long delays between the time at 
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which a stimulus is presented at study and presented again at test. The presence of an 
overall significant stimulus-response effect in accuracy and response times analysis 
suggested that stimulus-response binding is not short-lived: it lasted for at least 30 min. 
This result was further supported by between-subject statistics when the order of study 
blocks was taken into account: the stimulus-response effect was significant both for short 
delays between study and test phases with identical questions and nearly significant for 
long delays between study and test phases with identical questions. If considered together, 
these two pieces of evidence rule out the possibility that rapid response learning is short-
lived.  
Surprisingly, we found no order effect. Although the stimulus-response effect was 
numerically larger when the identical question was answered in the second study phase 
than in the first study phase, the difference was not significant. Although the general trend 
is in line with contiguity, given that lag effect is ruled out, the present results indicate that a 
similar effect is not reliable in the expression of rapid response learning. In fact the 
stimulus-response effect was nearly significant even when contiguity of phases with 
identical questions was blocked by a phase with reversed task instruction. 
 
4.b.3 General discussion 
 
Experiment 6 investigated whether stimulus-response binding is short-lived, and, in 
that case, whether this property can explain the order effect in a study-study-test design. 
Results are against an account of stimulus-response effect as a short-lived priming effect. 
In fact, the stimulus-response effect in the present experiment survived delays of around 
40 min between the last presentation of a stimulus at study and its presentation at test. 
Similar delay is the longest ever used in the study of rapid response learning. This outcome 
is in line with what was suggested by Schnyer et al. (2004): arrangement of the phases has 
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an effect not because of the different delays between study and test phases but because of 
the presence, in some condition, of a phase that disrupts contiguity between phases with 
identical questions.   
Surprisingly, although these results rule out an explanation of the order effect, as in 
Experiment 3, in term of lag, they undermine the reliability of the order effect in general. 
About this point, despite the similar trend of rapid response learning in the two order 
conditions, there are two main differences between results in Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 6: the order effect was significant in the first but not the second and the 
stimulus-response effect when identical question were performed in the first study phase 
was not significant in the first but nearly significant in the second. Considering that the 
two experiments were identical except for the duration of the distractor task, and since the 
lag effect does not abolish the stimulus-response effect, similar mismatches are difficult to 
explain. Such a mismatch could indicate high elusivity of this effect (see also Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7).   
 
4.b.4 Conclusion 
 
Stimulus-response binding is not a short-lived effect. Although the lag does not 
account for the order effects, like the ones reported in the literature and obtained in 
Experiment 3, the present experiment does not fully support the alternative interpretation - 
contiguity - because the order effect was not significant and the stimulus-response effect 
was present even in the non-contiguity condition. 
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Chapter 5 
 
An open question at this point is whether facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks is overpowered by rapid response learning when stimuli are presented more than 
one time at study, preventing it from becoming behaviourally relevant. Chapter 5 aims to 
isolate data-driven and conceptually driven priming (facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks), to prove the presence of facilitation other than rapid response 
learning in designs that promote stimulus-response binding. Orthogonal tasks were used in 
two experiments to detect the incontrovertible presence of networks facilitation when 
stimulus-response and stimulus-classification bindings cannot produce facilitation, as in 
the case of incongruent responses. Results showed that priming was significant even in the 
absence of any possible facilitation from the retrieval of bindings created by rapid response 
leaning. This is clear evidence of data-driven and conceptually driven priming. Other 
modulations of priming were obtained and interpreted as conceptually driven priming and 
stimulus-response effect. For the first time in this series of experiments, evidence for 
interference caused by rapid response learning was also obtained. These findings indicate 
that facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks is not obliterated by the creation 
and utilization of stimulus-response binding, and perhaps stimulus-classification binding, 
but that it co-occurs with rapid response learning to produce repetition priming. In other 
words, rapid response learning and facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks are 
complementary rather than competing aspects of priming.     
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Is facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks obliterated 
by rapid response learning? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 4 faster and more accurate responses to primed than unprimed stimuli in 
the reversed-question condition were interpreted outside the framework of rapid response 
learning; facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks for face perception and 
categorization was suggested instead. In fact, when the same stimulus is repeated in study 
and test phases and task instructions require accessing the same semantic information, as 
in Experiments 1-6, data-driven and conceptually driven priming should be involved.  
Although a similar interpretation of priming in the reversed-question condition is 
supported by more than 20 years of research on priming for person recognition, the 
alternative explanation, retrieval of a stimulus-classification binding, cannot definitely be 
ruled out yet. Priming in the reversed-question condition could still result from the 
reactivation of a classification code bound to the stimulus, which, by-passing perceptual 
and conceptual networks, allows the generation of a response without the need for full 
stimulus re-processing (Horner & Henson, 2009).  
In Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, stimulus-classification binding was criticized on 
theoretical grounds, but, still, using priming in the reversed-question condition as evidence 
of networks facilitation is potentially questionable if this alternative explanation is not 
demonstrated to be empirically plausible. In fact there is no reason to call upon networks 
facilitation to explain an ambiguous effect if it is not demonstrated first that data-driven 
and conceptually driven priming are still effective even in the presence of rapid response 
learning. Therefore, Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 aimed to bring up empirical evidence 
about the existence of facilitation that cannot be explained by rapid response learning, 
even as stimulus-classification binding. Similar priming will be interpreted in terms of 
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facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks. 
The best way to find pure facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks is by 
experimentally limiting any contribution of rapid response learning to priming. Orthogonal 
tasks offer a possible condition in which facilitation from stimulus-classification binding, 
and, at the same time, facilitation from stimulus-response binding are abolished, for half of 
the stimuli. To be clearer about this crucial point: two tasks are considered orthogonal if 
they depend on two different pieces of semantic information (i.e., size vs. natural-
manmade), but responses to the two tasks are identical for half of the stimuli (congruent: 
yes-yes, no-no) and different for half of the stimuli (incongruent: yes-no, no-yes). In a 
similar condition, classifying a stimulus at study as ‘bigger’, does not allow any 
facilitation at test if the judgement is natural-manmade, excluding any contribution from 
retrieval of a stimulus-classification binding. Moreover, facilitation due to retrieval of 
stimulus-response binding is blocked for stimuli that required different responses in the 
two tasks. For example, if the questions at study and test are respectively ‘Is the object 
smaller than a shoebox?’ and ‘Is the object manmade?’, at study the stimulus ‘chair’ is 
classified as ‘bigger’ and response codes (decision and action) are ‘no’ and ‘right button 
press’ while at test all retrieved codes are wrong: ‘manmade’, ‘yes’, ‘left button press’. On 
the other hand, the stimulus ‘mug’ is classified differently in the two tasks (‘smaller’ and 
‘manmade’) but the same response codes are required (‘yes’ and ‘left button press’). 
Responses to ‘chair’ are incongruent while responses to ‘mug’ are congruent.  
In summary, the use of orthogonal tasks allows a condition in which facilitation due 
to rapid response learning is ruled out both at response and classification level. Therefore, 
any facilitation in such condition would imply that rapid response learning is not the 
exclusive generator of priming and that other forms of facilitation should be considered. In 
addition, larger priming for congruent than incongruent responses (congruency effect), a 
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signature of stimulus-response binding, would indicate that facilitation due to the retrieval 
of a stimulus-response binding co-exists with facilitation in conceptual and perceptual 
networks. It is important to highlight here a terminological aspect: effect of retrieval of a 
stimulus-response binding in orthogonal tasks is generally called a congruency effect, 
instead of a stimulus-response effect, but the source of the two effects is probably identical 
(stimulus-response binding).    
In the literature of repetition priming in person recognition orthogonal tasks have 
been already used. Significant facilitation has been obtained after a single presentation of 
stimuli at study even when responses are incongruent (Burton, Kelly & Bruce, 1998; 
Johnston & Barry, 2006). Significant across-task priming for faces (orthogonal tasks 
condition) for incongruent responses is an outcome incompatible with rapid response 
learning, but predicted by facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks. However, the 
picture that emerges from the study of orthogonal tasks in object recognition is opposite. 
Across-task priming for incongruent responses is not significant: both after single (Bruce 
et al., 2000; Vriezen, et al., 1995) and triple presentation of stimuli at study (Horner & 
Henson, 2009; Race et al., 2010). The absence of across-task priming in object recognition 
for incongruent responses is an outcome incompatible with facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks, but predicted by rapid response learning. 
Regarding the retrieval of stimulus-response binding across tasks, a congruency 
effect was significant when stimuli (objects) were presented three times at study (Horner & 
Henson, 2009; Race et al., 2010) but not after single presentation (faces: Johnston & Barry, 
2006; object: Vriezen et al., 1995). A similar picture is in line with an interpretation of 
rapid response learning as facilitation that occurs only after multiple presentations of a 
stimulus at study (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Whether similar generalization takes 
place in the domain of faces when stimuli are presented three times has never been tested 
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before.  
In conclusion, the literature of across-task priming suggests that networks facilitation 
seems the best explanation of priming in person recognition while rapid response learning 
accommodates priming in object recognition, particularly when stimuli are repeated more 
than once at study. This contradiction is investigated in the present experiments by testing 
across-task priming for faces after multiple presentations of stimuli at study: a condition in 
which stimulus-response binding is strong enough to allow the involvement of rapid 
response learning in the generation of facilitation.  
 
5.1.1 Within-task priming vs. across-task priming 
 
Orthogonal tasks offer the possibility of testing whether priming within tasks is 
larger than priming across tasks. According to Burton’s (1998) model of person 
recognition, activation of a PIN determines the activation of all the linked SIUs. The 
consequent prediction is that priming across tasks is equal to priming within tasks because 
all the links between PIN and SIUs are strengthened regardless of task demands. In fact, 
Burton et al. (1998) obtained significant priming from names to facial pictures of 
celebrities (no data-driven priming) at test even in a new categorical task (dead/alive at 
study, nationality at test). A similar point was supported by non significant difference in 
the amounts of priming within tasks and across tasks (Experiment 2, Johnston & Berry, 
2006) when names of celebrities were used to primed facial pictures of celebrities. On the 
other hand, priming was significantly larger within tasks than across tasks when stimuli at 
study and test were identical (Experiment 1, Johnston & Berry, 2006). Significant priming 
even in the absence of data-driven priming was interpreted as conceptually driven priming, 
a form of facilitation resulting from previous engagement in a semantic task; but whether 
conceptually driven priming is modulated by the identity of tasks at study and test is an 
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aspect that needs further investigations. 
In object recognition, Horner and Henson (2009) and Race et al. (2010) found 
significantly smaller priming in the orthogonal-question compared to the identical-question 
condition when stimuli were primed three times at study (for single presentation see 
Vriezen et al., 1995). These results were, however, less clear if congruency was taken into 
account. In fact, identical-question and reversed-question conditions (within-task 
conditions) imply congruent and incongruent responses respectively, therefore orthogonal 
tasks (across-task condition) with congruent responses must be considered the across-task 
counterpart of the identical-question condition and, similarly, orthogonal tasks with 
incongruent responses for the reversed-question condition (See Fig 8). Interestingly, Race 
et al. (2010) did not find any significant difference between facilitations within tasks and 
across tasks for congruent responses. On the other hand, although Horner & Henson 
(2009) did not carry out direct statistics between within-task and across-task conditions by 
taking response congruency into consideration (identical-question condition vs. 
orthogonal-question condition with congruent responses; reversed-question condition vs. 
orthogonal-question condition with incongruent responses), priming was always 
numerically larger within tasks compared to across tasks, both for congruent and 
incongruent responses. 
It is important to underline that, in the two reported studies of object recognition, 
differences between within-task and across-task priming can be the effect of stimulus-
classification binding retrieval. In fact, rapid response learning is significant when stimuli 
are repeated three times at study (see Chapter 4). Considering the two reported studies in 
person recognition, it sounds reasonable to speak about pure conceptually driven priming, 
because Chapters 2-3 show that rapid response learning does not affect significantly 
behaviour after a single presentation.     
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In summary, an additional investigation of the present experiments was to contrast 
amounts of priming within tasks against across tasks by taking congruency of responses 
into account to explore whether performing the same task at study and test produces larger 
facilitation than performing two different tasks. Results will be discussed according to both 
conceptually driven priming and stimulus-classification binding. 
  
5.1.2 Occupation judgement vs. nationality judgement  
 
An open debate in the literature of person recognition is whether the semantic system 
for people is organized in categories, and, in that case, what they are. To investigate this 
point many different approaches have been used [category matching in a double decision 
task (Johnston & Bruce, 1990); release from proactive interference (Darling & Valentine, 
2005); masked categorical priming (Stone & Valentine, 2007); and categorical priming 
(Bruce, 1983)]. Outcomes from different approaches converge on the point that 
occupation, but not nationality or dead/alive, is a core category in the semantic system for 
people (Johnston & Bruce, 1990). Contrary to this point, Johnston & Barry (2006) found 
that participants were faster in responding to nationality than occupation of celebrities: the 
opposite would be expected if occupation, but not nationality, was a form of categorical 
information. Among the same lines, Barry, Johnston and Scanlan (1998) showed that the 
semantic representation of people, contrary to that of objects, is not encapsulated in 
categories. 
The representational status of occupation and nationality in the semantic system is an 
extremely relevant piece of knowledge for the present studies because stimulus-
classification binding could have a different influence on priming according to whether a 
task relies directly on categorical semantic information or on a property (Hampton, 1984). 
Creation and utilization of a classification code is reasonable for properties of a stimulus, 
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because of the absence of pre-existent information, but not for a categorical semantic entry.  
The present experiments explored whether responses are faster in one judgement 
than the other, and whether this difference has an impact on priming. Such a difference 
would be interpreted as retrieval of a stimulus-classification binding. 
 
5.1.3 The present experiments 
 
The main focus of Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 was the isolation of a form of 
facilitation in person recognition that can exclusively be explained as facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks. If a similar facilitation is obtained, its co-existence 
with retrieval of a stimulus-response binding was investigated. Data were also further 
analysed to investigate the influences of performing same or different tasks at study and 
test or performing occupation or nationality judgement on networks facilitation and rapid 
response learning. 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 could be considered together as part of a perfectly 
counterbalanced experiment but are presented separately because of potential differences 
in the nature of the categorical judgement at test (Johnston & Bruce, 1990). If nationality 
and occupation play different roles in the organization of the semantic system, effects on 
accuracy and response times are expected. This possibility and its implication for rapid 
response learning are investigated directly in the Interexperimental Analysis section. 
 
5.2 Experiment 7 
 
In the present experiment, the influence of facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks in person recognition was explored in a design that enhances the impact of rapid 
response learning. The principal aim of Experiment 7 was the isolation of a form of 
facilitation that cannot be explained otherwise than via networks facilitation. The condition 
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in which pure data-driven and conceptually driven priming were expected to occur was 
when orthogonal tasks were used and responses were incongruent.  
The selected design was identical to that used by Experiments 1-3 in Horner and 
Henson (2009) with the main exceptions that stimuli at study were presented always three 
times and faces were used as stimuli.  
 
 
Figure 8 Example of the experimental 
design of Experiment 7 and 
Experiment 8. Three study-test cycles 
were employed: A identical-question 
condition, B reversed-question 
condition, C orthogonal-question 
condition. The responses at study and 
test for primed stimuli were the same 
for stimuli in A and half of the stimuli 
in C. and different for stimuli in B and 
half of the stimuli in C. Stimuli at 
study (left-hand side boxes) were 
repeated three times under a 
categorical task; while, at test (right-
hand side boxes) primed stimuli were 
repeated again intermixed with 
unprimed stimuli. Throughout the 
three cycles, the same categorical 
question was required at test. 
According to the relationship between 
the task at study and the task at test 
priming condition could be within-
task congruent responses (singer?-
singer? cycle A) or within-task 
incongruent responses (actor?-singer? 
cycle B) or across-task congruent 
responses and across-task incongruent 
response (American?-singer? cycle 
C). Orthogonal categorizations 
resulted in two different congruency 
conditions. Congruency applied to 
unprimed stimuli as well, considering 
the supposed response at study. 
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Three study-test cycles were employed. Questions at test were always the same (for 
example: ‘singer?’) while the question at study could be identical (within-task, congruent 
responses: ‘singer?’, see Figure 8A), reversed (within-task, incongruent responses: 
‘actor/actress?’, see Figure 8B), or orthogonal (across-task, 50% incongruent responses 
and 50% congruent responses: ‘American?’, see Figure 8C). In the orthogonal cycle, half 
of the stimuli required the same responses at study and test (across-task, congruent 
responses) and half required different responses (across-task, incongruent responses). It is 
important to underline that responses could be expressed or not: to unprimed stimuli no 
response was given at study, nevertheless these stimuli could have required a congruent or 
incongruent response in the two phases of the orthogonal cycle. For example if the 
question at study was ‘American?’ and the question at test was ‘singer?’, Daniel Craig 
would be considered a congruent trial (‘no’-‘no’, he is a British actor) while John Lennon 
would be considered an incongruent trial (‘yes’-‘no’, he is a British singer) regardless of 
having been presented at study or not (see Figure 8C).  
We expected to find significant priming in the orthogonal cycle like Burton et al. 
(1998) and Experiment 2 in Johnston & Barry (2006). Contrary to Johnston & Barry 
(2006), significant congruency effect in the orthogonal cycle should be obtained in the 
present design, as a consequence of the acquired strength of stimulus-response binding due 
to multiple stimulus repetitions at study (see Chapter 3).  
In addition, this design allows us to study directly whether inversion of the direction 
of the categorical task is treated differently compared to a complete change of categorical 
task. In other words, when response conditions are equal, is there a benefit of re-engaging 
in the same semantic task compared to carrying out a completely different semantic task? 
As explained before, congruent and incongruent trails in the orthogonal cycle could be 
considered the across-task conditions of identical and reversed cycles; therefore any 
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difference would be an effect of facilitation in conceptual networks, which should be 
present only in the within-task conditions but not in the across-task conditions. 
Experiment 7 employed three study-test cycles with occupation judgement as test 
task. Occupation is considered a categorical semantic node (Johnston & Bruce, 1990; 
Bruce, 1983; but see also Barry et al., 1998) therefore facilitation due to retrieval of 
stimulus-classification was not expected.  
 
5.2.1 Materials and Methods 
 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
 
Fifty young British adults (mostly Bangor University undergraduate students) took 
part in Experiment 7 in return of course and printer credits. Data of two participants were 
discarded because the wrong task instruction was answered in one of the study or test 
phases. The mean age of the remaining forty-eight participants (13 male, 35 female) was 
20 years (range 18-38). All the participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
three participants were left-handed, by self report. 
The study was approved by the research ethics committee of Bangor University. 
Prior to the experiment, all the participants gave written informed consent. 
 
5.2.1.2 Stimuli 
 
Black and white facial pictures of British and American celebrities were used as 
stimuli. 204 stimuli were used in the experiment: ¼ British singers, ¼ American singers, ¼ 
British actors/actresses, ¼ American actors/actresses. Each nationality/occupation subset 
had 30 male celebrities and 21 female celebrities. Celebrities whose occupation or 
nationality was not clear (for example the singer and actor Russell Brand) were not 
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included in the stimuli set.  
An additional set of 36 stimuli, resembling the characteristics of the main stimulus 
set, was used for practice runs. 
 
5.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
Three consecutive study-test cycles constituted the main experiment. Occupation 
judgement was always required at test. According to the relationship with questions at test 
(for example ‘singer?’), the question at study could be identical (singer?), reversed 
(actor/actress?) or orthogonal (British? or American?). Each phase started with the 
presentation of the task instruction that had to be performed on each individual stimulus 
(‘Is the celebrity x?’ where x could be ‘a singer’, ‘an actor/actress’, ‘British’ or 
‘American’). Participants were instructed to use four pieces of paper, reporting each the 
crucial piece of information of the task instruction (x), as reminders: Every time a task 
instruction was displayed participants had to place the correspondent reminder next to the 
keyboard. Order of the cycles, the question at test (singer? or actor/actress?) and the 
question at study in the orthogonal cycle (British? or American?) were counterbalanced 
across participants. 
Stimuli were divided into six sets of 34: three sets were used as primed stimuli 
(shown both at study and test) and three sets as unprimed stimuli (presented only at test). 
In each 34 stimuli set (20 male celebrities) occupations and nationalities were equally 
represented in such a way that for all questions half of the stimuli required a positive 
response; crucially, in the orthogonal cycle an equal number of primed and unprimed 
stimuli required congruent or incongruent responses to questions at study and test. During 
each study phase, the 34 stimuli of a set were all presented randomly three times, avoiding 
consecutive presentations. At test, stimuli from the precedent study phase (primed) were 
100 
 
presented again randomly intermixed with stimuli from a different set (unprimed).  
In each phase stimuli were presented for 600 ms followed by a fixation cross, 
displayed for 2400 ms at study and 1900 ms at test. Responses were recorded throughout 
the whole duration of the trial (stimulus + fixation cross). Participants were instructed to 
be as fast and accurate as possible in pressing with their left and right index finger F and J 
keys, on computer keyboard, to express respectively ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answers. Stimuli had a 
size of 8.6*11.6 deg (width*height) and were displayed on a black background.  
 
5.2.1.4 Data analysis 
 
Only data from the test phases are reported (see Appendix 2 for data analysis of 
accuracy and response times in the study phases). Trials were considered correct when the 
correct response occurred between 200 ms after face onset and before the next face 
presentation. Accuracy was analyzed with Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests because the data did 
not show a normal distribution.  
Response times for unprimed faces were analysed from correct trials while response 
times for primed faces were analyzed only when correct responses within the defined time 
window were given in the test as well as in the study phases. In this way, trials for primed 
faces with correct responses at test were excluded from the calculation of mean response 
times when one or more incorrect responses were given in the study phase. A 3 x 2 
ANOVA was performed on mean response times; the following factors were considered: 
question condition (identical vs. reversed vs. orthogonal) and priming condition (primed 
vs. unprimed). Follow-up comparisons between mean response times were made with 
paired-sample two-tailed t-tests.  
Data in the orthogonal cycle were split according to congruency of the response 
required at study and the response required at test; the response could be expressed, as for 
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primed stimuli, or not, as for unprimed stimuli. In accuracy analysis priming for congruent 
and incongruent response was analyzed with Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests as differences 
between mean accuracies for primed and unprimed stimuli; the congruency effect was 
analyzed as the difference in accuracy gains due to priming for congruent and incongruent 
stimuli. 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with response congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and priming 
condition (unprimed vs. primed) as factors was performed on response times data to 
investigate main effects of response congruency and priming, and their interaction. 
Independent-sample one-tailed t-tests were performed to investigate priming in the two 
congruency conditions. 
 The difference between within-task and across-task priming in response times was 
assessed in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with task (within-task vs. across-task) and congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) as factors: dependent variables were priming in the cycle with 
identical questions, priming in the cycle with reversed questions, priming in the orthogonal 
cycles for stimuli that required congruent responses and priming in the orthogonal cycle 
for stimuli that required incongruent responses. 
The significance level was set at α=.05 for all comparisons of accuracy and response 
times. 
 
5.2.2 Results 
 
After excluding 0.3% of trials because of missing or early responses (response time 
faster than 200 ms), mean accuracy at test was 87.2%. Accuracy at test was significantly 
larger for primed than unprimed stimuli when questions were identical, z = 4.56, p < .001, 
but not for reversed or orthogonal question at study, zs < 0.61, ps > .541 (see Table 13).  
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Table 13  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 7.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed Orthogonal 
    
Unprimed 85.5 (1.2)            86.9 (1.1)            86.5 (1.2)            
Primed 91.8 (0.8)  86.0 (1.3)  86.0 (1.4)  
       
Priming 6.3 (1.1) *** -0.9 (1.1)  -0.4 (1.2)  
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
Accuracy gain of around 5.4% for the identical-question condition was significantly 
larger than accuracy gains in the reversed-question and the orthogonal-question conditions, 
zs < 3.87, ps < .001; but not between the two latter conditions, z = 0.31, p < .759. Figure 9 
displays mean accuracy values for primed and unprimed stimuli in the three conditions. 
Further 18.7 % of primed trials were discarded from response times analysis because 
of at least one wrong response at study. A 3 x 2 ANOVA was performed on mean response 
times; both the main effects were significant: question at study, F(2,46) = 19.07, p < .001, 
and priming condition, F(1,47) = 218.82, p < .001. The interaction between variables was 
significant too, F(2,46) = 18.38, p < .001. Priming was strongly significant in all the three 
question conditions, ts(47) > 9.49, ps < .001 (see Table 14).  
 
Table 14  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 7.  
 
 
Response Times 
Identical Reversed Orthogonal 
    
Unprimed 906 (29)            940 (23)            929 (23)            
Primed 717 (26)  813 (24)  832 (23)  
       
Priming 188 (15) *** 127 (11) *** 98 (10) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
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The stimulus-response effect, assessed as the difference between amounts of priming 
in the identical-question and the reversed-question condition, was significant, t(47) = 4.35, 
p < .001. Moreover, facilitation was significantly larger for stimuli primed at study by 
occupation judgement (no matter the question, identical or reversed, within-task 
conditions) compared to stimuli primed at study by nationality judgement (across-task 
condition), ts(47) > 2.50, ps < .016. (see Figure 10). 
 
When responses were congruent, participants were more accurate with primed than 
unprimed stimuli: larger accuracy was supported by a trend toward significance, z = 1.80, 
p = .072. On the contrary, participants were significantly less accurate for primed than 
unprimed stimuli when decisions were incongruent, z = 2.11, p = .035 (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Congruency Conditions in Experiment 7.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Congruent Incongruent 
   
Unprimed 87.0 (1.4)            86.0 (1.6)            
Primed 90.0 (1.3)  82.1 (1.8)  
     
Priming 3.0 (1.5)  -3.8 (1.7) * 
Note: *p < .05. 
 
 
Giving the same response at study and test in the orthogonal cycle allowed 
participants to be more accurate in responding to primed stimuli, z = 3.00, p = .003 (see 
Figure 11). 
 
Mean response times in the orthogonal task were analysed by taking congruency of 
responses in consideration. A 2 x 2 ANOVA showed significant main effects of 
congruency, F(1,47) = 5.56, p = .023, and priming condition, F(1,47) = 67.62, p < .001: 
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response times were faster for stimuli that required the same responses compared to those 
requiring different responses in study and test phase in orthogonal cycle (respectively M = 
871, SE = 23 and M = 895, SE = 24); moreover, facilitation was larger for primed (M = 
832, SE = 23) than unprimed stimuli (M = 929, SE = 23). Priming in the two congruency 
conditions was significant: participants had a benefit in responding to repeated stimuli no 
matter the response given at study: congruent, t(47) = 7.63, p < .001, incongruent t(47) = 
4.91, p < .001 (see Table 16).  
 
Table 16  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Congruency Conditions in Experiment 7.  
 
 
Response Times 
Congruent Incongruent 
   
Unprimed 925 (24)            934 (24)            
Primed 817 (26)  856 (26)  
     
Priming 109 (14) *** 78 (16) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
 
The interaction between factors was not significant, F(1,47) = 2.41, p = .127, 
indicating that, despite the numerical difference, facilitation in congruent responses 
condition was not significantly larger than facilitation in incongruent responses condition 
(see Figure 12).  
 
The difference between within-task and across-task priming was assessed in a 2 x 2 
ANOVA. Main effect of task was significant, F(1,47) = 27.35, p < .001: priming was 
larger within tasks than across tasks. 
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5.2.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 7 showed that responses to primed stimuli in orthogonal 
tasks when responses were incongruent were significantly faster than responses to 
unprimed stimuli. This finding in response times analysis is in line with facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks. In orthogonal tasks, despite the numerical difference, 
priming for congruent trials was not significantly larger than priming for incongruent 
trials, indicating that stimulus-response effect had only a marginal effect across tasks, in 
contrast to its significant influence within tasks.  
The significant difference between facilitation in the identical-question condition and 
the reversed-question condition was the signature of involvement of rapid response 
learning in the present experiment. Presenting stimuli three times appears to boost a 
stimulus-response binding that affects priming within tasks.  
In orthogonal tasks, facilitation in response times for primed stimuli that required an 
incongruent response and the absence of a congruency effect in the orthogonal cycles were 
a replication of the results of Johnston and Barry (2006) and could indicate that rapid 
response learning only has a marginal effect on priming for person recognition across 
tasks, even after three stimulus repetitions at study. However, accuracy analysis suggested 
otherwise: accuracy gain due to priming was significantly larger for congruent trials than 
incongruent trials, suggesting that a stimulus-response effect generalized from one task to 
the other. A similar generalization of stimulus-response binding was not restricted to 
congruent trials but extended to incongruent trials too and determined interference, evident 
from lower accuracy in this condition.   
Smaller facilitation across tasks than within tasks when congruency was taken into 
account could be a signature of either modulation of conceptually driven priming or 
stimulus-classification binding. Given that multiple streams of research consider 
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occupation a categorical node in the semantic system for people, an interpretation of a 
similar effect as modulation of conceptually driven priming sounds more reasonable.   
 
Residual facilitation in the across-task condition for incongruent responses is 
unquestionable evidence of a form of facilitation not explicable according to rapid 
response learning. Similar facilitation is in line with data-driven and conceptually driven 
priming. Although, accuracy analysis presented effects ascribable to rapid response 
learning in the orthogonal cycle as well; the main evidence was a decrease in accuracy for 
incongruent trials. 
In addition, priming in response times within tasks was larger than priming across 
tasks. Given the categorical nature of the semantic information, this effect could be 
evidence of modulation of conceptually driven priming. 
 
5.3 Experiment 8 
 
Experiment 8 investigated priming and rapid response learning across tasks using a 
task that relies on non-categorical semantic information (Johnston & Bruce, 1990) at test.  
 
5.3.1 Materials and Methods 
 
Experiment 8 was identical to Experiment 7 except that nationality judgement was 
the main judgement (in test phases) while occupation judgement was used only in the 
study phase of the orthogonal cycle. 
 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
 
Fifty British students of Bangor University took part in the Experiment in return for 
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course and printer credits. Data of two participants were not considered in the data analysis 
because the wrong question was answered at study. The mean age of the remaining 48 
participants (7 male, 41 female; 5 left-handed) was 20 years (range 18-42). 
 
 5.3.2 Results 
 
After excluding 0.8% of trials because of missing or outlier responses (response time 
< 200 ms), accuracy was 77.4%. Participants were more accurate in responding to primed 
stimuli when tasks at study and test phases were both nationality: benefit in accuracy was 
strongly significant, z = 0.42, p < .001, when questions were identical but even for 
reversed questions accuracy for primed stimuli was significantly larger than accuracy for 
unprimed stimuli, z = 2.19, p < .028. In the orthogonal-question condition responses at test 
were not significantly more accurate to stimuli presented previously at study than 
responses to stimuli presented for the first time at test, z = 1.48, p = .139 (see Table 17). 
 
Table 17  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 8.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed Orthogonal 
    
Unprimed 76.9 (1.8)            74.6 (1.6)            74.5 (1.8)            
Primed 82.9 (1.4)  78.1 (1.5)  77.1 (1.5)  
       
Priming 6.0 (1.3) *** 3.5 (1.4) * 2.5 (1.6)  
Note: *p < .05; ***p < .001. 
 
Accuracy gains due to priming in the three question conditions were not significantly 
different, zs < 1.62, ps > .105 (see Figure 9). 
Further 19.6% of primed stimuli were discarded because of at least a wrong response 
at study. A 3 x 2 repeated-measurements ANOVA showed that both main effects were 
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strongly significant: question at study, F(1,46) = 25.19, p < .001, and priming condition, 
F(1,47) = 223.70, p < .001. Responses were faster in the cycle with identical question 
compared to responses in the other cycles, ts(47) > 5.16, ps < .001. Responses to primed 
stimuli were significantly faster than responses to unprimed stimuli in all the three 
question conditions, ts(47) > 4.63, ps < .001 (see Table 18). Interaction between the two 
factors was significant, F(1,46) = 29.53, p < .001.  
 
 Table 18  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 8.  
 
 
Response Times 
Identical Reversed Orthogonal 
    
Unprimed 978 (32)            1003 (33)            1001 (33)            
Primed 747 (23)  840 (24)  902 (32)  
       
Priming 232 (17) *** 163 (16) *** 99 (14) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
 
The stimulus-response effect, assessed as difference between amounts of priming in 
the identical-question and the reversed-question condition, was significant, t(47) = 4.25, p 
< .001; priming in the orthogonal-question condition was significantly smaller than 
priming in the identical-question condition, t(47) = 7.19, p < .001, and priming in the 
reversed-question condition, t(47) = 2.49, p = .006 (see Figure 10).  
 
The effect of congruency of responses in study and test phases of the orthogonal 
cycle was analysed. When responses were congruent, participants were significantly more 
accurate for primed than unprimed stimuli, z = 4.68, p < .001; contrariwise, a trend toward 
less accuracy for primed than unprimed stimuli was obtained for incongruent responses, z 
= 1.86, p = .063 (see Table 19).  
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Congruency had a strongly significant effect on accuracy, z = 3.80, p < .001 (see 
Figure 11). 
 
Table 19  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Congruency Conditions in Experiment 8.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Congruent Incongruent 
   
Unprimed 75.4 (2.0)            73.7 (2.4)            
Primed 85.0 (1.7)  69.1 (2.3)  
     
Priming 9.5 (1.6) *** -4.5 (2.6)  
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on response times showed significant main effects of response 
congruency, F(1,47) = 27.90, p < .001, and priming condition, F(1,47) = 38.94, p < .001: 
response times were faster for stimuli that required same responses compared to different 
responses in study and test phase (respectively M = 983, SE = 34 and M = 927, SE = 29) 
and for primed than unprimed stimuli (respectively M = 902, SE = 32 and M = 1001, SE = 
33). Priming in the two congruency conditions was significant; participants had a benefit 
in responding to repeated stimuli no matter the response given at study: congruent, t(47) = 
5.69, p < .001, incongruent t(47) = 3.24, p = .002 (see Table 20).  
 
Table 20  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Congruency Conditions in Experiment 8.  
 
 
Response Times 
Congruent Incongruent 
   
Unprimed 987 (33)            1014 (34)            
Primed 868 (29)  951 (37)  
     
Priming 119 (21) *** 62 (19) ** 
Note: **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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The interaction between factors was significant, F(1,47) = 4.09, p = .049, indicating 
that priming for congruent condition was significantly larger than priming for incongruent 
condition (see Figure 12). 
The difference between within-task and across-task priming was significant, F(1,47) 
= 29.88, p < .001: priming was larger within tasks than across tasks. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 8 replicated most of the outcomes of Experiment 7.  
Results in Experiment 8 showed significant priming for primed stimuli across tasks 
when responses were incongruent, evidence of facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks in person recognition. Contrary to Experiment 7, the congruency effect on 
response times was significant. Experiment 8 reported for the first time a significant 
congruency effect on response times across tasks, when faces were used as stimuli. 
The stimulus-response effect was clearly evident in within-task conditions. 
Participants were faster, but not more accurate, in responding to repeated stimuli when 
questions at study and test were identical compared to reversed questions.  
Results of accuracy analysis in Experiment 8 were less clear than those in 
Experiment 7. In the orthogonal cycle, repetition of a stimulus when responses were 
incongruent had a negative effect on accuracy, but the decrement was only marginally 
significant. The congruency effect for accuracy was strongly significant. 
Larger facilitation within tasks than across tasks is hard to be interpreted 
unambiguously as conceptually driven priming because stimulus-classification binding 
could account for it also. In fact, nationality is considered property information in the 
semantic system for people, therefore the creation of a classification code seems likely.  
Whether nationality judgement is treated differently than occupation judgement and 
111 
 
the possible consequences on priming and rapid response learning are investigated in the 
Interexperimental Analysis. 
 
Experiment 8 found evidences of both facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks and interference cause by rapid response learning in the across-task incongruent 
responses condition. Congruency effect in the orthogonal cycle was significant both for 
accuracy and response times analyses, suggesting that stimulus-response binding is not 
restricted to within-task conditions.  
Priming in response times within tasks was larger than priming across tasks: given 
the not-categorical nature of the semantic information a similar result could be evidence of 
stimulus-classification binding, or conceptually driven priming, or a combination of the 
two. 
 
5.4 Interexperimental Analyses  
 
5.4.1 Results 
 
Overall, mean accuracy was significantly higher in Experiment 7 than Experiment 8, 
z = 5.10, p < .001, but mean response times were not significantly different in Experiment 
7 (M = 865, SE = 23) than Experiment 8 (M = 912, SE = 27), t(94) = 1.57, p = .119. The 
significant difference between mean accuracy but not between mean response times in 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 held even when means where restricted to unprimed 
stimuli, to exclude any possible confounding effect of priming, z = 5.01, p < .001 and t(94) 
= 1.78, p = .078.   
Gains in accuracy due to priming were not significantly different between 
experiments in the identical-question condition and the orthogonal-question condition, zs < 
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1.46, ps > .145; in the reversed-question condition gain in accuracy in Experiment 8 (M = 
3.5%, SE = 1.4%) was significantly larger than that in Experiment 7 (M = 0.9%, SE = 
1.1%), z = 2.09, p = .037. Despite this last difference, there was only a trend toward a 
significant difference between the stimulus-response effects in the two experiments, z = 
1.79, p = .073 (see Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9 Mean accuracy across question (identical, reversed and orthogonal) and priming 
(unprimed, primed) conditions in Experiment 7 and Experiment 8. Error bars represent standard 
error. No statistical analyses are displayed. 
 
A repeated measurement 3 x 2 ANOVA with question at study (identical vs. reversed 
vs. orthogonal) and priming conditions (primed vs. unprimed) as within-subject factors and 
experiments (Experiment 7 vs. Experiment 8) as between-subjects factor showed a trend 
toward a significant interaction between the priming condition and experiments, F(1,94) = 
3.45, p = .066; the interaction was significant when only the within-task conditions were 
considered, F(1,94) = 4.90, p = .029. Priming was nearly significantly larger in Experiment 
8 than Experiment 7 in the within-task cycles, both for the identical questions, t(94) = 
1.93, p = .057 , and for reversed questions, t(94) = 1.87, p = .065, but not for orthogonal 
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questions, t(94) = 0.64, p = .949 (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10 Priming in reaction times across question conditions (identical, reversed and 
orthogonal) in Experiment 7 and Experiment 8. Error bars represent standard error. No statistical 
analyses are displayed. 
 
In the orthogonal cycle, the stimulus-response effect (congruency effect), assessed as 
difference between accuracy gains due to priming in the two congruency conditions, was 
nearly significantly larger in Experiment 8 compared to Experiment 7, z = 1.73, p = .084 
(see Figure 11).  
Such a trend of larger congruency effect in Experiment 8 than Experiment 7 was 
absent in response times analysis, t(94) = 0.75, p < .456 (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 11 Mean percentages of accuracies across congruency (congruent, incongruent) and 
priming (unprimed, primed) conditions in Experiment 7 and Experiment 8. Error bars represent 
standard error. No statistical analyses are displayed 
 
 
Figure 12 Priming in response times across congruency (congruent, incongruent) 
conditions in Experiment 7 and Experiment 8. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
5.4.2 Discussion 
 
Participants were more accurate and faster, but not significantly, in occupation than 
nationality judgement. This difference could be the effect of a different representation of 
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nationality and occupation in the semantic system, or, alternatively, higher uncertainty in 
nationality than occupation judgement. 
Priming in nationality judgement was significantly larger than priming in occupation 
judgement, indicating a larger benefit of repetition in this task either due to the fact that 
nationality judgement involves a larger number of links that can be strengthened by 
repetition or, alternatively, due to the creation of a stimulus-classification binding that 
allows faster responses to nationality judgement, but not to occupation judgement because 
such binding is not created.  
The last significant effect found in the Interexperimental Analysis is a trend toward a 
larger congruency effect across tasks in the nationality judgement compared to the 
occupation judgement. A similar effect cannot be ascribed to stimulus-classification 
binding because it has a marginal effect across tasks; data-driven or conceptually driven 
priming cannot be considered either because they were similar in the two experiments. A 
possible explanation, but direct investigation is required, could be certainty in the semantic 
knowledge required by the two orthogonal categorizations. If at test, a participant is unsure 
about the correct response, stimulus-response binding can favour the selection of the 
previously given response, resulting in an increase of accuracy when stimulus requires 
congruent responses and a decrease when stimulus requires incongruent responses. 
According to uncertainty, a larger congruency effect in Experiment 8 than Experiment 7 
would be expected because stimulus-response binding created at study for the occupation 
judgment (Experiment 8) is stronger than that created at study for nationality judgement 
(Experiment 7), due to higher certainty. This stimulus-response binding would then 
compete at test with the output of stimulus processing that is weaker in nationality 
judgement (Experiment 8) compared to occupation judgement (Experiment 7). Such 
unbalanced strength could determine a larger bias toward the response of the stimulus-
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response binding and consequently a larger congruency effect in Experiment 8.  
  
5.5 General discussion 
 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 were conducted to explore whether facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks plays a role in priming in person recognition when 
stimuli are presented three times at study, and, therefore, when rapid response learning is 
involved. A cycle with orthogonal tasks was used to isolate networks facilitation: two other 
cycles with identical and reversed task instructions were employed to test the magnitude of 
stimulus-response effect. Results of Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 show that rapid 
response learning was significant in the within-task condition, indicating that stimulus-
response bindings were created in the study phases and utilized at test in the within-task 
cycles.  
In a similar scenario, with evidence of the involvement of rapid response learning by 
the present design, a form of priming in person recognition not contemplated by rapid 
response learning was isolated as well. Facilitation for stimuli primed across tasks when 
responses at study and test were incongruent was significant. Such facilitation cannot be 
explained according to rapid response learning because of the complete mismatch between 
response and classification codes retrieved from memory and response and classification 
codes obtained from reprocessing the stimulus. This facilitation must be accounted for by 
facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, instead, as data-driven priming - 
facilitation in repeated processing same perceptual information - and conceptually driven 
priming - facilitation in accessing the semantic system. 
This result contrasts with results in Horner & Henson (2009) and Race et al. (2010) 
in which facilitation in object recognition was abolished when post-semantic processes, 
critical for rapid response learning, are unusable because their content is incorrect for the 
117 
 
new question context. On the other hand, it is in line with the literature of across-task 
priming in person recognition when stimuli are repeated only once at study (Burton et al., 
1998; Johnston & Barry, 2006). Taken together, these studies indicate a different impact of 
data-driven and conceptually driven priming in object recognition and person recognition. 
Presenting a face but not presenting an object causes strengthening of the links between 
structural encoding, recognition unit, identity node and semantic units that allow priming 
even when response codes cannot generate any facilitation. 
Networks facilitation was not the only priming effect evident in the across-task 
condition. In fact, priming for congruent stimuli was larger than priming for incongruent 
stimuli; a numerical difference was significant for accuracy in Experiment 7 and for 
response times in Experiment 8. The congruency effect is clear evidence of stimulus-
response binding even across tasks: having given response at study allows being faster and 
more accurate in giving the same response at test, even when a different task is performed.  
This result is in line with Horner & Henson (2010) and Race et al. (2009), but 
contrasts with Johnston & Berry (2006) and Vriezen et al. (1995), suggesting that stimulus-
response binding is an association that needs multiple stimulus repetitions at study to 
become behaviourally relevant and generalize to different tasks. 
How the reactivation of stimulus-response binding acts in a context different from 
the one in which it was created, is a question that can find an answer in the different trends 
of accuracy for primed stimuli across tasks, in relation to congruency. Repetition of a 
stimulus produced an increase in accuracy when responses at study and test were 
congruent but a decrease in accuracy when responses at study and test were incongruent. 
Benefit and cost are indication of interaction in response networks that facilitates giving a 
congruent response but interferes in giving an incongruent response.  
Across-task interference was obtained by Race et al. (2010) for response times. 
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Horner & Henson (2011b, 2012) reported interference after change of the reference size 
when names of objects were used to prime pictures of objects. The absence of interference 
in responses times in the present experiments, both across tasks and within tasks (reversed-
question condition), could be related to the fact that negative effects caused by 
incongruency were masked by positive effects due to data-driven and conceptually driven 
priming across tasks, and additional facilitation due to stimulus-classification binding 
within tasks. This possibility makes an interpretation of priming in reversed-question 
condition as pure facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks plus stimulus-
classification binding questionable. Indeed, facilitation in this condition could be reduced 
by interference caused by stimulus-response binding. However, no evidence of a cost in 
accuracy for primed stimuli in reversed-question condition seems against a similar 
possibility, but the absence of a proper baseline condition within tasks does not allow 
ruling out interference (see Chapter 6).  
An important question, at this point, is how the cognitive system manages mismatch 
responses, determining interference across tasks but not within tasks. A possible factor 
could be expectation of a mismatch. In reversed-question condition responses bound to a 
stimulus are always wrong at test while only half of them are wrong at test in orthogonal-
questions condition. Therefore, compared to an orthogonal cycle, in reversed cycle 
executive processes could be more inclined to accept and manage conflicts between 
response associated with a stimulus (stimulus-response binding) and new response 
produced by re-processing the stimulus, favouring the second. In effect a similar conflict 
should happen for all the stimuli associated with a response (primed); otherwise an error in 
the re-processing would have occurred. On the other hand, in an orthogonal cycle the 
control system cannot expect a priori response conflicts because responses mismatched 
only for half of the primed stimuli. Consequently a response cannot be preferential and 
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interference might be larger in this condition. This interpretation accounts for interference 
for incongruent stimuli in the across-task but not in the within-task condition, but it is 
insufficient to explain why in Experiment 3 and Experiment 6 interference was not 
evident. In a study-study-distractor-test design the cognitive system cannot expect 
mismatch for all the repeated stimuli a priori, because for half of the repeated stimuli a 
match between responses happens (identical-question condition) but for half of the 
repeated stimuli a mismatch between responses occurs (reversed-question condition). To 
account for a similar discrepancy the cognitive system should be aware of the priming 
context and use this information to direct expectation.  
 
In summary, priming in person recognition results from both facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks and rapid response learning. Taken together, these 
results and those of Johnston & Barry (2006) suggest that networks facilitation operates 
immediately after a single presentation of stimuli at study, while rapid response learning 
comes into play after multiple stimulus presentations. These two types of memory interact 
and, sometimes compete, in the generation of a correct response.  
 
5.5.1 Within-task priming vs. across-task priming 
 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 employed two within-task cycles and one across-
task cycle. The two within-task cycles differed according to the congruency of responses: 
congruent responses in one cycle (identical questions) and incongruent responses in one 
cycle (reversed questions). The across-task cycle incorporated both congruent and 
incongruent responses within the same cycle. This design allows detecting facilitation 
related to performing the same task at study and test by contrasting within-task priming 
against across-task priming, when congruency of responses is taken into account.  
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Priming was larger within tasks than across tasks, both for occupation judgement and 
nationality judgement. This result is in line with findings in Horner & Henson (2009) and 
in Experiment 1 in Johnston & Barry (2006), but contrasts with findings in Race et al. 
(2010), Burton et al. (1998) and Experiment 2 in Johnston & Barry (2006).  
Larger priming within tasks than across tasks could be either indication of a different 
impact of conceptually driven in within-task conditions than in across-task conditions or 
indication of stimulus-classification binding. However, both these alternatives require 
further specification to account for this result. Conceptually driven priming should be 
reinterpreted to accommodate for this result. In agreement to Burton’s (1998) model all the 
SIUs associated with a PIN are activated in a semantic task and links are strengthened, 
allowing conceptually driven priming across tasks, but the link to the target task-specific 
SIU are strengthened more, determining larger conceptually driven priming in the within-
task conditions than in the across-task conditions, as in the present experiments. On the 
other hand, it should be hypothesised that a task-specific classification is created no matter 
the presence of an identical categorical SIU.  
The categorical nature of occupation judgement allows advancing the hypothesis that 
larger within- than across-task priming in Experiment 7 is pure modulation of conceptually 
driven priming. On the other hand, this effect in Experiment 8, given the different nature of 
nationality judgement, could be either evidence of conceptually driven priming, or 
stimulus-classification binding, or a combination of the two. Differences between 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 were investigated in Interexperimental Analysis, and are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
The main outcome of the comparison between within- and across-task conditions 
was significantly larger priming when the same task was performed at study and test 
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compared to when different tasks were carried out. Whether this result is evidence of 
modulation of conceptually driven priming or retrieval of a stimulus-classification binding 
cannot be answer right definitely, but Experiment 7, using occupation judgement at test, 
supports this interpretation.      
 
5.5.2 Occupation judgement vs. nationality judgement 
 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 employed two different semantic tasks: occupation 
and nationality. Responses to occupation judgement were more accurate, and nearly faster, 
than responses to nationality judgement, indicating higher uncertainty in the second task 
compared to the first task, possible consequence of a difference in the representation of the 
two semantic entries. These results are more or less in line with the literature that considers 
occupation a categorical entry and nationality a property (Johnston et al., 1990); however, 
the general trend of the results is opposite compared to that in Johnston & Berry (2006).  
How priming and the stimulus-response effect are modulated by these two different 
tasks was investigated. Within-task priming was significantly larger in Experiment 8 
compared to Experiment 7. This result could be evidence of further modulation of 
conceptually driven priming or stimulus-classification binding. According to Johnston & 
Bruce (1990) occupation is a category while nationality is a property (Hampton, 1984). 
Consequently, it is possible that accessing property information involves additional 
processes that are primed by repetition. However, stimulus-classification binding seems to 
be the best candidate to explain a similar facilitation. This form of facilitation was 
identified by Horner & Henson (2009, Experiment 7) but its existence in tasks other than 
size judgement has never been reported yet. Significant difference between within-task 
priming in Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 could suggest a role of stimulus-classification 
binding in nationality judgement but not in occupation judgement. Similarly, in Horner & 
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Henson (2009) priming was numerically larger (no direct statistics were reported, though) 
for size judgement than natural/manmade decision.  
Retrieval of a stimulus-classification binding is a better explanation for another 
effect evident in the Interexperimental Analysis: participants were more accurate for 
reversed task instructions in Experiment 8 compared to Experiment 7. This effect could be 
caused by utilization of a classification code for nationality but not for occupation 
judgement.  
 
The general picture that emerges from these studies suggests that classification acts 
when the categorical judgement relies on properties of the stimulus, like nationality of 
celebrities (size of object), but not when it relies on categorical information, occupation for 
celebrities (natural/manmade for objects). In any case, further direct investigations are 
needed. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
To summarize, the results of Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 bring strong evidence 
about the existence of data-driven and conceptually driven priming in person recognition 
even in designs that favour the use of rapid response learning. This point undermines rapid 
response learning status as global interpretation of priming, but at the same time suggests 
facilitation can be generated in response networks, particularly after multiple stimulus 
presentations at study.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Rapid response learning is the product of the reactivation of a stimulus-response 
binding. How the cognitive system manages a possible conflict between the response 
retrieved from memory and the response generated by reprocessing the stimulus is a 
question not fully answered yet. Lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) and event-related 
potentials (ERPs) were used to test whether responses are retrieved even when a change of 
categorical cue makes them incorrect in the new task condition and the consequences of 
such retrieval on response production. Participants performed nationality judgements on 
faces of celebrities when electrophysiological signals from their brain were recorded. Two 
study phases were followed by a single test phase, in which stimuli from the study phases 
and stimuli not shown before were presented. Questions in the study phases were identical 
or reversed compared to questions in the test phase. Clear behavioural and 
electrophysiological effects of the reactivation of stimulus-response binding were 
obtained. LRPs showed that a response was transmitted to the motor cortex even when the 
response was incorrect, causing interference. ERP correlates of stimulus repetition not 
fully explicable as rapid response learning or episodic memory were also found and 
interpreted as networks facilitation. Findings of the present experiment support a multiple-
routes multiple-stages interpretation of priming in person recognition. 
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Is rapid response learning a benefit of giving the same response 
again or an effect of interaction between responses? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Rapid response learning is the reactivation of a stimulus-response binding that 
allows faster and more accurate responses to repeated stimuli when tasks at study and test 
are identical, and even when tasks are different but responses are congruent. However, for 
different tasks, repetition results in faster but less accurate performance when responses 
are incongruent (Chapter 4; see also Denis & Perfect, 2012). Evidence of interference for 
incongruent responses, in response times instead, were reported in similar experimental 
paradigms as well (Race et al., 2010; Race et al., 2009), and consistently when names are 
used to prime pictures of objects and the reference of the size judgement is changed 
(Horner & Henson, 2011b, 2012). However, interference has never been reported when 
categorical cues are reversed. In this condition, interference could be overpowered, or 
masked, by other sources of facilitation, like data-driven or conceptually driven priming or 
stimulus-classification binding. In fact, a change of task limits the effect of conceptually 
driven priming or stimulus-classification binding in Race et al. (2009) and Chapter 5, 
while a change in domain of the stimulus material (names to pictures) obliterates data-
driven priming, as in Horner & Henson (2011b, 2012). Therefore, potential interference 
due to a stimulus being bound to an incorrect response, when categorical cues are reversed 
at study and test, represents a crucial aspect for the interpretation of rapid response 
learning. In other words, is rapid response learning a benefit of giving the same response 
again or an effect of interaction between responses? 
The absence of an appropriate baseline condition in studies that investigated rapid 
response learning has precluded any attempt to experimentally disentangle these two 
alternatives. A potential baseline condition could be presenting stimuli at study when the 
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participants are asked to access as much biographical knowledge as possible about the 
stimulus, without performing any categorical task. Such an experiment has never been 
carried out; however some insights into the topic is provided by the study of LRPs. LRPs 
allow the direct investigation of motor response even in the absence of response. LRPs are 
electrophysiological correlates of pre-motor and motor processes extracted from the EEG 
signal (Masaki, Wild-Wall, Sangals, & Sommer, 2004). For example, a left hand 
movement is preceded by activity in the right motor cortex; this activity generates a larger 
negative potential over central electrodes contralateral to the responding hand as compared 
to that over homologous locations ipsilateral to the responding hand. The difference 
between contralateral and ipsilateral potentials results in a negative deflection of the signal 
before response when ipsilateral activity is subtracted from contralateral activity (Coles, 
1989). The deflection is positive, instead, if a movement with the wrong hand is prepared. 
Crucially for the present study, a positive deflection of the LRP (the so called “dip”) is an 
index of incorrect motor preparation, even if the motor response is not overtly expressed. 
In fact, a wrong response can often be automatically activated but blocked before it is 
performed, in favour of the correct response. Interference between an automatically 
prepared incorrect response and newly processed correct response, when the correct 
response is given, manifests as a positive potential (incorrect motor response) that precedes 
the negative potential (correct response), and delays the onset latency of the main negative 
deflection.  
If rapid response learning facilitates response processes, it should be evident as a 
significantly faster onset of the main negative deflection for stimuli primed by the identical 
task instruction compared to stimuli primed by the reversed task instruction. This 
difference, if significant, could either be determined by reactivation of the previously 
given response that delays the preparation of the correct incongruent response and favours 
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the preparation of the correct congruent response, or, alternatively, the higher availability 
of the correct response could incentivise the preparation of the correct response only in the 
congruent condition. The presence of a positive dip (interference) in the primed reversed-
question condition would support the first account. Horner & Henson (2012) found that 
stimulus-response binding determined a response-locked modulation of within-domain 
ERPs around 250 ms before response due to stimulus-response binding: the ERP for 
primed congruent response was more negative than the ERP to novel stimuli, whereas the 
ERP for primed incongruent responses was more positive than the ERP to novel stimuli. 
This different trend was cautiously interpreted as evidence of interference. The described 
study found a similar trend in activity in the prefrontal cortex: a decrease of neural signal 
for the primed congruent response condition and an increase of neural signal for the 
primed incongruent response condition. Interestingly, the ERP, but not the neural, effect of 
stimulus-response binding was absent across-domain, a condition in which the behavioural 
congruency effect was smaller. Interpretation of this ERP trend as clear evidence of 
interference is problematic because it has not previously been shown that interference 
determines a shift in polarity of the ERPs. Therefore, more research on interference is 
needed and the study of LRPs represents a possible way to test the topic directly.  
In summary, Experiment 9 aims to investigate whether any significant difference due 
to the priming history of the stimuli can be detected in LRPs, indicating an effect of 
stimulus-response binding in response preparation. Further, an indication of reactivation of 
the incorrect response in the reversed-question condition would suggest interference in this 
process. 
   
In addition to LRP analysis, the EEG signal was further analysed to extract the ERP 
correlates of rapid response learning and stimulus repetition. Whether a difference in 
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priming history is identified at an early or a late stage of stimulus processing is an 
important piece of information that further advances the understanding of the cognitive 
processes behind rapid response learning. Logan’s (1990) instance theory proposed that 
facilitation is produced only by reactivation of an instance. How reactivation is managed 
when the response is incorrect and the categorical cue is reversed remains unclear. In fact, 
simple reactivation of an instance would produce facilitation in response times regardless 
of the categorical cue, but a high rate of incorrect responses in those conditions in which 
responses are incongruent. On the other hand, instances might be retrieved only when 
categorical cues are identical, but not when they are reversed (Dobbins et al., 2004). This 
last account was supported by Race et al. (2010). An ERP correlate of retrieval of 
stimulus-response binding was found around 450 ms after stimulus onset. Interestingly the 
ERP of primed stimuli with congruent responses was significantly more negative than the 
ERP of unprimed stimuli and the ERP of primed stimuli with an incongruent response, as 
would be predicted if retrieval of an instance was blocked when incorrect. However, the 
fact that the ERP in congruent response conditions had a similar trend within tasks, when 
the correctness of the retrieved response is predictable, and across-task, when 
predictability is less straightforward, complicates an interpretation of this effect as pure 
retrieval of an instance when correct.  
Race et al. (2010) obtained an ERP correlate of stimulus-classification binding later 
in stimulus-processing, around 600 ms. Using a similar paradigm, Hsu & Waszak (2012) 
reported earlier detection, around 200 ms, of differential priming history (a possible index 
of stimulus-classification binding) but they did not find any ERP modulation due to 
response congruency. The discrepancy between these two studies - earlier detection of 
priming history in Hsu & Waszak (2012) compared to Race et al. (2010) - could be 
justified by the presence of a confounding experimental factor in Race et al. (2010). A task 
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description for each individual trial (displayed for 500 ms) was presented before the 
stimulus, but separated from it by an inter-stimuli interval (ISI) of 500 ms in Hsu & 
Waszak (2012), while in Race et al. (2010) the task instruction immediately preceded the 
presentation of the stimulus, without any interval (ISI = 0). Therefore, in Race et al. (2010) 
stimulus processing could be delayed by processing of task instructions. The absence of 
any ERP correlate of stimulus-response binding in Hsu & Waszak (2012) is difficult to 
explain, though, it could be due to stimuli being primed only once at study.       
 An alternative interpretation of repetition priming is the multiple-routes multiple-
codes model (Horner & Henson, 2009). According to this model priming is the product of 
networks facilitation and interaction/competition between the response retrieved from 
memory and the response generated by re-processing the stimulus. Horner & Henson 
(2012) found that stimulus-locked ERPs were modulated by stimulus repetition, in 
agreement with networks facilitation, whereas response-locked ERPs were modulated by 
response congruency, in agreement with interaction/competition between responses (see 
also Race et al., 2010).  
To summarize, ERP studies of rapid response learning found that priming history 
modulates stimulus-locked ERPs, even at an early stage, probably perceptual, (Hsu & 
Waszak, 2012; Race et al., 2010) even though in one instance this modulation was absent 
in stimulus-locked ERPs but significant in response-locked ERPs (Horner & Henson, 
2012). Whether the effect of retrieval of memory trace is time-locked to the stimulus or the 
response is a crucial question for differentiating between blocking and 
interaction/competition accounts of rapid response learning.  
A secondary goal of the present experiment, therefore, is to determine at which level 
of processing (i.e., stimulus or response) the cognitive system detects a difference in 
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priming history.  
 
The EEG signal is further analysed to investigate whether other forms of memory are 
engaged by the present design, and if so, which ones. ERP correlates of stimulus repetition 
can either be a signature of priming or episodic memory. In fact, a stimulus at study is 
generally primed and encoded in episodic memory at the same time. Paller et al. (2003) 
showed that the ERP of unlikely remembered faces was more negative than that of new 
faces over frontal electrodes in the time-window 250-400 ms; on the other hand, the ERP 
of likely remembered faces was more positive over parietal electrodes in the time-window 
400-800 ms. Rugg et al. (1998) found a similar negativity for unremembered primed 
objects (~ 300-500 ms) with a more posterior topography, but two ERP correlates 
associated with episodic memory were reported instead of the single effect in the domain 
of faces: a frontal to central positivity around 300-500 ms and a left parietal positivity 
around 500-800 ms. Other studies replicated the absence of frontal ERP correlates of 
episodic memory in the domain of faces (MacKenzie & Donaldson, 2007; Yovel & Paller, 
2004).      
The present experiment does not employ an episodic memory retrieval test. 
Consequently, the interpretation of the nature of the ERP correlates of stimulus repetition 
can be based only on the literature. Priming is generally associated with a small potential 
that varies in time and topography in relation to the stimulus domain and the task demand. 
On the other hand, the ERP correlates of episodic memory are less variable: frontal 
Old/New effect - a positivity over fronto-central electrodes in the time-window 300-500 
ms -, parietal Old/New effect - a positivity over parietal electrodes in the time-window 
500-800 ms -, and late posterior negativity - a long lasting negativity that starts 
immediately after the parietal Old/New effect. The frontal Old/New effect (generally 
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absent for faces) is thought to represent familiarity while the parietal Old/New effect 
would index recollection (Rugg et al., 1998): the late posterior negativity is generally 
observed in designs that induce high response conflict or in tasks that require source 
judgement (Johansson & Meckingler, 2002).  
 
6.2 Experiment 9 
 
The current experiment tested the core properties of rapid response learning by 
investigating how priming by identical or reversed questions affects LRPs and ERPs of 
repeated stimuli. Electrophysiological signals were recorded while participants performed 
nationality judgements on facial pictures of celebrities. Task of the participants was 
nationality judgement. The different priming conditions were obtained by employing two 
study phases: one study phase had the identical question to that in test phase, while the 
other study phase had the reversed question (still nationality but with a different 
categorical cue). LRPs and ERPs were analysed to investigate whether motor interference 
can explain rapid response learning, and at which level of stimulus or response processing 
the cognitive system is aware of the identical or reversed study context of primed stimuli.     
 
6.2.1 Materials and Methods 
 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
 
Twenty-five German university students participated in this experiment in exchange 
for course credits or in return for a €16/£15 payment (depending on location). The data of 
one participant was discarded because overall accuracy was below 60% (chance 
performance is 50%). Mean age of the remaining twenty-four participants (18 women) was 
24 years (range 18-42). All the participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and, 
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according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) all participants were 
right-handed except for one ambidextrous and one left-handed participant. The study was 
approved by the ethics committee at the School of Psychology, Bangor University, and all 
participants gave written informed consent. 
Seventeen participants carried out the experiment at the Institute of Psychology, 
Humboldt University at Berlin, and eight at the School of Psychology, Bangor University. 
 
6.2.1.2 Stimuli 
 
300 black and white facial pictures of celebrities (mostly actors, singers, politicians, 
athletes and TV presenters) were used as stimuli. The selected celebrities had half German 
nationality (90 men, 60 women) and the other half American nationality (90 men, 60 
women).  
140 colored pictures of objects, on a white background, were also used; half of the 
objects were presented in their canonical position and half were rotated upside-down.  
Additional 24 pictures of celebrities and 12 pictures of objects, resembling the 
characteristics of the experimental stimulus set, were used as practice stimuli. 
 
6.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment the procedure was explained to the 
participants and three short practice runs with 12 stimuli each, in which the three 
experimental task instructions were presented in a random order, were performed. 
The experiment consisted of two cycles of two study phases followed by a distractor 
task and one test phase. In each cycle the two opposite questions (“Is the celebrity 
German?” or “Is the celebrity American?”) were presented separately in the two study 
phases and their order was counterbalanced between cycles. The task in distractor phases 
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was an orientation judgement (“Is the object correctly orientated?”). In the two test phases, 
the same question was presented. Participants had to express a yes/no judgement and 
responded using two response buttons with the left and right index finger.  
In each study phase 50 randomly selected stimuli (15 German males, 10 German 
females, 15 American males, and 10 American females) were presented three times. In 
study phases a stimulus could not be presented for the second time before all the stimuli 
had been presented once, and similarly for the third presentation; immediate repetition was 
also excluded. Stimuli presented in study phases (primed) were presented again in the test 
phase mixed with 50 stimuli not previously shown (unprimed). According to the question 
at study, the response for primed stimuli presented in the test phase was either the same 
(identical-question condition) or the reversed (reversed-question condition) response 
expressed at study. Between the study phases and the test phase a distractor phase made up 
of 70 stimuli (35 objects in their canonical position, 35 upside-down rotated objects) was 
performed. The question at test, response buttons' mapping and order of the study phases 
were counterbalanced across participants. 
Throughout the experiment stimuli were presented for 600 ms, followed by a 
fixation cross displayed for 2400 ms in study phases and distractor phases and for 1900 ms 
in test phases. Facial stimuli had a size of 8.6*11.6 deg (width*height) and were displayed 
on a black background while object stimuli had a size of 8.6*8.6 deg (width*height) and 
were displayed on a white background. Responses were collected during the whole 
duration of the trial (stimulus + fixation cross). 
The experiment was conducted in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated, and electrically 
shielded chamber at the Institute of Psychology, Humboldt University at Berlin, or in an 
electrically shielded room at the School of Psychology, Bangor University. 
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6.2.1.4 EGG recording 
 
The EEG was recorded during the whole duration of the experiment from 27 
Ag/AgCl electrodes embedded in an elastic cap. The locations of the electrodes were based 
on the International 10-20 system and corresponded to the positions: Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, 
F4, F8, FC3, FCz, FC4, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP3, CPz, CP4, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO9, 
PO10, O1, O2. Two electrodes were applied directly on the skin or on the cap over the left 
and right mastoids, M1 and M2. Initial common reference was M1 (FCz was used, instead, 
for eight participants) and AFz (Fpz was used, instead, for eight participants) served as 
ground. Different reference and ground electrodes were used because of specific 
experimental procedures in the two labs (Biologische Psychologie/ Psychophysiologie, at 
Institute of Psychology, Humboldt University at Berlin and Boehm’s EEG lab at the 
School of Psychology, Bangor University). EOG was recorded from four electrodes, with 
two placed below the right and the left eye (VEOG) and two on outer canthi of both eyes 
(HEOG). All signals were digitized with a frequency of 250Hz and band-pass filtered to 
include frequencies from 0.05 to 70Hz. Electrodes impedance was kept below 10kΩ for 
EEG electrodes and below 20kΩ for EOG electrodes. 
 
6.2.1.5 LRP/ERP data processing 
 
Offline, the influence of blinks and eye movements on the EEG signal was corrected 
via independent component analysis based on 20 calibration trials for each artefact (left, 
right, up, down, blink) obtained after the experiment proper. A low-pass filter with a cut-
off frequency 30 Hz for ERP analysis or 18 Hz for LRP analysis was applied; slope was 48 
dB/octave. A 200 ms pre-stimulus interval was used as baseline. 
EEG signal was segmented in epochs anchored to the stimulus, for stimulus-locked 
analyses, or to the response, for response-locked analyses. For ERP analysis, epochs of 
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1200 ms were generated: in stimulus-locked analysis the whole epoch extended after 
stimulus onset, while in response-locked analysis the epoch started 700ms before response. 
For LRP analysis stimulus-locked and response-locked epochs had a duration of 1000ms: 
for stimulus-locked analysis the epoch started 200 ms before stimulus onset, while for 
response-locked analysis the epoch started 500 ms before response.  
ERPs/LRPs were obtained as grand averages of unprimed stimuli with correct 
response at test and of primed stimuli with consistently correct responses at study and test. 
All epochs for primed faces correctly categorized both at study and test were averaged 
together according to task instruction at study to obtain two priming conditions (primed 
identical-question, primed reversed-question); all epochs for unprimed faces correctly 
categorized at test were averaged together (unprimed).  
Epochs were automatically and visually inspected to detect artefacts, which were 
discarded. All potentials were re-referenced to the average reference.  
 
6.2.1.6 Behavioural analysis 
 
Behavioural analysis was identical to that reported in Chapter 3.   
 
6.2.1.7 ERP data analysis 
 
Average waveforms were computed for conditions and subjects in 50 ms time–
windows and analysed with repeated-measures ANOVAs. Degrees of freedom were 
adjusted according to Greenhouse-Geisser correction. In the occurrence of significant 
contrasts, time-windows were aggregated, if necessary, and two-tailed paired-sample t-
tests were performed on electrodes with the highest negative or positive potential. For 
these statistical analyses EOG electrodes were not included. The significance level was set 
at α = .05 for all statistical tests. 
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Stimulus-response binding was assessed as the difference between the waveforms for 
the two question conditions (identical vs. reversed); ERPs for unprimed and primed 
(collapsed between the two question conditions) were contrasted to investigate the ERP 
correlates of stimulus repetition. 
 
6.2.1.8 LRP data analyses 
 
To extract the LRPs, activity at central electrodes ipsilateral to the responding hand 
was subtracted from contralateral activity at the homologous electrode. The LRPs for right 
hand responses were calculated as the subtraction of activity at C4 from activity at C3, 
while activity at C3 was subtracted from activity at C4 for left hand responses. The LRPs 
for right and left hand responses were then averaged within each required response hand 
and successively average across both response hands according to the condition.  
To determine LRP onset time a linear regression procedure (Mordkoff & Gianaros, 
2000) was used on jackknife averages (Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998). Starting from 
the peak of the LRP, regression lines were generated moving step by step backward with 
the method of least squares. In other words, considering the peak of the LRP as the anchor 
point pe = 0, a regression was generated between pe = 0 and ps = -1, the first data point 
before the peak; similarly regression lines were generated between pe = 0 and ps = -2, and 
so on for all the p data point ranging from the peak to the beginning of the epoch. The 
goodness of fit was assessed with standard error of measurement, and the starting point of 
the regression function was the ps at which the predictive power of the regression starts an 
asymptotic decline. The onset time of the LRPs was the point at which the regression line 
crosses the x-axis. ANOVA was performed on the onset time of the jackknife averages for 
the two priming conditions. F value was corrected according to Ulrich & Miller (2001), Fc 
= F/(n-1)
2
 .  
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Average waveforms were also computed for conditions and subjects and 50 ms time–
windows before onset of the negative deflection were analysed with two-tailed paired-
samples t-tests. The significance level was set at α = .05 for all statistical tests. 
The unprimed condition was not analysed. 
 
6.2.2 Results 
 
6.2.2.1 Behavioural results 
 
The order of the study phases did not significantly interact with the stimulus-
response effect in accuracy, Z = 1.75, p = .080, or in response times analysis, t(23) = 0.50, 
p = .961. Therefore, data were collapsed between cycles. 
Missing and early responses accounted for 0.7% of trials. Stimulus repetition 
significantly improved accuracy only when the questions at study and test were identical, Z 
= 2.97, p = .003, but not when they were reversed, Z = 0.68, p = .495 (see Table 21). The 
larger accuracy gain of 3.6 % for the identical-question condition compared to reversed-
question condition was significant, z = 2.61, p = .009, demonstrating a stimulus-response 
effect in person recognition in accuracy analysis. 
 
Table 21  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) Percentage of Accuracy and Accuracy Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Conditions in Experiment 9.  
 
 
Accuracy % 
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 87.8 (8.6) 
Primed 92.4 (4.4)  88.9 (6.5)  
     
Priming 4.6 (1.3) ** 1.1 (1.3)  
Note: **p < .01. 
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A further 14.4% of correct primed trials were discarded because of at least one 
incorrect response at study. Priming, assessed as difference between response times for 
unprimed and primed stimuli was significant in both priming conditions: t(23) = 10.81, p 
<.001, when questions were identical, and t(23) = 8.85, p <.001 when questions were 
reversed (see Table 22).  
 
Table 22  
Mean (Plus Standard Error) of Response Times and Response Times Priming (Unprimed 
Minus Primed) across Question Condition for Experiment 9.  
 
 
Response Times  
Identical Reversed 
   
Unprimed 952 (30) 
Primed 779 (28)  819 (29)  
     
Priming 173 (16) *** 133 (15) *** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
The stimulus-response effect, assessed as the difference between priming levels in 
the two priming conditions (M = 40 ms, SE = 7) was significant, t(23) = 5.82, p <.001 (see 
Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13 Reaction time priming across priming conditions. Statistically significant 
contrast was indicated by: * p < .05. Error bars represent standard error. 
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6.2.2.2 ERP results: stimulus-locked 
 
The ERP for primed and the ERP for unprimed stimuli were contrasted to investigate 
stimulus repetition effect. Stimulus repetition (primed vs. unprimed) significantly 
modulated ERPs in the time-window 150-250 ms, F(5.09,117.01) = 3.82, p = .003: ERPs 
to primed stimuli were significantly more negative than those to unprimed stimuli over 
right parieto-occipital locations, peaking at PO10, t(23) = 2.81, p = .010 (see Figure 14).  
The ERP for repeated stimuli was more positive than the ERP for novel stimuli over 
parietal electrodes from 450 to 700 ms, F(3.70,85.05) = 15.94, p < .001, peaking at Pz, 
t(23) = 5.69, p < .001 (see Figure 15). This parietal correlate of stimulus repetition was 
immediately followed by a long lasting (until the end of the epoch) left centro-parietal 
negativity starting at 800 ms, F(4.42,101.62) = 10.92, p < .001, peaking at Pz, t (23) = -
5.81, p < .001 (see Figure 15). In addition, primed stimuli presented more negative ERP 
over left frontal electrodes from 550 to 1000 ms, F(5.10,117.32) = -4.16, p = .002, peaking 
at Fz, t(23) = -4.08, p < .001 (see Figure 16). 
 
The ERP for primed identical-question and the ERP for primed reversed-question 
were contrasted to investigate stimulus-response effect. These ERPs were significantly 
different across all electrodes in the time window 300-350 ms, F(4.22,97.12) = 2.71, p = 
.032: the ERP for primed identical-question condition was more negative than the ERP for 
primed reversed-question condition over fronto-central electrodes, peaking at FCz , t(23) = 
-2.63, p = .015 (see Figure 17), and more negative over left occipito-temporal electrodes, 
peaking at PO9, t(23) = 3.26, p = .001. When contrasted to the unprimed condition, 
considered as a baseline for the stimulus-response effect, the ERP difference for primed 
reversed-question was significant, F(4.87,112.00) = 3.05, p = .014, but the ERP difference 
for primed identical-question was not significant, F(4.44,102.17) = 0.60, p = .679. 
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In addition, the ERPs for the two question conditions were significantly different in 
the time-window 700-1000 ms, F(5.04,115.94) = 5.06, p < .001: the ERP for primed 
identical-question stimuli presented a more positive potential than the ERP for primed 
reversed-question stimuli over occipito-temporal electrodes, PO10, t(23) = 3.88, p = .001, 
and more negative over centro-parietal electrodes, Cz, t(23) = 3.22, p = .004 (see Figure 
18). 
6.2.2.3 ERP results: response-locked 
 
Stimulus-response binding strongly modulated response-locked ERPs of primed 
stimuli. An effect starting 500 ms before response, lasting for 400 ms, was strongly 
significant, F(4.38,100.78) = 6.09, p < .001: the ERP for the identical-question condition 
was more negative than the ERP for reversed-question condition over fronto-central 
electrodes, peaking at FCz , t(23) = -2.86, p = .009 (see Figure 19). 
 After response, the polarity became more lateralized, the reported negativity moved 
toward left electrodes and the difference became significant again in the time window 200-
300 ms, F(5.09,117.14) = 3.69, p = .004.   
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Figure 14 Stimulus-locked ERPs: repetition effect in the time-window 150-250 ms. (A) 
ERPs for unprimed and primed conditions at electrode PO10. (B) Mean amplitudes of the 
signal at electrode PO10; significance of the statistical test is also reported. (C) 
Topographic map of amplitude differences between the ERP for the primed condition and 
the ERP for the unprimed condition. The arrow points the location of the displayed 
electrode.  
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Figure 15 Stimulus-locked ERPs: repetition effects in the time-windows 450-7000 ms and 
800-1200 ms. (A) ERPs for unprimed and primed conditions at electrode Pz. (B) and (D) 
Mean amplitudes of the signal at electrode Pz; significance of the statistical test is also 
reported. (C) and (E) Topographic map of amplitude differences between the ERP for the 
primed condition and the ERP for the unprimed condition. The arrow points the location of 
the displayed electrode.  
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Figure 16 Stimulus-locked ERPs: repetition effect in the time-window 550-1000 ms. (A) 
ERPs for unprimed and primed conditions at electrode Fz. (B) Mean amplitudes of the 
signal at electrode Fz; significance of the statistical test is also reported. (C) Topographic 
map of amplitude differences between the ERP for the primed condition and the ERP for 
the unprimed condition. The arrow points the location of the displayed electrode. 
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Figure 17 Stimulus-locked ERPs: stimulus-response effect in the time-window 300-350 
ms. (A) ERPs for primed identical-question and primed reversed-question conditions at 
electrode FCz. (B) Mean amplitudes of the signal at electrode FCz; significance of the 
statistical test is also reported. (C) Topographic map of amplitude differences between the 
ERP for the primed reversed-question condition and the ERP for the primed identical-
question condition. The arrow points the location of the displayed electrode. 
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Figure 18 Stimulus-locked ERPs: stimulus-response effect in the time-window 700-1000 
ms. (A) ERPs for primed identical-question and primed reversed-question conditions at 
electrode PO10. (B) Mean amplitudes of the signal at electrode PO10; significance of the 
statistical test is also reported. (C) Topographic map of amplitude differences between the 
ERP for the primed reversed-question condition and the ERP for the primed identical-
question condition. The arrow points the location of the displayed electrode. 
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Figure 19 Response-locked ERPs: stimulus-response effect in the time-window -500--100 
ms. (A) ERPs for primed identical-question and primed reversed-question conditions at 
electrode FCz. (B) Mean amplitudes of the signal at electrode FCz; significance of the 
statistical test is also reported. (C) Topographic map of amplitude differences between the 
ERP for the primed reversed-question condition and the ERP for the primed identical-
question condition. The arrow points the location of the displayed electrode. 
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6.2.2.4 LRP results: stimulus-locked 
 
Exploratory t-test performed on the LRPs in the two question conditions showed a 
significant difference in the time-window 250-300 ms, t(23) = 2.40, p = .025. The LRP for 
the reversed-question condition presented a small positive deflection while the LRP for the 
identical-question condition presented a small negative deflection (see Figure 20).  
Although latencies for the main negative deflection were numerically shorter for the 
identical-question condition (M = 324 ms) than reversed-question condition (M = 384 ms), 
the difference in onset times was not significant, Fc(1,23) = 1.73, pc = .200 (see Figure 20). 
However, this difference was significant when a low-pass filter of 8 was applied and two 
participants excluded, because no negative deflection was obtained in response-locked 
analyses, Fc(1,21) = 4.80, pc = .040, but smoothing of the signal cancelled the crucial small 
positive and negative deflections, signatures of interference.  
 
6.2.2.5 LRP results: response-locked 
 
The LRP for the identical-question condition started 235 ms before response, while 
the LRP for the reversed-question condition started 203 ms before response. This 
numerical difference between the two onset latencies was not significant, Fc(1,23) = 2.20, 
pc = .152 (see Figure 21) 
Visual inspection of the two LRPs excluded the presence of a positive dip. 
Consequently, no statistical analyses were performed. 
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Figure 20 Stimulus-locked LRPs. Significant effect is highlighted in the time window 250-
300 ms. Dotted lines represent the regression lines for the two question conditions. 
 
 
Figure 21 Response-locked LRPs. Dotted lines represent the regression lines for the two 
question conditions. 
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6.3 Discussion 
 
The repetition of a stimulus can have a negative impact on performance in the case 
of a conflict between responses. Behavioural interference has been found across-task or 
across-reference (Horner & Henson, 2011b, Race et al., 2010) but never within tasks after 
categorical cue inversion. The current study used LRP and ERP analyses to addresses 
interference within tasks for the first time.    
Participants were significantly faster in responding to repeated than to novel stimuli, 
and in turn even faster and more accurate in responding at test to stimuli that had been 
primed at study by the identical question with respect to the reversed question. This last 
effect is a clear behavioural evidence of rapid response learning: reactivation of a stimulus-
response binding has a significant effect on priming. This finding confirms that the present 
experiment is suitable to obtain clear rapid response learning that can be further 
investigated with LRPs and ERPs. 
Stimulus-locked LRP analysis showed a numerical difference between latencies of 
the main negative deflection in the two conditions that was in line with what would be 
predicted according to rapid response learning: the LRP for the identical-question 
condition started before the LRP for primed reversed-question condition. However, this 
difference was not significant. The failure to obtain a significant result could be 
consequence of the high level of noise in the data: in fact, the difference was significant 
when a stronger filter was used and two participants, that did not show any response-
locked negative deflection, were excluded. Application of a stronger filter reduces noise 
but it can often mask small effects. Considering that the main focus of the present 
experiment was the investigation of possible dips whose magnitudes are generally a 
fraction of the magnitudes of the main negative deflection, the filter was selected in such a 
way that noise was reduced without having too great an impact on the signal. Response-
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locked LRP analysis did not present any significant difference between latencies. This 
result is expected considering that response-locked LRP are modulated by the motor aspect 
of the response (Masaki et al., 2003) and in the present experiment responses in the two 
conditions were identical.      
Stimulus-locked LRP analysis showed that stimulus-response binding was 
reactivated around 250 ms after stimulus onset, both for the identical- and reversed-
question conditions. In the 250-300 ms time-window the LRP for the identical-question 
condition presented a small negative deflection while the LRP for the reversed-question 
condition presented a small positive deflection. This opposite polarity of the deflections is 
direct evidence that for the identical-question condition the correct motor response was 
selected while for reversed-question condition the incorrect motor response was selected, 
instead. This result demonstrates that stimulus-response binding is activated in the test 
phase independently of question requirement or the correctness of the output, providing 
strong support for Horner & Henson’s (2009) multiple-routes multiple-stages framework. 
The finding of activation of both incorrect and correct motor responses is in line with 
retrieval of stimulus-response binding regardless of its applicability to the new question 
condition. Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the output of stimulus-response 
binding interacts with the output of stimulus reprocessing and produces a benefit when 
congruent or a cost when incongruent. Without such an interaction, activation of the wrong 
motor response would lead to a high error rate, but this prediction is not supported by the 
positive direction, even if not significant, of facilitation in accuracy for primed stimuli 
when the question was reversed. The absence of negative effects of repetition on accuracy 
analysis suggests that the outline LRP effect could be larger in designs like the one in 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8, where interference was evident in behavioural data as 
well.  
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Interference is predicted by the multiple-routes multiple-stages framework (Horner 
& Henson, 2009) but not by Logan’s (1990) instance theory. Further evidence for the good 
fit of the present data to the Horner & Henson’s (2009) framework is the presence of a 
clear ERP correlate of stimulus repetition whose properties, time-window, topography and 
magnitude suggest networks facilitation (see also Boehm & Sommer (2005) for a similar 
early repetition effect). Determining whether this effect represents data-driven or 
conceptually driven priming is difficult, but its presence is sufficient to rule out the 
position that perceptual and conceptual processes are completely by-passed by stimulus-
response binding. This finding suggests that some facilitation for repeated faces is the 
product of networks facilitation. On the contrary, Hsu and Waszak (2012) found an effect 
of stimulus-classification binding in a similar time-window at more anterior right 
electrodes. Given that inversion of categorical cues does not disable classification code, it 
is difficult to conclude that the effect in the current study is not a manifestation of 
classification code. However, further support for an interpretation in terms of networks 
facilitation comes from the fact that ERP correlates of networks facilitation were found in 
other studies in the domain of objects and these effects were insensitive to whether the 
classification code could be applied in the new context (Horner & Henson, 2012; Race et 
al., 2010). Accounts of rapid response learning underestimate networks facilitation but, 
although instance theory categorically excludes it, the multiple-routes multiple-stages 
framework, by incorporating perceptual and conceptual networks, can accommodate this 
contribution, though it is considered secondary with respect to rapid response learning.  
As described in the introduction to this chapter, another important question in the 
rapid response learning literature is whether ERP correlates of stimulus-response binding 
are locked to the stimulus or to the response. A similar point allows understanding whether 
reactivation of a stimulus-response binding impact stimulus processing - as predicted 
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according to a blocking interpretation of instance theory - or response processing - in 
agreement with multiple-routes multiple-stages framework. In the present experiment 
stimulus-response binding was associated with an early stimulus-locked fronto-central 
negativity around 300-350 ms. The temporal dynamic of this first rapid response learning 
effect suggested that the cognitive system detected a difference in priming history at quite 
a late stage of stimulus processing, probably beyond the perceptual networks. The fronto-
central negativity of this effect could indicate an involvement of higher cognitive 
functions, probably response selection. In support to this interpretation, this early effect 
occurred more or less simultaneously with the onset of a long lasting response-locked 
stimulus-response effect that had a similar topography: a fronto-central negativity and 
occipito-temporal positivity. Interestingly, the stimulus-locked ERP for primed reversed-
question condition was significantly different from the ERP for unprimed stimuli, but this 
difference was not significant for the ERP for primed identical-question condition. The 
opposite would be predicted according to instance theory. What differentiates primed 
reversed-question from both primed identical-question and unprimed stimuli is the 
possible presence of interference in this condition, but not in the other two conditions: 
unprimed stimuli are not associated with any pre-existent response while stimulus-
response binding produces a response for primed identical-question condition that does not 
interfere with the response produced by re-processing the stimulus. Consequently, this 
early stimulus-locked ERP correlate of rapid response learning seems to be associated 
more to aspects of response processing, like interference, than stimulus processing. 
The two late ERP correlates of stimulus-response binding, stimulus-locked and 
response-locked, occurred around or after a response is given, and therefore their relevance 
to repetition priming is probably secondary. In fact, Horner & Henson (2012) found an 
ERP correlate of rapid response learning around response time but did not discuss it, as 
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they said it could be related to motor preparation. Response-locked ERP correlates of rapid 
response learning after response could be evidence of post-response managing of 
interference (Race et al., 2010). 
In summary, ERP and LRP analysis strongly support Horner & Henson’s (2009) 
framework, against Logan’s (1990) instance theory. Interference can only occur when the 
output of stimulus-response binding is compared to the output of stimulus processing: the 
congruency of outputs allows faster responses than does incongruency of outputs. 
Considering that the comparison takes place only when the slowest output is produced, 
facilitation should be related mostly to how fast this output is generated, and, consequently 
to networks facilitation. Without networks facilitation, response times for primed stimuli 
should be faster than those for unprimed stimuli when responses are congruent and slower 
than those for unprimed stimuli when responses are incongruent. In fact, a similar trend of 
positive and negative priming was found when the benefit of facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks is limited after a change in domain of the stimuli (Horner & Henson, 
2011b, 2012) or a change of task (Race et al., 2010). Facilitation in perceptual and 
conceptual networks allows raising the bar of priming at a level in which benefit/cost due 
to rapid response learning is applied. Positive priming in the primed reversed-question 
condition, even in the presence of interference, supports a similar interpretation.      
 
As an interim summary about the crucial topic of this ERP/LRP investigation, our 
results support an interpretation of rapid response learning as retrieval of a stimulus-
response binding for all repeated stimuli. Reactivation of a response from memory can 
facilitate or interfere with expression of a correct response. The interaction modulates the 
magnitude of priming produced by facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks. In 
fact, evidence of networks facilitation was also found.  
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As described earlier in this section the first stimulus repetition effect is likely to 
represent an electrophysiological correlate of priming because it occurred before well 
known correlates of episodic memory, its magnitude is quite small (1ƞV) and the occipito-
temporal topography contrasted with frontal or parietal topography of ERP correlates of 
episodic memory. On the other hand the later stimulus-locked effects have been widely 
reported in the literature of episodic memory contamination in priming studies (Paller et 
al., 2003; Rugg et al., 1998).     
The parietal repetition effects, positivity in the time window 450-700 ms and 
negativity after 800 ms, are both ERP correlates of episodic memory retrieval. In the 
episodic memory literature they are respectively called the parietal Old/New effect (Rugg 
et al., 1998) and the late posterior negativity (Johanston & MecKingler, 2006). The 
absence of any mid-frontal Old/New effect in the present study is in line with other ERP 
studies of memory retrieval when faces are used as stimuli (MacKenzie & Donaldson, 
2007; Yovel & Paller, 2004). The parietal Old/New effect is considered a manifestation of 
recollection of a qualitatively strong memory generally associated with contextual 
information (Wilding & Rugg, 1996). Polarity inversion at parietal electrodes occurring 
after response is an effect often obtained in episodic memory source judgement tasks 
(Hayama, Johnson & Rugg, 2008, for a review Johansson & Mecklinger, 2003). As in the 
present experiment, source judgement experiments involve two different study contexts, 
therefore it is plausible that the participants, even if not instructed to do so, attempted to 
mentally travel back in time to retrieve the task instruction that was associated with 
repeated stimuli at study. Less well-documented is the frontal negativity for repeated 
stimuli. A similar ERP correlate is reported in the literature of memory in aging (Friedman, 
de Chastelaine, Nessler, & Malcolm, 2010; Nessler, Friedman, Johnson, & Bersick, 2007; 
Swick, Senkfor, & Van Petten, 2006): older adults present a left frontal negativity starting 
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at 600 ms after stimulus onset when engaged in source memory retrieval. The 
interpretation given to this ERP effect is adoption of alternative memory strategies by older 
adults to recover episodic memory. How a similar ERP correlate of memory in aging fits in 
a study of rapid response learning when most of the participants were young adults is a 
question that goes beyond the topic of the present experiment. As a speculation, incidental 
encoding, similarly to aging, could determine weak source memory and consequently 
employment of alternative memory strategies. 
 
The parietal Old/New effect, late posterior negativity and left frontal negativity all 
have something in common: they are all ERP correlates often found in source memory 
judgement. This finding shows that episodic memory is strongly engaged by the present 
design, and participants seemed to attempt retrieving the contextual information about the 
study phase. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The present experiment showed for the first time evidence of reactivation of 
stimulus-response binding even when the new task context makes the retrieved response 
incorrect. The response retrieved from stimulus-response binding interacts with the 
response obtained from stimulus reprocessing and determines behavioural benefit or cost. 
Benefits or costs sum up to facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks to express 
repetition priming. All these findings are strongly in agreement with a multiple-routes 
multiple-stages framework of repetition priming in person recognition.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion  
 
The main objective of the thesis was to investigate whether rapid response learning 
applies to the domain of person recognition. It does. Thus, the focus of the thesis moved 
forward to study the experimental factor (or factors) that favour the creation and utilization 
of stimulus-response binding in this domain. In addition, this thesis explored how this type 
of memory acts in comparison to other forms of facilitation, in the specific facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks. Behavioural and electrophysiological data were 
recorded to explore this important topic. The results indicated that rapid response learning 
plays a significant role in priming for person recognition after multiple presentations of 
stimuli, but the contribution of rapid response learning is marginal compared to that of 
networks facilitation, with which it interacts at the level of response selection. These 
findings support a multiple-routes multiple-stages framework of priming for person 
recognition.    
Experiment 1 employed a design that was able to determine the possible contribution 
of rapid response learning to repeated stimuli in the domain of person recognition. 
Participants demonstrated different degrees of facilitation according to the type of question 
answered at study and test: response times were slower to reversed questions than to 
identical questions. This behavioural effect provides a clear manifestation of rapid 
response learning in the domain of person recognition.   
Experiments 2-4 investigated which experimental factor (or factors) is (are) crucial 
for the creation and utilization of stimulus-response binding in person recognition. Task, 
contiguity between study and test phases and number of stimulus repetitions at study were 
identified as possible experimental factors affecting stimulus-response binding. The 
cumulative subtraction of these experimental factors from a regular rapid response learning 
design highlighted the number of stimulus repetitions as the main factor for making 
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stimulus-response binding behaviourally relevant: priming in the two question conditions 
was not significantly different after a single stimulus presentation at study, in contrast to a 
significant difference after three presentations. An effect of contiguity of study and test 
phases was also found, but its meaning is not clear. 
Experiments 5-6 explored further the outcomes of Experiments 2-4 to rule out two 
experimental confounds present in the reported series of studies. Experiment 5 showed that 
single stimulus repetition did not involve rapid response learning even when it was the 
only subtracted factor from a regular rapid response learning design, as opposed to being 
subtracted concurrently with the other two experimental factors, as in Experiment 4. This 
result provided strong support for the idea that multiple presentations of stimuli at study 
are necessary for the creation and utilization of stimulus-response binding. Experiment 6 
showed that rapid response learning was resistant to long lags between study and test 
phases. This result was used to understand the order effect in Experiment 3, but the failure 
to replicate modulation of stimulus-response effects according to the arrangement of study 
phases in Experiment 6 indicated a low reliability of this effect, and consequently a 
secondary role for contiguity in the expression of stimulus-response binding. 
Experiments 7-8 incorporated a cycle with orthogonal tasks in a regular rapid 
response learning design in order to isolate contributions to priming generated by forms of 
memory other than rapid response learning. Stimuli primed by orthogonal questions 
presented significant facilitation even in the absence of any possible contribution of 
stimulus-response and stimulus-classification binding. This result indicates that facilitation 
in perceptual and conceptual networks is not obliterated by rapid response learning but 
occurs alongside it. In this series of experiments, evidence of interference due to retrieval 
of stimulus-response binding was obtained for the first time. 
Experiment 9 employed EEG to investigate whether stimulus-response bindings 
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were retrieved even for reversed task instructions, and how a similar reactivation is 
managed when the output is wrong in the new task condition. Lateralized readiness 
potential showed that a signal from stimulus-response binding was transmitted to the 
motor cortex regardless of its correctness. This signal interacts with the output of stimulus 
reprocessing and facilitates performance when they match but causes a cost when they 
mismatch. Event-related potential analysis supported an interpretation in terms of 
interference. 
 
Considered together, these results provide strong empirical support to the current 
models of priming in person recognition, but their theoretical impact goes beyond the 
domain of person recognition. Current theories of repetition priming for person recognition 
are assessed according to the present findings. A framework that incorporates both 
perceptual and conceptual networks and stimulus-response binding is proposed. 
 
7.1 Structural model 
 
Facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks explains repetition priming as the 
effect of link strengthening between representational units engaged in stimulus processing. 
Two main types of facilitations are proposed: data-driven and conceptually driven priming. 
Presenting an identical stimulus at study and test produces full facilitation in perceptual 
networks (i.e., data-driven priming), whilst performing the same categorical judgement at 
study and test expresses full facilitation in conceptual networks (i.e., conceptually driven 
priming). Networks facilitation has been proposed to account for most repetition priming 
results in person recognition but has some limitations in explaining some findings of the 
present series of experiments. Firstly, the significant difference in priming between 
reversed-question condition and identical-question condition represents an outcome not 
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readily explicable by networks facilitation. This is because networks facilitation predicts 
similar priming in these two conditions: because perceptual and conceptual processing is 
identical in these two conditions, the same stimulus is presented at study and test, and 
identical semantic entry is accessed to express the judgement, equal priming would be 
expected. In fact, reversing task instruction does not change the semantic entry necessary 
to express the judgement but how semantic information is utilized, a process that occurs 
after the semantic entry is activated where no pre-existing link can be strengthened to 
contribute to conceptually driven priming. A possible interpretation that could account for 
these results without overturning the core aspect of the theory is that conceptually driven 
priming is blocked every time the question is changed, no matter if reversed or orthogonal. 
A similar re-interpretation is supported by the absence of rapid response learning when a 
study phase with reversed task instruction interrupts contiguity of study and test phases in 
a study-study-test design, as in Experiment 3. However, the fact that the priming difference 
was significant when contiguity was interrupted, in Experiment 6 and Experiment 9, and 
when task was changed, as in Experiments 7-8, undermines such an explanation. The 
significant congruency effect in the orthogonal cycles in Experiments 7-8 represents an 
extra challenge for the networks facilitation account. This effect cannot be explained by 
modulation of data-driven or conceptually driven priming. The congruency effect is 
unquestionable evidence of facilitation (or cost) induced by response processes. Contrary 
to a difference between priming for stimuli primed at study by identical or reversed 
questions, in the orthogonal cycle repeated stimuli were primed and tested under equal 
conditions, therefore no experimental factor can confuse the real source of the effect. 
Priming in the orthogonal cycle is unquestionably modulated by congruency or 
incongruency between responses given at study and response at test. A similar 
interpretation can be applied to the previously described priming difference between 
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reversed-question condition and identical-question conditions. The congruency effect 
cannot be accounted for by a model that does not include a network of response units 
beyond the semantic networks and a set of links between response units and semantic units 
that can be strengthened by repetition. Such a model accounts for all the priming effects in 
this series of experiments: the congruency effect could be explained as faster activation of 
a response if congruent because re-processed links are tuned compared to activation of a 
response if incongruent because re-processed links are not tuned. Unfortunately, this 
interpretation of facilitation in response networks predicts only facilitation, but not cost, 
such as lower accuracy for primed than unprimed stimuli that required incongruent 
responses as in Experiments 7-8. An additional distortion to the original interpretation of 
facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, required to account for cost, would be 
that links to a response that are not strengthened are inhibited. This type of process is not 
new in models of face learning and recognition. Burton et al., (1990) suggested within-
pool competition; however, this competition is short-lived and abolished by presentation of 
another stimulus: for such competition to be effective in the present design it would have 
to survive long lags and many intervening stimuli. Alternatively, strengthening of a link to 
a response favours the selection of that response, sometimes even if incorrect.  
An important property of such a response network is that it becomes behaviourally 
relevant only after multiple stimulus repetitions, in opposition to the immediate significant 
effect of perceptual and conceptual networks. 
  
In summary, consideration of a response network in which facilitation, but also 
interference, can arise, in addition to facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, 
could account quite well for present results and most repetition priming results, principally 
in person recognition. However, evidence of early activation of wrong and correct motor 
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responses and successive competition in Experiment 9 are more in line with a retrieval 
account of a stimulus-response binding. 
 
7.2 Episodic model 
 
Instance theory is an interpretation of priming in terms of retrieval of an instance of a 
previous encounter with a stimulus that allows the by-passing of stimulus processing to 
generate a response. Retrieving an instance from memory is faster than re-processing the 
stimulus and, consequently, repetition priming is obtained for primed but not unprimed 
stimuli. An important aspect of this theory is that priming is exclusively memory-based: no 
facilitation for repeated algorithmic-based processing is considered. The main predictions 
of this theory, often contradicted by the literature on priming in person recognition, are 
significant facilitation for the identical-question condition and absence of facilitation after 
a change of question. The results of this series of experiments are in accordance with the 
prediction that priming is always significant when questions are identical at study and test; 
moreover priming in this condition was always at least numerically larger than priming for 
the reversed-question condition. However, priming was significant in all priming 
conditions, even reversed or orthogonal, when retrieval of an instance would favour the 
production of a wrong response. Significant priming in the reversed-question condition 
could be accounted for by considering that it is sufficient to reverse the output obtained 
from instance retrieval to carry out the task without the need of reprocessing the stimulus; 
consequently, facilitation is reduced for primed reversed-question stimuli because of the 
additional process of response inversion. A similar explanation is possible for designs in 
which stimuli from a single study phase are presented again in the following test phase: in 
this case reversing the categorical cue makes all retrieved responses wrong and the system 
can automatically apply inversion of the response. However, in study-study-test design, 
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like the one employed in Experiment 3, 4, 6, 9, and, particularly, in orthogonal cycles, as in 
Experiments 7-8 such a process cannot operate automatically, otherwise facilitation in 
response times would be associated with a negative effect of repetition on accuracy. On the 
contrary, the results of these experiments indicated that repetition allows faster and, 
sometimes, even more accurate response in primed reversed-question condition. However, 
an automatic response inversion process in study-study-test design is still possible if the 
task instruction associated with the stimulus is encoded in memory. Nevertheless, such 
information cannot guide any automatic response inversion process for some stimuli but 
not others, as in the case of orthogonal cycles. In conclusion, even if instance theory can be 
adjusted to accommodate results when categorical cues are reversed, it fails to properly 
account for significant priming in the orthogonal question condition.   
Facilitation in the algorithmic-based processing (in other words facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks) can accommodate well this result but the pure 
episodic-based nature of the theory would be lost. However, even considering facilitation 
in algorithmic-based processing does not solve all the problems. According to instance 
theory, priming is determined by the process, memory-based or algorithmic-based, that 
first generates a response. Considering that memory-based processing is faster (since 
otherwise it could not generate priming for identical-question conditions), memory-based 
processing is always the winner causing a high error rate in reversed-question condition 
and orthogonal-question conditions. Alternatively, memory-based processing could be 
blocked after a change of question, allowing the expression of the slower but facilitated 
response of the algorithmic-based processing. However, a response congruency effect in 
the orthogonal cycle could not be accounted for by the exclusive effect of algorithmic-
based processing if a response network is not considered, and in this case there would be 
no need of an independent memory-based processing anymore.  
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The LRP and ERP results could be interpreted in support of instance theory: the LRP 
results, by showing that a response is activated regardless of its correctness, suggest that 
memory-based processing is not disabled for stimuli primed in the study phase with 
reversed question; in addition, dissimilar ERPs for primed reversed-question compared to 
primed identical-question and unprimed stimuli could indicate automatic inversion of the 
response. Nevertheless, this theory fails to accommodate the results in the orthogonal cycle 
and, particularly, the coexistence of behavioural benefit and cost of stimulus repetition 
cannot be explained if memory-based processing does not interact with algorithmic-passed 
processing.     
 
In summary, pure episodic models, like instance theory, successfully, predict results 
when the questions at study and test are identical but have difficulty explaining significant 
facilitation for reversed and orthogonal questions. Facilitation in algorithmic-based 
processing is needed to account for these results, but algorithmic-based processing should 
interact with memory-based processing to predict facilitation and interference. A similar 
hybrid model already exists: it is called the multiple-routes multiple-stages framework. 
 
7.3 Hybrid model 
 
The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework is a hybrid model of memory-based 
and algorithmic-based progressing. Priming is the consequence of the interaction between 
response codes and classification codes activated by retrieval of a stimulus-response and 
stimulus-classification binding and obtained from stimulus reprocessing. Greater priming 
for the identical vs. the reversed question condition is the result from full overlap between 
response codes in the first but not the second condition. However, significant priming for 
reversed-question condition requires an additional source of facilitation. According to this 
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framework, priming in the reversed-question condition is mostly determined by the 
reactivation of stimulus-classification binding which in turn allows correct responses by-
passing perceptual and conceptual networks. However, considering that priming for the 
identical-question condition and reversed-question condition is significant even in the 
absence of rapid response learning, as in Experiments 4-5, it must be hypothesized that 
stimulus-classification binding is created after a single presentation whilst stimulus-
response binding needs multiple presentations. Horner & Henson (2009) used a task that 
rules out such an interpretation. In their study, changing the size of the reference abolished 
any benefit of by-passing stimulus reprocessing because a correct response cannot be 
given without semantic reprocessing of the real size of the stimulus, but priming was 
significant even after a change of reference. In conclusion, stimulus-classification binding 
cannot be used every time to by-pass algorithmic-based processing, therefore the 
possibility that data-driven and conceptually driven priming could generate facilitation is 
still open.  
In fact, Experiments 7-8 showed clearly that, in the absence of any possible by-pass, 
facilitation is significant even when stimulus-response binding determines cost, instead of 
facilitation. Significant priming across tasks for incongruent responses is unquestionable 
evidence of facilitation in conceptual and perceptual networks. Such facilitation is 
modulated by interactions at response stages, resulting in a significant congruency effect. 
The existence of facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks across-task suggests 
that similar facilitation can be effective even within tasks, without the need of any by-pass 
to be faster. It is important to mention that networks facilitation does not rule out stimulus-
classification binding; this binding can still have a significant effect on priming, 
particularly in some tasks, as an additional interaction stage between the two routes but not 
as an element of the memory trace that generates priming independently. 
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In summary, behavioural findings support a multiple-routes multiple-stages 
framework of repetition priming in person recognition. Contrary to this framework of 
repetition priming in the domain of objects, larger emphasis is given to algorithmic-based 
processing, compared to memory-based processing. In fact, rapid response learning 
represents only a late comparison level that corroborates or inhibits an already facilitated 
response for repeated stimuli. Given that a comparison can take place only when the to-be-
compared elements are both active, the main effect of facilitation can only speed-up the 
slowest process, in the specific algorithmic-based processing, to allow interaction with the 
fastest process, in the specific memory-based processing. In such a case the interaction due 
to rapid response learning can increase or decrease priming due to facilitation in perceptual 
and conceptual networks. The secondary role of rapid response learning in priming is 
further supported by the evidence that facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks 
occurs even after a single presentation while rapid response learning needs multiple 
stimulus presentations to be effective. Other experimental factors like task and contiguity 
of study and test phases seem to be unnecessary for rapid response learning. 
 
This interpretation of the model can account perfectly for all behavioural results of 
the series of experiments reported in this thesis. Priming is greatest (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 6, 
7, 8, 9) for stimuli primed by identical task instruction because of maximum facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks, and positive effects of interaction at response stages 
and classification stage. Priming is reduced but still significant (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 
8, 9) for stimuli primed by reversed categorical cue because maximum facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks benefits only from stimulus-classification binding but 
not from stimulus-response binding, because decision and action retrieved from memory-
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based processing mismatch decision and action obtained from algorithmic-based 
processing. Performing a different task, as in across-task condition, (Experiments 7-8) can 
cause a reduction of conceptually driven priming and abolishes any facilitation at 
classification stage, resulting in smaller priming compared to the within-task conditions, 
but the priming effect is still significant because of data-driven and partial conceptually 
driven priming. Significant across-task priming is further modulated by comparisons at 
response stages that enhance or inhibit priming, resulting in a congruency effect. 
 An important and new aspect of this framework for priming in person recognition is 
the differential dependency of algorithmic-based and memory-based processing from 
number of repetitions at study. Memory-based processing, that manifests itself mostly as a 
stimulus-response effect, requires multiple stimulus presentations at study to be 
behaviourally relevant; on the other hand, facilitation in perceptual and conceptual 
networks is significant even after a single presentation (Experiments 4-5). As an aside, it is 
useful at this point to underline that stimulus-response effects and congruency effects 
result from the same interaction at response stages, and the use of two different terms to 
refer to the same effect seems inadvisable; for future studies the term congruency effect is 
suggested to describe the consequence of interaction at response stages both within and 
across tasks. 
     
The general picture of priming in accuracy in the present series of experiments is less 
clear than for response times. Higher noise in accuracy data could be the consequence of 
not excluding trials with inconsistently correct responses. The use of similar methods in 
other studies of rapid response learning justified this approach to analysis of accuracy data.  
In general repetition of a stimulus leads to greater accuracy in responding to primed 
than unprimed stimuli in identical task instruction condition, regardless of how many times 
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the stimulus was presented at study, for both occupation and nationality judgement 
(Experiments 2-9) but not in height judgement (Experiment 1). In the reversed task 
instruction condition, although the gain in accuracy is generally positive (except 
Experiment 7), priming is significant in some experiments (Experiments 2, 3, 4, 8) but not 
others (Experiments 1, 5, 6, 7, 9). The absence of any regularity makes the interpretation 
of the different trends of priming results difficult. A similar problem was observed in the 
stimulus-response effect in accuracy analysis: the stimulus-response effect was significant 
in some experiments after multiple presentations of stimuli (Experiments 2, 6, 9) but not 
others (Experiments 1, 3, 5, 8), though never after a single presentation (Experiments 4, 5). 
This last result further supports the idea that multiple presentations of stimuli at study are 
necessary for rapid response learning, but not much else can be concluded from within-
task analysis of accuracy. More interesting are the negative and positive priming effects on 
accuracy in the across-task condition due to congruency of responses: this effect is clear 
evidence of a benefit/cost interaction at response stages. Given that priming was generally 
positive (but sometimes not significant) in all, except one, of the within-task conditions it 
can be hypothesised that interference due to response stages is masked by facilitation from 
conceptually driven priming or stimulus-classification binding; the presence of positive 
priming after a single presentation of stimuli seems more in line with facilitation in 
conceptual networks. 
 
LRP and ERP give further support to the multiple-routes multiple-stages framework 
for person recognition. LRP analysis showed that stimulus-response binding was activated 
for all repeated stimuli supporting the existence of memory-based processing. ERPs were 
affected by stimulus repetition, but priming history had an additional impact on ERP for 
repeated stimuli: these independent effects of repetition on stimulus-response effect were 
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interpreted as networks facilitation and rapid response learning, respectively. In summary, 
the electrophysiological results are consistent with multiple-routes multiple-stages 
framework in which stimulus-response bindings are automatically activated and interact 
with the output of tuned stimulus processing; evidence for interference, but not benefit, 
was also obtained.     
 
The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework is nothing more than an expansion of 
Burton’s (1998) model of person recognition. Perceptual and conceptual networks are 
supported by a route that pre-activates some classification and response codes beyond 
conceptual networks when stimuli are repeated more than once: such pre-activation can 
favour or impede preparation of task specific response. It is important to underline that this 
alternative route is mostly utilized after multiple presentation of stimuli at study, but when 
a stimulus is presented once only component processing is accessible and no interaction 
takes place at response stages. Therefore the predictive power of Burton’s (1998) model 
for priming after a single repetition is further enhanced by the incorporation of stimulus-
response and stimulus-classification bindings to account for rapid response learning when 
stimuli are presented more than once at study.  
Although the present series of experiments advances consistently our understanding 
of priming for person recognition, additional studies are needed to directly explore the 
influence of classification codes on priming, and specifically whether interaction at this 
level produces only facilitation or also inhibition. This question has important 
consequences for understanding the often reported absence of data-driven and 
conceptually driven priming in the domain of objects (see next paragraph). Another point, 
not investigated in the present thesis is the stage at which stimulus processing retrieval of 
bindings occurs. According to many studies in the domain of object recognition, the 
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stimulus-response effect is significant even for different exemplars or for different format 
of stimulus, indicating that rapid response learning is not specific to a stimulus but 
generalizes to the identity of the stimulus. In addition, a replication of ERP and LRP 
results seems necessary to provide further support for the effect found and reduce noise in 
the signal to increase analysis sensitivity, particularly with regard to LRPs onset latencies. 
A design that emphasizes interference would be preferable; and the across-task condition 
seems more suited to such an investigation. 
 
The multiple-routes multiple-stages framework proposed here for person recognition 
differs from the one proposed by Horner & Henson (2009) for object recognition in two 
ways: 1) larger emphasis is given to facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks 
compared to rapid response learning and 2) rapid response learning seems to be more 
dependent on the number of stimulus repetition. The absence of net priming across tasks in 
object recognition requires a re-evaluation of the impact of networks facilitation in object 
recognition. Presenting the same stimulus at study and test does not produce significant 
data-driven priming, or, alternatively data-driven priming is masked by interference at the 
classification stage. The idea that data-driven priming is less important for object 
recognition than face recognition could be a consequence of the fact that judgements for 
people are based mostly on the identity of the individual person, while judgements for 
objects are based mostly on the category, instead of the specific stimulus. Person 
recognition requires the identification of persons within the category, for example, 
recognition of a familiar face among other faces. Object recognition usually does not 
require such individuation of objects; it rather involves identification of the object 
category, such as chair or house. Testing whether data-driven priming in object recognition 
is stronger in a task that required individuation of an object within the category is an 
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interesting investigation for future studies. An example of such task in object recognition 
could be the classification of cars according to manufactory nationality. On the other hand, 
some results provide support for facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks even in 
object recognition. Amnesic patients did not present rapid response learning but show 
significant priming regardless of how many times a stimulus is presented at study and 
regardless of task instruction performed at study (Schnyer et al., 2006): this is a clear 
indication of a form of facilitation that is not affected by inversion of the task or number of 
stimulus repetitions: both characteristics are important for rapid response learning but not 
for networks facilitation. Larger modulation of priming than stimulus-response effect due 
to change of exemplar or format of a stimulus (Horner & Henson, 2011b) is more plausible 
according to data-driven priming than rapid response learning. In addition evidence of 
networks facilitation was found both in fMRI and EEG: BOLD and electrophysiological 
signals were modulated by repetition of a stimulus regardless of the study context, these 
effects are contrary to rapid response learning but in agreement with networks facilitation. 
The dependency of rapid response learning in object recognition on multiple 
stimulus presentations at study is a property often suspected but never stated clearly. 
Although, the stimulus-response effect was significant in some studies (for example see 
Dew & Giovanello, 2010b) after long presentation times, the influence of rapid response 
learning after a single study presentation has been always smaller than the influence after 
multiple presentations, and sometimes the former has not been significant.   
 
7.4 Conclusion: Multiple-routes multiple-stages framework for person 
recognition 
 
Burton’s (1998) model of person recognition, and its precursor by Bruce and Young 
(1986), has accounted for and predicted repetition priming in person recognition, and its 
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explanatory power is not under discussion, particularly after single stimulus repetition at 
study. The present thesis, however, presents strong evidence that a memory-based route 
should be incorporated into the model to account for repetition effects specific to multiple 
stimulus presentations. The outputs of memory-based and algorithmic-based processing 
interact to facilitate production of previous response if correct and to inhibit expression of 
a previous response if incorrect. It should be noted, however, that repetition priming is not 
the exclusive product of this interaction but is significantly modulated by it.  
Repetition priming in person recognition is mainly the effect of facilitation in 
perceptual and conceptual networks, but after multiple encounters with a stimulus, this 
facilitation is modulated by rapid response learning.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Response times for consistent responses to a primed stimulus across study and test 
phases, even if consistently incorrect, were analysed. Only 41% of primed trials had 
consistent responses (the percentage was 31% when only consistently correct responses 
were considered). Responses to primed stimuli were significantly faster than those for 
unprimed stimuli regardless of categorical cue at study: for the identical-question condition 
(RTs for primed stimuli: M = 830, SE = 20), t(39) = 12.53, p < .001; for the reversed-
question condition (RTs for primed stimuli: M = 916, SE = 20), t(39) = 9.35, p < .001. 
The stimulus-response effect was strongly significant, t(39) = 3.01, p = .004: 
facilitation was 52 ms (SE = 17) larger for the identical-question condition compared to the 
reversed-question condition. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases were 61.9% (SE = 0.8) for the first 
presentation, 63.7% (SE = 1.0) for the second presentation and 63.5% (SE = 0.9) for third 
the presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 2.12, ps < .034; however there was no change in 
performance between the second and third presentations , z = 0.10, p = .922. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases were 1066 ms (SE = 26) for the first 
presentation, 909 ms (SE = 22) for the second presentation and 833 ms (SE = 20) for the 
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third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time were significantly 
faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 157 ms, SE = 15), t(39) = 
10.55, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a further significant 
decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 76 ms, SE = 11), 
t(39) = 6.69, p < .001.  
 
Experiment 2 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases were 74.1% (SE = 1.8) for the first 
presentation, 78.4% (SE = 1.6) for the second presentation and 80.1% (SE = 1.5) for third 
the presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 3.90, ps < .001; however there was only a trend 
toward a significant change in performance between the second and third presentations , z 
= 1.80, p = .071. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases were 965 ms (SE = 29) for the first 
presentation, 774 ms (SE = 27) for the second presentation and 713 ms (SE = 23) for the 
third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time were significantly 
faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 192 ms, SE = 13), t(39) = 
13.81, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a further significant 
decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 61 ms, SE = 11), 
t(39) = 5.63, p < .001.  
 
Experiment 3 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases were 73.7% (SE = 1.2) for the first 
presentation, 77.1% (SE = 1.1) for the second presentation and 77.5% (SE = 1.1) for third 
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the presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 3.71, ps < .001; however there was no change in 
performance between the second and third presentations , z = 0.59, p = .557. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases were 1023 ms (SE = 23) for the first 
presentation, 802 ms (SE = 18) for the second presentation and 737 ms (SE = 17) for the 
third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time were significantly 
faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 221 ms, SE = 14), t(39) = 
15.35, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a further significant 
decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 65 ms, SE = 5), 
t(39) = 11.22, p < .001.  
 
Experiment 6 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases were 76.0% (SE = 1.1) for the first 
presentation, 79.3% (SE = 1.1) for the second presentation and 80.9% (SE = 1.1) for third 
the presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 4.05, ps < .001; gain in accuracy was 
significantly larger for third than second presentation , z = 2.73, p = .006. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases were 962 ms (SE = 25) for the first 
presentation, 765 ms (SE = 21) for the second presentation and 720 ms (SE = 19) for the 
third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time were significantly 
faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 197 ms, SE = 10), t(39) = 
19.80, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a further significant 
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decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 46 ms, SE = 8), 
t(39) = 5.60, p < .001.  
 
Experiment 7 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 
86.4% (SE = 1.1) for the first presentation, 89.4% (SE = 0.8) for the second presentation 
and 89.7% (SE = 1.0) for the third presentation. Performance was significantly higher for 
second and third presentations compared to the initial presentation  zs > 3.34, ps < .001; 
however there was only a trend toward a significant change in performance between the 
second and third presentations , z = 1.23, p = .220.  
 
Mean response times in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 947 ms 
(SE = 24) for the first presentation, 752 ms (SE = 22) for the second presentation and 696 
ms (SE = 23) for the third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time 
were significantly faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 196 ms, 
SE = 12), t(47) = 15.51, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a 
further significant decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 
55 ms, SE = 8), t(47) = 6.64, p < .001.  
 
Results had a similar trend in the across-task condition. Mean accuracy percentages 
in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 80.4% (SE = 1.4) for the first 
presentation, 83.4% (SE = 1.2) for the second presentation and 83.7% (SE = 1.2) for the 
third presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 2.70, ps < .007; however there was only a trend 
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toward a significant change in performance between the second and third presentations , z 
= 0.49, p = .624. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 1024 ms 
(SE = 27) for the first presentation, 797 ms (SE = 24) for the second presentation and 721 
ms (SE = 22) for the third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time 
were significantly faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 228 ms, 
SE = 14), t(47) = 15.92, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a 
further significant decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 
75 ms, SE = 14), t(47) = 5.35, p < .001.  
 
Experiment 8 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 
76.8% (SE = 1.6) for the first presentation, 80.8% (SE = 1.3) for the second presentation 
and 80.6% (SE = 1.4) for the third presentation. Performance was significantly higher for 
second and third presentations compared to the initial presentation  zs > 3.83, ps < .001; 
however there was only a trend toward a significant change in performance between the 
second and third presentations , z = 0.90, p = .928.  
 
Mean response times in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 1026 ms 
(SE = 29) for the first presentation, 801 ms (SE = 26) for the second presentation and 724 
ms (SE = 23) for the third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time 
were significantly faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 225 ms, 
SE = 11), t(47) = 19.11, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a 
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further significant decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 
77 ms, SE = 7), t(47) = 9.78, p < .001.  
 
Results had a similar trend in the across-task condition. Mean accuracy percentages 
in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 85.5% (SE = 1.1) for the first 
presentation, 86.7% (SE = 1.5) for the second presentation and 87.5% (SE = 1.4) for the 
third presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 1.86, ps < .063; however there was only a trend 
toward a significant change in performance between the second and third presentations , z 
= 1.09, p = .274. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases of the within-task conditions were 973 ms 
(SE = 29) for the first presentation, 772 ms (SE = 24) for the second presentation and 697 
ms (SE = 20) for the third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time 
were significantly faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 201 ms, 
SE = 15), t(39) = 12.92, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a 
further significant decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 
74 ms, SE = 10), t(39) = 7.15, p < .001.  
 
Experiment 9 
Mean accuracy percentages in the study phases were 87.2% (SE = 1.4) for the first 
presentation, 89.2% (SE = 1.2) for the second presentation and 88.9% (SE = 1.3) for third 
the presentation. Performance was significantly higher for second and third presentations 
compared to the initial presentation  zs > 2.70, ps < .007; however there was only a trend 
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toward a significant change in performance between the second and third presentations , z 
= 0.05, p = .958. 
 
Mean response times in the study phases were 1000 ms (SE = 32) for the first 
presentation, 816 ms (SE = 31) for the second presentation and 745 ms (SE = 30) for the 
third presentation. Responses to stimuli presented for the second time were significantly 
faster than responses to stimuli presented for the first time (M = 184 ms, SE = 15), t(23) = 
12.26, p < .001; moreover, presenting a stimulus a third time lead to a further significant 
decrease in response times, compared to the second presentation (M = 70 ms, SE = 8), 
t(23) = 8.17, p < .001.  
 
